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Abstract
This study explored the relationship among competition, regulation and stability in the
Sub-Saharan Africa region commercial banks. This was targeted at better banking sector
management for economic growth at a time when the region is contending poverty and
underdevelopment. We implemented this with three distinct objectives, namely; the com-
petitive condition of SSA region commercial banks using Lerner index, the relationship
between competition and stability applying Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and Gen-
eralised Method of Moments (GMM), and the interplay among competition, regulation
and stability using Panel Structural Vector Autoregressive (P-SVAR) model and Struc-
tural Equation Modelling (SEM). The study covered a 10-year period from 2006 to 2015
for a panel of 440 banks; data were collected from 37 countries using Bankscope. We
provide evidence consistent with a monopolistic competitive commercial banking market.
We also found that competition is detrimental to the stability of banks in the region unless
it engenders efficiency. In addition, evidence shows that variations in capital regulation
among other regulatory variables employed, has the largest impact on the stability of the
commercial banking sectors of the SSA region. While there is no short-term relationship
found between capital and competition, results suggest that although stability responds
instantaneously to competition, most of the impacts of competition on stability are trans-
mitted via efficiency. Overall, the results show that regulation has a direct influence on
competition and has direct and indirect influence on stability, while competition directly
and indirectly influences stability. The study reveals that the direct influences are partially
mediated by competition as all the paths permitted to be fitted by model fit criteria were
found to be significant. Therefore, we conclude that, SSA banking sectors are competitive
with strong structural relationship among competition, regulation and stability. Among
others, we recommend policies that will sustain and improve the existing competition level
while ensuring a balancing act as a decision affecting a variable in the structure will si-
vi
multaneously impact on the others. We contribute to extant literature in the following
ways; we estimated bank level competition with larger number of SSA countries; we iden-
tified some banks specific factors that determine competition in the banking sectors of the
region; we highlighted major risks for consideration in stimulating the regions banking
sectors’ competition; we measured the extent of efficiency that is associated with com-
petition using SFA and established a transmission from competition to stability through
efficiency in the region’s banking sectors. In addition, we addressed ways of managing
competition, regulation and stability using short run analysis and proposed competition,
regulation and stability (CRS) model, and pioneered the application of P-SVAR and SEM
in this study area.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Competition, regulation and stability are key components in normal banking business.
Maintaining a competitive banking environment without compromising the stability of
the system is difficult. This is the situation policy makers and regulators in the financial
system of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have found themselves in. The region desperately
needs to grow her economies, build infrastructure, grow and process her own food, indus-
trialise and advance in technology, among others (Watkins, 2014). Such growth requires
a stable, efficient and a competitive banking system that will stimulate capital formation
and distribute funds for optimal application in the economies. The right form of banking
requires the right regulations/reforms which have enormous cost implications. However,
these costs are not as high as the costs that can be incurred if the banking system fails as
a result of non-regulation.
The tale of Africa is that of a continent endowed with enormous wealth yet wallowing
in abject poverty, with the better proportion of the population suffering amidst plenty.
Growth burgeon by the rich mineral and natural resources makes headline in the media.
Unfortunately, as an acceptable measure of progress, this is a far cry from ultimately
transforming the well-being of the people. Figure 1.1 below shows clearly this level of
disparity. While in the past decade, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has averaged 5% growth
rate (Figure 1.1a) with rising average income (Figure 1.1b), poverty indices have as well
exacerbated. Figure 1.1c shows average SSA as very poor with mean daily consumption
below the poverty line. As a result, most of SSA’s poor are far from the US$1.25 daily liv-
ing threshold (Figure 1.1d). Although poverty rate varies per country as shown in Figure
1.1e, the mapping of poverty in million per country as presented in Figure 1.1f indicates
1
that several millions of people live in penury with Nigeria leading the charade.
(a) Decades of growth rate (b) Per capital income growth
(c) Population living below poverty line (d) Population below US$1.25 threshold
(e) Poverty rate per country (f) Poverty mapping, million
Figure 1.1: Africa Developmental Indices
Source: Africa Progress Panel Report, 2014
In order to reverse the ugly trend, the region has to be completely transformed. However,
a number of obstacles have to be overcome, namely; lack of access to formal finance, weak
infrastructure and lack of fund for public investment. Surmounting the problem of access
to formal finance is in fact consistent with the arguments of the proponents of supply-
leading hypothesis (Ang, 2008; Beck, 2013; King & Levine, 1993; Levine, 2005; Patrick,
1966; Schumpeter, 1911, among others) that highlight the importance of financial sector
for economic development.
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Hence, the agitation for crafting policies that will increase competition in the banking
sectors of the region. Competition is good, but as has been argued, has its attendant chal-
lenges that could cause financial instability. Caution must then be applied such that the
success of increasing competition to achieve access to finance would not mean a problem
of instability that will in essence erode the gains of access to finance. The preoccupation
of this study is therefore not how competition brings about access to finance, but rather,
on the investigation of the implication of competition for stability and how they could be
managed by exploring the interplay among competition, regulation and stability in SSA
banking sector.
Attempting to make the best of competition without compromising the system’s stability
is a herculean task. This has elicited arguments in academic research and is particularly
a flashpoint for practitioners and regulators alike. Moreover, it could be a lot more chal-
lenging coming from the background of an underdeveloped banking and financial system.
1.1 Background of the Study
Competition has attracted attention in banking and finance literature for decades. An
extensive body of theoretical and empirical studies has reported the significant role of
bank competition in ensuring access to finance (Chen, Ma, & Song, 2010; Clarke, Cull,
& Peria, 2006; Love & Per´ıa, 2014; Mudd, 2013; Rice & Strahan, 2010; Tan, 2013), effi-
ciency of the banking system (Mlambo & Ncube, 2011; Ningaye, Mathilde, & Luc, 2014;
Pasiouras, Delis, & Papanikolaou, 2009; Pruteanu-Podpiera, Weill, & Schobert, 2008) and
bank stability (Ariss, 2010; Beck, De Jonghe, & Schepens, 2013; Fu, Lin, & Molyneux,
2014; Schaeck & Ciha´k, 2014) in any economy. Competition is good for many reasons; it
is an essential force in any economy and encourages firms to be more efficient and pro-
vide better allocation of resources. In banking, efficiency should entail lower costs, which
should be passed to bank customers in the form of lower bank charges, higher deposit rates
and reduced lending costs (Casu, Girardone, & Molyneux, 2015). Essentially, competition
in banking improves access to finance, increases overall competitiveness in other sectors of
an economy, fosters innovation, enhances quality, widens consumer choice and promotes
economic growth (Leon, 2015b).
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The banking sector the world over has witnessed significant transformation overtime. The
outputs of banks in providing various financial intermediation services are now being pro-
duced using fewer but more sophisticated inputs, due to deregulation, globalisation, finan-
cial innovation and technological advancements (Tan, 2013). This implies that banking
technical efficiency has improved remarkably in the world’s financial system. Notwith-
standing, a number of financial instabilities in banking systems have also been witnessed
arising from moral hazards and agency conflicts among the market players in keeping with
the pace of the competition in the system. This has immensely impacted on systemic
stability that resulted in financial crises in South East Asia, 1997; Latin America, 1994;
Russia, 1998 and most recently the 2007-2009 world financial crisis. This has prompted
regulators and stakeholders to call for a rethink of bank regulation (Casu et al., 2015).
Consequently, this has increased the level of regulation of banking especially in terms of
their capital base (Basel Accords) which saw various countries’ regulators adjusting and
readjusting their banking sector capital bases to meet the growing challenges facing mod-
ern banking.
This study draws on industrial organisation theory of banking competition, efficiency
structure theory, theory of contestability, competition-stability views and other empirical
work to examine the competition, regulation and stability (CRS) nexus in sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) commercial banks. Economic and financial indicators suggest that SSA is
underdeveloped (Jacobsen & Nielsen, 2014; Mbeki, 2005) with financial institutions not
supporting the much needed growth as shown in Table 1.1 below. Efforts to stimulate a
competitive banking environment via regulation brought about by various reforms have
not yielded desired results of efficient banking systems with low operating costs, low in-
terest rate spread and high access to finance, among others. Statistics provide quite a
conflicting picture of stability of SSA banking sectors as available data suggests that they
are solvent with high profitability, yet with high incidence of non-performing loans. Al-
though there is existing literature on the relationship between regulation and competition
as well as competition and stability, such studies are scarce in SSA. Hence the motivation
of this study to conduct a SSA investigation that could establish relationship among com-
petition, regulation and stability for financial and economic policy implication.
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SSA is underdeveloped and faces critical infrastructural challenges. Moreover, countries
in this region share similar features in terms of the nature of their economies. This study
captured all SSA countries as far as data could allow. Consideration for data includes
availability and integrity as most of the countries have been engrossed in long term eco-
nomic and political crisis and, in some extreme cases crisis of war, that have resulted in
prolonged banking crisis in the decade covered by this study. However, South Africa was
excluded from among the SSA countries because of her more advanced and sophisticated
banking system (Allen, Otchere, & Senbet, 2011; Senbet & Otchere, 2006) to avoid struc-
tural imbalance in the panel data analysis.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides a general
outlook of the banking system of the SSA region which sets out why the study is impor-
tant to SSA at this time. This is followed by the problem to be studied and the aim and
objectives of the study. These are followed by the scope and/or delimitation as well as
the contribution of the study. Next are the conceptual and theoretical frameworks of this
study. Finally, is the structure of the thesis.
1.1.1 SSA Banking System
The SSA financial system is largely bank-based1 with grossly underdeveloped capital mar-
kets (Abdelkader & Mansouri, 2013). The financial and banking systems in SSA countries
remain underdeveloped and laced with inefficiencies. The banking systems are highly
concentrated, in some cases dominated by foreign owned banks, and generally inefficient
at financial intermediation (Mlachila, Dykes, et al., 2013). In terms of concentration; for
instance, in Nigeria the six largest banks held over 90% of the total banking assets in 2015.
Likewise, in Angola five banks account for the total assets of the sector, in Botswana four
banks account for 85% of banking assets, and 10 banks for 80% of banking assets in Tan-
zania (Mlachila, Park, & Yabara, 2013). These figures provide a snapshot of the market
structure of SSA banking sectors. In most cases, a concentrated banking system is char-
acterised by banks charging uncompetitive high prices for loan and low prices for deposits
as currently is the case in most banking sectors of SSA. Concentration gives banks con-
siderable amount of market power while the banking public faces limited choices of banks
1A bank based financial system is one that has dominance of banking system. An economy requires a
well-developed capital and money markets for an inclusive financial system
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and banking products. Hence, efficiency gets eroded and customers’ welfare compromised
in the absence of competition.
Table 1.1: SSA Countries Finance Indicators Table
List of Countries EG SVG BCPS LIR IRS NPLTL RQ DWCB BFCB CBB
Angola 3.9 22 12.6 16 12.5 10.9 –1.2 609 20 12.9
Benin 5.4 0.7 18.7 –0.4 155 3.3
Botswana 4.4 3.9 23.8 9 6.5 3.6 0.6 671 191 9.5
Burkina Faso 4.1 0.8 17.3 –0.2 112 2.3
Cameroon 5.9 2.7 11.2 18.1 11.1 –0.8 65 20 1.9
Central AR 1 8.3 18.1 –1.2 56 0.9
Chad 7.3 4.4 18.1 –1 9 1
Coˆte d’Ivoire 9 2.4 15.5 –0.8 4.7
Djibouti 5.5 0.1 26.3 13 11.5 11.5 –0.6 130 59 5.6
Equatorial Guinea –3.1 6.1 18.1 –1.4 336 28 6.5
Ethiopia 9.9 12 18.1 8 31.8 –1.2 137 2 2.9
Gabon 4.3 2.4 10.7 18.1 9.1 –0.5 230 108 10.4
Gambia –0.2 0.1 12.4 29 12 –0.4 8.8
Ghana 4.2 3.5 13.9 13.8 –0.1 459 6.1
Guinea –0.3 0 4.6 19 –1 63 16 1.9
Guinea Bissau 2.5 0 5.4 –1.1 60 2.6
Lesotho 2 0.4 13.3 10 7.6 2.5 –0.6 329 65 3.6
Liberia 0.5 0 9.6 13 9.6 –1.3 9 3.7
Malawi 5.7 0.5 10.6 44 31.1 –0.5 237 3.2
Mali 7.2 1.4 19 –0.4 153 5.4
Mauritania 6.4 1.3 22.3 17 11.2 32.7 –0.5 111 48 6.9
Mauritius 3.6 1.4 79.8 9 1.7 4.8 0.7 24.2
Mozambique 7.4 0.8 18.1 15 6.2 7.3 –0.4 60 4.1
Namibia 4.5 1.8 46.7 9 4.5 2.4 0.1 834 245 12.8
Niger 6.9 0.6 9.4 –0.6 42 1.5
Nigeria 6.3 44.1 17.2 17 7.2 15.2 –0.9 648 31 5.6
Rwanda 7 10.3 17 23.5 –0.5 160 33 4.1
Senegal 3.9 1.5 24.1 17.1 –0.2 149 4.6
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Table 1.1: (continued)
List of Countries EG SVG BCPS LIR IRS NPLTL RQ DWCB BFCB CBB
Seychelles 2.8 0.2 22.5 12 9.3 5.8 –0.6 1655 226 54.8
Sierra Leone 7 0.1 4.5 19 12.8 20.8 –1 173 16 2.9
Swaziland 2.5 0.3 20.7 9 6.5 7 –0.5 465 111 5.8
Tanzania 7 4.2 9.8 16 6.4 8.8 –0.4 20 2.3
Togo 5.7 0 21.1 –0.8 169 4.6
Uganda 4.5 2.5 10.6 22 10.7 4.2 –0.1 187 19 2.9
Zambia 6 6.4 9 12 3.7 12.5 –0.5 39 5
Continental Average 3.3 8.2 20.8 15.1 10.2 11.7 –0.8 283.8 45.9 7.5
Sources: World Bank, IMF, AFDB, Transparency International, theglobaleconom.com
and Author’s computations. Where EG is Economic growth as @2014, SVG, savings in
$ (2004–2014), BCPS, bank credit to private sector as a % of GDP (2004–2014), LIR,
lending interest rate as @2014, NPLTL, nonperforming loans to total loans (2004–2014),
IRS, interest rate spread as @2014, DWCB, depositors with commercial banks per 1000
adults as @2014, BFCB, borrowers from commercial banks per 1000 adults as @2014,
CBB, commercial bank branch per 100,000 adults, as @ 2014, RQ, regulatory quality
(2004–2014).
Moreover, most of the banking sectors are relatively small in size and characterised by
low loan to deposit ratio. The largest share of assets of most SSA banks is held in the
form of government securities and liquid assets rather than financing the real sectors of
the economy with deposits mainly government patronage. According to Mlachila, Dykes,
et al. (2013) lending is typically short term in nature with about 60% of loans having a
maturity of less than a year. Access to finance is among the lowest in the world which
is an obstacle to enterprise growth, (WBDI2). Domestic credit to private sector as a per-
centage of GDP averages only about 20.8% (as shown in Figure 1.2), in contrast to East
Asia and Pacific countries which average above 90%, as shown in Figure 1.2 below. A
survey by the African Progress Panel in December 2014 revealed that two-thirds of adults
in SSA do not have a bank account, let alone access to savings and credit. According to
2World Bank Development Indicator
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the same report, the SSA banks branch to population ratio is just 3 to 100,000 adults,
which is less than half of the level obtainable in South Asia and most other regions of the
world, (Figure 1.2). A report by FinScope on East Africa in 2014 showed that over 50%
of the population in Tanzania and Rwanda and 30% of Kenya and Uganda are excluded
from any formal financial services. According to Africa Economic Outlook report (AFDB,
2015) only about 2% of Burundian population have a bank account. This poses a major
problem of access to finance and growth of real sectors of the economies, given an undevel-
oped capital market with commercial banks holding more than 80% of total banking assets.
High cost of operation is prevalent, which implies high interest rate spread and high
service fee level. Interest rate expense averaged over 30.5% in 2014 (with Madagascar,
Malawi, Uganda and Gambia reporting as much as 60%, 44%, 22% and 29% respectively,
(Table 1.1 above), while overhead cost to total bank assets in SSA ranks among the high-
est in the world. Interest rate spread is also among the highest as indicated in Figure 1.2
below, and currently in the region of 17% in a number of SSA banking systems. Its con-
sequence is devastating on the performance of loan to private sector for which the average
of nonperforming loans (NPLs) as a percentage of total loans over the last decade stood
at 20.8%, 17.1%, 32.7%, 31.8% and 23.5% in Sierra Leon, Senegal, Mauritania, Ethiopia
and Rwanda respectively (Table 1.1). This is the highest compared to other regions of the
world.
In spite of the forgoing, SSA has relatively very profitable banking system as measured
by return on equity (ROE) which is in excess of 20% in Angola, Zambia and Mozam-
bique, 17.4% in Ghana and Tanzania, and average of 10.4% in West Africa Economic and
Monetary Union (WAEMU) (Allen, Otchere, & Senbet, 2011; Mlachila, Park, & Yabara,
2013). The banking sectors in SSA are well capitalised with most of the banks having
their capital base in excess of the 10% minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR). Capitali-
sation plays a significant role in the stability of SSA banking sector. The various reforms
implemented post 1980s and 1990s financial crises may have contributed to the relatively
stable SSA banking system as only the Nigerian banking system was hard hit in SSA with
the 2007-2009 financial crisis that ravaged the world’s financial system. Despite that, the
increased number of banks following reforms and high level of inefficiency have continued
to raise the question of stability resulting in a number of recapitalisation programs across
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(a) Interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit
rate, %)
(b) Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans
(%)
(c) Commercial bank branches (per 100,000 adults) (d) Domestic credit to private sector by banks (%
of GDP)
Figure 1.2: SSA Selected Banking Competition Features Compared with Rest
of the World
Source: Author’s Estimation from WDI, IMF and AFDB
borders in SSA.
SSA banking sectors witnessed significant reforms which were majorly undertaken in the
80s and 90s, as shown in Table 1.2 below. The main thrust of these reforms was the removal
of credit controls, establishment of new refinancing policies through interest rate liberal-
isation, consolidation and strengthening of the framework for prudential management,
privatisation of state owned controlled banks, and deregulation (Senbet & Otchere, 2006).
In addition, the reforms also included writing-off NPLs, improved governance, financial
sector supervision, recapitalisation and restructuring. These reforms which were relatively
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similar and mostly linked across SSA countries were introduced to enhance banking sys-
tems’ stability by increasing the efficiency of banks and promoting competition within
the banking system. Despite all these efforts, not much has been done in complying with
international regulations in which compliance to Basel II is limited let alone Basel III
(as shown in Table 1.3 of subsection 1.8.4 below). Nonetheless, the region has witnessed
increased stability; its systemic failure has reduced considerably overtime compared to
other regions of the world (Mlachila, Dykes, et al., 2013). But how this can be held up on
the region raises a big question in the wake of rising NPLs and the different vulnerabili-
ties that individual countries faced as will be seen later in Chapter 2. Moreover how the
regulations have impacted on the level of competition in the light of low financial inter-
mediation, high operating costs, among others is another dimension that this study seeks
to unravel. More so that the African continent has the history of non-compliance to rules
and regulation as evidenced in the quality of their regulations, as shown in Table 1.1 above.
Table 1.2: Banking Reforms in SSA Region
Reform year liberalisation restructuring privatisation recapitalisation
Benin - 1989 - - -
Botswana 1991 1991 - - -
Cameroon - 1990 - 1998 -
Coˆte d’Ivoire - 1989 - 1999 -
Gambia - 1986 - - -
Ghana 1983 1988 1989 1997 2009
Kenya 1989 1991 - 1989 -
Madagascar - 1994 - 1999 -
Malawi 1987 1988 1990 - -
Mauritania - 1990 - - -
Mauritius 1983 1993 - - -
Namibia 1992 1991 - - -
Nigeria 1987 1987 1990 1992 2004
Tanzania 1985 1991 1991 1994 -
Uganda 1987 1988 - 1996 -
Zambia 1991 1992 - - -
Zimbabwe 1991 1991 - 1997
Sources: World Bank privatisation database
Given this background, the African Progress Panel (APP) (Watkins, 2014) opine that
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coming up with policies and regulations that will engender a well-managed, robust and
competitive banking system will improve the economic situation of SSA countries. More-
over, competition-stability views envisaged that a competitive banking system will correct
the issues of high operational costs, high interest rate spread, low financial intermediation
and their associated costs as well as bring about a stable banking system. However, the
trade-off between competition and stability have to be borne in mind in the desirability
of a competitive banking system because the recent financial crises have been blamed on
excessive competition and deregulation (Fu et al., 2014). It is on this note that this study
is proposed with particular focus on commercial banks in SSA banking sectors as com-
mercial banks hold in excess of 75% of the total banking sectors assets (Allen, Otchere, &
Senbet, 2011). It tests the competition and stability relationship in SSA banking sectors
and analyses the role of regulation in effectuating competition and stability in the banks.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Banking competition brings about a stable and an efficient banking sector where there is
access to finance, low charges and moderate interest rates spread (Ariss, 2010; Chirwa,
2003; Freixas, Rochet, et al., 2008; Kouki & Al-Nasser, 2014; Mugume, 2008). However,
service charges and lending rates are extremely high with meagre deposit interest rates
in SSA banking sectors (Mlachila, Park, & Yabara, 2013). Moreover, high NPLs threaten
the stability of the banks in the region. Despite some of the efforts to regulate the sector
these problems have persisted. High costs of banking and lending rates are being identified
as factors militating against banking sectors’ financial intermediation role. Consequently,
service charges are high, financial intermediation is low and high interest rate spreads stifle
investment and savings, curtailing the efficient operation of banks in this region, hence their
inability to finance SSA countries’ developmental goals. These pose enormous challenge
to policy makers of addressing competition in banking without sacrificing stability of the
sector and require empirical investigation for resolution. This study thus aims at analysing
the interaction among regulation, competition and stability in the SSA region commercial
banks to explore ways of stimulating competition in banking sectors to support economic
growth without incurring the curse of financial system instability that could result from
banks fragility owing to excessive competition.
11
1.3 Aim of the Study
Given the above background, the aim of this study is to evaluate competition in SSA
banking sector and how it brings about stability of the banking system in the light of
regulations. This will be achieved with the following three specific objectives leading to
three complementary papers.
1.3.1 Specific Objectives
The specific research objectives of this study are to;
1. Measure the degree of competitiveness of the commercial banking sectors in SSA
countries.
2. Investigate the effects of competition in the banking sector on the stability of banks
in SSA countries.
3. Analyse the relationship among competition, regulation and stability within SSA
banking sectors.
1.4 Research Questions
This study attempts to provide answers to the following questions in order to actualise
the objectives set out in this study;
1. Is SSA region commercial banking sector competitive?
2. What is the effect of competition on the stability of commercial banks in SSA region?
3. Is there a relationship among competition, regulation and stability of commercial
banks in SSA region?
1.5 Research Hypotheses
It is necessary to test the following hypotheses to provide answers to the foregoing questions
that were posed to achieve our study objectives.
1. Hypothesis one: Given the statistics that abound about how concentrated the bank-
ing sectors of SSA region are, we do not expect the commercial banking sector of
this region to be competitive. Hence the first hypothesis of the study is that;
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• H01 SSA region commercial banks are not competitive.
2. Hypothesis two: models of competition and stability around the world have been
inconclusive and polarised between two opposing groups, namely, the competition-
stability view and the competition-fragility view. Most of the works on these models
have been carried out in developed economies where banks are highly developed and
sophisticated. The competition-stability view expects an efficient banking for com-
petition to bring about stability. Due to the underdeveloped and less sophisticated
nature of the banking systems in SSA region, the study does not envisage an efficient
banking system and as such supports the competition-fragility view. To this end,
the hypothesis for answering the second question will be;
• H02 Competition causes instability in SSA region commercial banking sectors.
3. Hypothesis three: The main reason for reforms or regulation in the banking industry
is to encourage competition and ensure stability of the banking system. Regulation
is thus expected to directly and simultaneously influence both competition and sta-
bility. An indirect relationship is also expected to be transmitted from regulation to
stability through competition based on the subsisting relationship between compe-
tition and stability. These provide basis for the third hypothesis of the study, which
is as follows;
• H03 A relationship exists among competition, regulation and stability in SSA
region’s commercial banks.
The outcomes of these tests are expected to proffer solutions to the above questions and
ultimately the aim given the specific objectives enumerated.
1.6 Scope/Delimitation of the Study
The focus of this study is on competition, regulation and stability of commercial banks in
the SSA region. The study period spans over 10 years from 2006 to 2015. The choice of
2006 is largely influenced by data availability for most of the SSA countries being consid-
ered on the Bankscope database compiled by Fitch/IBCA Bureau Van Dijk. Data collected
were predominantly bank profile data and mainly from Bankscope to guide against incon-
sistencies while allowing comparison across countries’ different banks. The study focuses
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only on 373 out of the 54 countries that constitute the SSA region.
1.7 Research Contributions
This research is an attempt to empirically test the call by African Progress Panel, for
banking regulators to craft policies that will enhance competition in African banking sec-
tors as a means to unlocking African potential for growth and development. SSA region
is the most undeveloped region of Africa with the bulk of its population living in abject
poverty, hence it became the target for this research. The study contributes to the body
of knowledge in numerous ways. First, it contributes to extant literature by extending the
frontier of research in banking competition, regulation and stability nexus. It is the first
study to consider the trio in the study of banking in SSA. Second, this study uses a large
panel data set to consider competition-stability view for a wider range of SSA banking
sector than currently reviewed. Needless to say that no existing literature in this area has
focused on commercial banks that are the mainstay of the banking/financial sectors of the
region. It is the first time SFA will be applied to exogenously study the effects of com-
petition on stability, beside using the model to estimate the level of efficiency associated
with competition. Third, the relationship among competition, regulation and stability is
analysed in SSA commercial banking system for the first time and with P-SVAR. More-
over, we highlighted major determinants of competition as well as flashpoints in terms of
risks for balancing in policy permutation. The study succeeds in expanding the coverage
of competitive measure of SSA commercial banking sector. Above all, the findings suggest
that right polices targeting capital, liquid assets and the quality of assets of banks will
enhance competition without compromising the stability of the banking sector.
Furthermore, we propose Competition-Regulation-Stability (CRS) Model in Figure 1.3
below developed with SEM in Chapter 7 that explains the gap filled in this thesis. This in
addition to the P-SVAR model provides insight into the management of these phenomena
in the banking system of the SSA region. It is another first in the literature of competition
and stability in banking. We employed efficiency variable to mediate between competition
and stability. Overall, the Bank CRS model affirms that competition, regulation and sta-
bility can be simultaneously managed in the SSA banking sectors to optimise competition
3Excluded are countries considered as outlier either based on their level of development, data in-
tegrity/availability or they are war ravaged and are without functional banking sectors
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without compromising stability. It addresses the extent to which regulation enforcement
can impact on competition and stability. Through this model, the impact of competition
policies in the banking markets and how effectively it could be better evaluated and as-
sessed. Besides the paucity of some of these studies in SSA countries, it is the first time
to our knowledge that this model will be considered.
Figure 1.3: Bank CRS Model
Source: SEM Result (Chapter 7)
1.8 Description of Study Concepts
In this section, we describe the basic concepts used in this study.
1.8.1 Banking Overview
The role of the banking system in any economy can not be overemphasised. One could
devout ages attempting to underscore the place of banking in any economy. Since its
inception in the 17th century just as a warehouse for safekeeping of gold and silver for
merchants (Lewis, 1992), scholars, experts, business practitioners and academics alike have
come up with a deluge of theories, arguments, perspectives and perhaps, empirical evi-
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dence as to what indeed constitutes the roles played by banks in an economy. Depending
on which part of banking interests an individual, there is quite a lot to explore about
its significance. From the private sector perspective, a strand of literature sees banks as
‘information providers’ (Bhattacharya, 1998; Lewis, 1992), what they referred to as ‘social
accountant’ coming from the vintage position of banks’ access to confidential information
about their customers to whom they provide credit facilities. Another school of thought
also considers banks as ‘liquid insurer’ (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983), in other words, they
provide liquid assets to depositors with uncertain liquidity needs. Yet some other perspec-
tives focus on service banking, wholesale banking, multinational banking, and off-balance
sheet banking.
Banks provide financial intermediation, channelling funds from savers to borrowers by
offering loans, deposits and payment services; which enable them to function as size, ma-
turity and risk transformers. In other words, they mediate between the surplus and the
deficit units of the economy, thus, increase economic efficiency through promotion of bet-
ter resources allocation. Banks provide deposit services to savers and loan services to
borrowers. Depositors require the security of the amount deposited and want to be able
to get them on demand. Borrowers, on the other hand lack investment funds and rely on
the banks for liquidity. By bridging the surplus and deficit units gap, banks provide surety
to depositors of the safety of their liquid assets while making the liquid assets available
to the borrowers to leverage on in the form of long-term facilities4. In doing this, banks
also minimise direct lending cost such as transaction costs and information asymmetry.
Typically, deposits have characteristics of being highly liquid, low risk and small in size,
whereas loans are large in size, highly illiquid and of larger risk which without the banking
systems transformation could not have been useful to the parties. Banks thus make profit
by charging an interest rate on the loan that is higher than the ones they pay to depositors.
At the macroeconomics level, deposit liabilities form a major part of nations money supply
and are therefore very relevant to governments and central banks for the transmission of
monetary policies. Bank deposits create money5, which increases total money supply in
4Lenders will only allow a short term facility at highest possible returns, while borrowers want long-term
financing
5Credit multiplier = ∆deposits/∆reserves
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the economy. Undoubtedly, a sound banking system has the capacity to boost productiv-
ity and improve efficiency with which resources are allocated, providing wider access to
the real sector that makes it more productive, efficient and innovative, become more stable
and enhance economic growth. Overall, having the banking sector with high market power
could hamper the actualisation of all these important roles, as bank concentration could
increase intermediation costs, provide incentives for less savings and deposits, thereby
driving and rendering the banks inefficient and unstable.
1.8.2 Competition
Competition has been defined in a number of ways. It refers to rivalry among individual
business firms, organisations and the likes in pursuance of either market shares or issues
that are of common interest. Stigler (1957) defines competition as a rivalry between in-
dividual, group or nations and arises where two or more parties strive for something that
all cannot obtain. Vickers (1995) points out that rivalry encompasses all sorts of rivalry
–market trading, auctions, races, war of attrition, etc., – instrument of rivalry –prices,
advertising, research and development, takeover bids, effort levels among others–, objects
of rivalry –profits, market share, corporate control, promotion, prices, survival, etc., – as
well as types of rivals. Competition is considered imperative for firms’ efficiency beside
better resources allocation in any economy and for Beck (2008), it is a prerequisite for an
efficient banking system.
Competition in the banking industry, like any other industry can be categorised as either
perfect, monopolistic, oligopolistic or monopoly. Mankiw and Taylor (2006) described a
perfect competitive banking environment as one characterised by large number of banks
with identical products, and having low entry and exit costs. Banks here are price takers
as market forces determine prices. The main distinction between perfectly competitive
banking markets and monopolistic competitive banking market is that the later possesses
some control over price and/or product because of associated differentiated products. In
the case of an oligopoly market, there are few large banks that are interdependent with
significant control over price. At the extreme end is a pure monopoly banking market
with one bank that marks the absence of competition and the presence of absolute power.
Competition among banks promotes social welfare as its presence presumes efficiency
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that translates to lower costs passed on to customers in the form of lower charges, higher
deposit rates and reduced lending rates. However, specific banking features like; switch-
ing costs, information asymmetry, franchise and charter values, among others, mean that
conventional application of competition may not be admissible as the cost of potential
instability has to be weighed against the perceived benefits of competition. This is at the
core of this study.
1.8.3 Efficiency
Efficiency refers to the level of performance of a firm which could be viewed either in
relation to output or cost savings. In the former, few inputs are converted to optimal
production output while the later epitomise avoidance of excesses like waste to achieve
a desired outcome. Hence the classification as productive (technical) and economic effi-
ciency. Early insight into this field by Koopmans (1951) describes productive efficiency
as the point where further output can no longer be achieved without employing more
inputs or reducing production of some other outputs. On the other hand, economic effi-
ciency aims to achieve a given output at minimum cost, or use a given input to maximise
revenue, or allocate inputs and outputs to maximise profit (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2003).
Technical efficiency hence emphasises the ability to minimise inputs used in a vector of
output production or maximise output from a given input vector.
Productivity and efficiency are being used interchangeably but are however different. In
terms of production, the production frontier is a representation of the maximum attain-
able output of a firm from a given input. Thus reflecting the current state of the firm’s
technology. In the case of technical efficiency, when firms in an industry operate on the
frontier, they are technically efficient, otherwise, inefficient. This implies that firms oper-
ating inefficiently have the latitude further to the frontier without altering their inputs.
In banking, this is developed to measure an efficient frontier from which banks positions
are compared. Competition therefore forces banks to become efficient in their operational
activities in order to maintain a competitive advantage and outperform their rivals. As
Hicks (1935) argued, it makes managers to come out of their shelves. By implication,
an efficient banking system is characterised by lower costs resulting in a better financial
intermediation functions thereby culminating in lower charges to customers.
18
1.8.4 Bank Regulation
Regulation in banking encompasses the culmination of reforms, policies and practices that
are either enacted or otherwise and become the guiding rules for the proper conduct of
the system in the interest of the public. Bank regulation differs from country to country
across the world and in SSA countries. However, incidences of global financial malfeasance
Table 1.3: SSA Financial Sector Supervisory Standards
Accounting Standard Capital Adequacy standard Deposit Insurance Assets Classification
Angola National No Basel II yet No < 90 days
Botswana IFRS Basel II in progress No 90 days
Burundi IFRS Plan Basel II in progress No > 90 days
Cabo Verde IFRS Basel II in progress No < 90 days
CEMAC IFRS Plan No Basel II yet Implemented > 90 days
Comoros National Basel II in progress No N/A
Congo, Dem. Rep. National No Basel II yet No 90 days
Eritrea N/A N/A No N/A
Ethiopia IFRS Plan No Basel II yet No 90 days
Gambia IFRS Plan No Basel II yet No 90 days
Ghana IFRS No Basel II yet No 90 days
Guinea National No Basel II yet No N/A
Kenya IFRS Parts of Basel II/III Implemented 90 days
Lesotho IFRS No Basel II yet No 90 days
Liberia IFRS Basel II in progress No 90 days
Madagascar National No Basel II yet No 90 days
Malawi IFRS Basel II No 90 days
Mauritius IFRS Basel II No 90 days
Mozambique IFRS Basel II No > 90 days
Namibia IFRS Parts of Basel II No 90 days
Nigeria IFRS Basel II in progress Implemented 90 days
Rwanda IFRS Basel II in progress No 90 days
So Tom and Prncipe IFRS Plan Basel II in progress No N/A
Seychelles IFRS Plan No Basel II yet No 90 days
Sierra Leone IFRS No Basel II yet No 90 days
South Africa IFRS Basel III No 90 days
South Sudan National No Basel II yet No N/A
Swaziland IFRS No Basel II yet No 90 days
Uganda IFRS No Basel II yet Implemented 90 days
Tanzania IFRS No Basel II yet Implemented 90 days
WAEMU IFRS Plan No Basel II yet No > 90 days
Zambia IFRS No Basel II yet No 90 days
Zimbabwe IFRS Basel II in progress Implemented 91 days
Source: Montfort et al. (2016), Pg.41
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led to the birth of the Basel Accord with the first sets of standard regulatory principles
in 1989 to the latest in 2010. These have been accepted as the common best practices for
benchmarking sound operation of the banking sectors across with countries compliance
through reforms and acts of parliaments. Table 1.3 above provides overwhelming evidence
of greater non adoption of Basel Accords cum basic regulatory tenets and/or some in the
process of implementation in most of SSA banking sectors. Progress towards adoption of
the Basel’s capital adequacy standards has been slow and largely not encouraging. Need-
less to say that individual countries do strive to pursue regulations that aim to safeguard
the soundness of their banking system. Among the main components of the Basel Accord’s
pillars and by far the most targeted for regulation in banking are, capital, liquidity and
asset quality.
1.8.5 Capital Regulation
A bank’s capital implies the worth of its net assets, that is, total assets less total liabili-
ties. Often referred in practice as the sum of the paid-up capital and accumulated capital
reserves. The role of capital in banking or financial sector is a critical component of regu-
lation. It is important for the protection of depositors and the maintenance of confidence
in banks operations, including the underpinning long-term stability and growth. It has
been the major element in the pillars of the various Basel Accords and at the center of the
various regulatory reforms in various countries. Common measures of regulatory capital
in literature according to Casu et al. (2015) are total capital to risk-weighted assets, Tier
1 capital to risk-weighted assets and Tier 1 capital to total assets, also often referred to
in empirical studies as equity capital ratio.
1.8.6 Liquidity Requirements
Bank liquidity has serious implications for the credit market. It provides solvency shield
to depositors of lending institutions. Liquidity is a measurement of the capacity of banks
to respond to their cash and collateral obligations without any impediments on day-to-day
operations or risking financial solvency. The introduction of liquidity requirements in Basel
III in 2010 is considered one of its main innovations aimed at ensuring that sufficient high-
quality liquid assets are available for banks short-term survival without also neglecting
long-term bank resilience. There are various short and long term measures of liquidity in
literature that are contained in the liquidity ratio.
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1.8.7 Asset Quality
Asset quality ratio, also known as the loan loss ratio, measures the ratio of loan impairment
charge for the year as a percentage of loans and advances to customers. It relates to the
asset side of the balance sheet and is one of the most critical areas in determining the
overall condition of a bank. Asset quality has also become a critical component of the
Basel Accord, especially as it directly affects the earning capacity of banks. The primary
factor affecting overall asset quality is the quality of the loan portfolio and the credit
administration program.
1.8.8 Stability
Bank stability describes the soundness of the banking system while financial stability ag-
gregates the stability of key financial institutions and the financial markets in which they
operate. It precedes real resource allocation rational decision making for an economy’s sav-
ings and investments environment. Financial fragility6 is a displacement of the foregoing
resulting in an uncertain situation that causes resources misallocation including unwill-
ingness to contract inter temporally. This has upsetting economic and political effects
that makes the maintenance of a stable financial system the preoccupation of the financial
authorities.
Stability is often used interchangeably with risk in banking literature. But risks are a
culmination of exposures that impact on the soundness of the financial or banking sys-
tem hence a manifestation of instability. The obvious features of banks stability presup-
poses sufficient capital to absolve losses, and sufficient liquidity to manage operations and
volatility in normal periods. This is often driven by effective regulatory infrastructure,
micro-prudential surveillance and public confidence.
1.9 Underpinning Theoretical Review
This section deals with some of the underlying theories within the study area.
6Contagion and payments and settlements systems forms the channels for the spread of the fragility.
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1.9.1 Theories of Competition
The concept of competition was inspired by Smith (1776), who in his “Wealth of Nation”
analysed free competition as an ordering force towards equilibrium. He argued that in the
long run, free competition leads to prices being equal to the costs of production. Nonethe-
less, for Smith, competition is not a state or a situation but a race between competitors
to gain market share. It is rivalry that forces prices towards equilibrium of demand and
supply. An essential condition for free competition is not the number of rivals but rather
individual freedom.
This idea was subsequently developed into two major reviews of competition drawing
from the inspiration of Smith (1776); competition as a static state and competition as a
process of rivalry. Standard theory refers to the results of competition as a static equi-
librium outcome. According to this theory, competition is a static state in which firms
cannot overprice and earn abnormal profit. However, other economists, particularly the
Austrian school, criticised this static view and retained the central role played by rivalry
to define competition.
1.9.2 Competition as a Static State
Cournot (1838) was the first to relate free competition to the result of competition.
Cournot defined the ideal of competition not as the process that in the long run tends
towards a certain equilibrium position, but rather as the equilibrium position itself. Com-
petition is the situation where price equals the price of production. According to Cournot,
the excess of the price over cost approaches zero as the number of producers increases.
Bertrand in 1883 criticised this and posited that the relevant strategies for firms are prices
and not quantities. Further contributions by Morrison and Chamberlin (1933) and Robin-
son (1933) to the Cournot Oligopoly theory forms the bedrock of both structural and the
majority of non-structural measures of competition. These concept is however challenged
by another that focused on the dynamic aspect of competitive rivalry.
1.9.3 Competition as a Process of Rivalry
The Austrian school under Von Mises, Schumpeter and Hayek argued that the traditional
neoclassical economists misused the term competition by applying it to a state rather
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than a process. Competition is viewed not as a static state but as a complex process of
rivalry among firms. Therefore, the core of competition is the behaviour of firms in the
market. Firms engage in a continuous dynamic process, constantly creating and adopting
new products and processes in order to cope with competition. The competition process
act as a selection mechanism through the destructive-creation mechanism principles; less
efficient incumbents are removed and replaced by more efficient entrants.
According to the Austrian school arguments, a market is competitive when rivals are
sufficiently aggressive to give an incumbent incentive to improve in terms of better qual-
ity, improved management, etc., in order to maintain its advantage. Inefficient firms are
directly sanctioned by consumers while more efficient and innovative companies are re-
warded. The role of monopoly and market power is revisited in the Austrian perspective
that explained why firms are unable to raise prices over and above marginal cost in a
perfect market framework. For the Austrians, the existence of rent is a normal aspect of
the competitive process. In a free competitive market, each firms innovate and develop
risky strategies in order to gain a competitive advantage over its rivals. Firms that do ob-
tain such an edge temporarily derive static monopoly during the interval before imitating
competitors replicate their innovation or supersede it with a more superior one. Successful
firms earn temporary monopoly profits as their reward for risky strategies. As a result, a
free competitive market is compatible with market power and abnormal profit rates.
1.9.4 The Industrial Organisation Theory
The Chicago industrial organisation approach explains the market structure theory of
banking market and clarifies the issue of competitive pricing and market power in the
banking industry. They incline towards the view that many markets if not most, approx-
imate perfect competition in the long run, where positive profit is considered transitory
since their presence stimulate entry and hence their demise. This explains the effect of
banking market features on its equilibrium price and quantity. This approach considers
banks as intermediaries buying and selling deposits and loans with their respective tech-
nologies and hence prescribe the equilibrium in the banking sector on the basis of the
prevailing bank market competition (Freixas et al., 2008). Given the assumptions of per-
fectly competitive market, it argues that banks in this market must adjust their volume of
loans and deposits such that their intermediation margin equals their marginal manage-
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ment cost. Consequently, an increase in the price of deposit will decrease bank demand
for deposit and an increase in the price of loan will increase bank supply of loan. This
implies lower net interest margin and intermediation costs for competitive banks.
On the other hand, the Monti-Klein model of bank monopoly assumes entry barriers
may invalidate the perfect competition assumption in banks and therefore argues that an
imperfect competition like the oligopoly model is more appropriate,(Freixas et al., 2008).
It describes a monopolist bank as facing a downward sloping demand for deposits and an
upward sloping supply of loans given the banks decision variables such as amount of loans,
amount of deposits and amount of required reserved (assumed to be given). In addition
to a similar assumption as in perfect competition, monopoly banks profit only differs from
those of the competitive market by the influence of the quantity of loan and deposits on
their prices respectively. Therefore, bank profit under monopoly is the sum of intermedi-
ation margin on loan and on deposit less management costs. However, given the elasticity
of demand for deposits and the elasticity of supply of loans, monopoly banks profit max-
imisation is simply the adaptation to the banking sector of the familiar equalities between
Lerner index and inverse elasticity (Lerner, 1934). The greater the bank market power on
deposit and loan the smaller the elasticity and the higher the Lerner index. This leads
to the conclusion that intermediation margins are higher when a bank has a high market
power thus providing some background to competition and stability relationship consid-
ered in Chapters 4 of this thesis. Monopoly banks set their volume of loans in such a way
that the Lerner index equals inverse elasticities, consequently, intermediation margin will
adversely affect substitutes to banking products such as access by household to money
market for instance.
The Monti-Klein model, however, further argued for the adaptation of monopoly model
to imperfect competition between a finite number of banks representing a more accurate
description of reality. This explains the oligopolistic and the monopolistic competitive
version of the theory. Since the banking industry is not clearly controlled by a unique
firm, the practical relevance of the monopoly result could be questionable. The advocated
banking markets differ from monopoly in that there exist a number of banks on which the
sensitivity of loans and deposits pricing depend, this constitute a proxy for the intensity
of competition.
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1.9.5 The Theory of Contestability
The arguments of the Austrian school were revitalised by the Chicago school who argued
that many if not most markets tend to approximate perfect competition in the long run.
Hence, Posner (1979) posits that positive profits are only a temporal occurrence because
their existence arouses entry of many firms and hence leads to their exit. A neoclassical
formalisation of this idea was given by Perrakis, Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) in
the contestability theory. They argued that regulation is irrelevant in a constable market.
This is because, when the market is contestable, it satisfies the requirements of static
welfare maximisation and potential entry becomes a threat to incumbent market power.
The necessary conditions for a contestable market are (i) free entry with no limit; (ii)
absolute entry; and (iii) a perfectly reversible entry. In this market, monopoly power is
usually short-lived given the strength of market forces. The power of competition is then
linked to market contestability, as such unrelated to market structure.
The divergence between the two conceptions of contestability was clarified by Audretsch,
Baumol, and Burke (2001). They argued that the analysis remain static in the theory
of market contestability as the divergence from long run equilibrium is transitory and fo-
cuses on prices. The Austrian school, by contrast, argued that the normal functioning of a
competitive market is synonymous with disequilibrium and monopoly power. The reasons
why entrepreneurs innovate, or undertake risky market strategy as well as the evolution of
economics are however not explicable by the theory of contestability. The major contribu-
tions of the Austrian school in terms of dynamic analysis, non-price strategies, etc., were
discovered in subsequent development in industrial organisation literature. According to
Audretsch et al. (2001), the literature has moved beyond traditional static model and price
competition. He however admits that technical change which is the centre of the Austrian
dynamic competition is not captured in the evolution of industrial economics from static
to dynamic analysis.
Overall, these theories assumed a perfectly competitive market with free entry and exit
and the inherent efficiency. However, the existence of friction in banking markets (e.g. en-
try barriers, information asymmetry) causes the welfare theorem associated with perfect
competition not to be directly applicable, thus allowing room for the exercise of market
power. However, a healthy degree of rivalry is considered necessary for the dynamic effi-
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ciency of the sector; this is the principle that forms the basis of the trend towards fostering
greater competition in banking markets all over the world.
1.9.6 New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO)
Various attempts at empirically testing the foregoing theories have brought about a num-
ber of empirical models among which are; the structural models and the non-structural
models which are based on the traditional and the new industrial organisational theory
rooted in the competition as a static state.
The structural model was pioneered by Hicks (1935)’s quiet life hypothesis (QLH) that
says monopoly power encourages inefficiencies because it relieves managers from compet-
itive pressure and conclude that increased concentration reduces efficiency. This became
the first work to find a link between market structure and efficiency and has been further
interpreted as market power theories of structure-conduct-performance (SCP), the relative
market power and efficiency theory.
Proponents of the SCP hold the belief that concentration is anti-competition, reduces
collusion costs and results in excessive profit. The SCP market power hypothesis by
Bain (1956) linked concentration and entry barriers to margin and profit. This hypoth-
esis relates performance to firm structure and describes structure as being the number
of firms, size, entry condition, and concentration level while they relate performance to
profit, growth, market share, efficiency and market progress. Researches in banking have
used profit (return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE)), price (loan rate, deposit
rate) as proxies for performance; meanwhile, conduct was to be inferred by the nature
of firm structure as it was difficult to measure with structure impacting on performance.
Relative market power (RMP) using individual market share as proxy variable for market
power believes that large banks can exploit their market power to charge uncompetitive
high prices. Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall (1984) and Shepherd (1983) opine that per-
formance differences here can be explained by superior efficiencies.
The efficiency theory is often referred to as the efficiency structure hypothesis (ESH) and
is further categorised into x-efficiency (ESX) and scale efficiency (ESS). ESH proposed
an opposing argument to QLH, that more often than not efficiency is gained through
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size which in turn results in higher profits (Demsetz, 1973). ESH further postulates that
positive structure and performance relationship should not necessarily be attributed to
collusion forces but rather to efficiency. Larger firms tend to operate more efficiently, be-
cause efficient banks have lower costs which accounts for their high profits. Therefore, it is
efficiency that enhances high market share which eventually could result in concentration.
It can thus be argued that if all firms operate on the same level of efficiency, average profit
will be low. Similar to this is the ESS which emphasises economies of scale. It extends the
efficiency structure theory by attributing efficiency to better management and improved
technology which are believed to facilitate operation at a more efficient scale resulting in
lower unit costs and consequent high profit. As such, the ESS proponents argued that
more concentrated firm/banking sector will tend to be more profitable on the average with
higher market share. Efficiency theorist argued that regulation will penalise an efficient
firm, since it is assumed profit is associated with structure, whereas correlation between
concentration and profitability is the result of the underlying relationship between effi-
ciency and profitability.
The failure to measure conduct in the SCP is identified as the main weakness of the
structural model. Furthermore, empirical research based on SCP often found the antic-
ipated relationship between structure, conduct and performance as often very weak in
terms of statistical significance. Thus, questions whether concentration indicators can re-
ally be interpreted as a competitive behaviour motivated the non-structural model.
The non-structural model originated from the new industrial organisation literature which
is based on the empirical observation of conduct as a way to evaluate how firms set their
prices and quantities. The Lerner index discussed further in subsection 1.9.7 was proposed
by Lerner (1934) as a model for measuring bank level competition. Panzar and Rosse
(1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1987) developed a model of oligopolistic, monopolistic and
perfectly competitive market and derived a concise statistic known as the Panzar-Rosse
statistic or H-statistic to differentiate them. Their model assumes that market power de-
pends on the extent to which changes in factor prices reflect on revenue, in other words,
the relationship between firm level revenue and variation in factor prices of production.
Although it is based on the empirical observation of firms’ behaviour, it does not map into
a range of oligopoly concepts as robust as the Lerner index, and fails to incorporate long
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run structural adjustment, say Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras (2011).
Other non-structural models include conjectural variation approach (Bresnahan, 1982;
Iwata, 1974; Lau, 1982) which prescribes the extreme cases of perfect competition and
monopoly, where a monopoly has no rival and firms are too small to take notice of each
other under perfect competition. It is a model for determining market power based on
demand, cost and interdependence of market participants; it emphasises that firms should
take into consideration competitors’ reaction when setting prices and outputs. The degree
of competitiveness is measured based on the ability of any firm to charge its price above
the marginal cost, hence competition depends on the interdependence between market par-
ticipants. The more the market power the more the deviation from competitive pricing
and consequently the lower the level of competitiveness in the market. In another non-
structural bank competition modelling approach, Boone (2008b) developed a competitive
measurement indicator that has come to be known as the Boone indicator. The idea here is
to measure market power on the assumption that competition enhances performance. He
argues that relative profit difference thrives within a competitive environment that enables
an efficient bank (with lower marginal cost) to increase its market share and profit. Market
share is influenced by efficiency, which validates the efficiency structure hypothesis which
foregrounds the idea that the more competitive a banking sector is the better for efficient
banks while the less efficient ones get punished as their profits get eroded. It has been
faulted for ignoring bank size (Schiersch & Schmidt-Ehmcke, 2010) and assuming that effi-
ciency improvement will enable banks to increase market shares without decreasing prices.
Persistence of profit by Mueller (1977, 1986) which focuses on profit dynamics as a way to
measure the market power of banks is yet another non-structural model. He believes that
the extent to which a bank’s level of profit converge with the long run values reflects the
degree of competitiveness in the market. The slower the speed of adjustment the stronger
the persistence of profit then the more the market power. The standardised profit rate
is used as the measure which is the difference between firms actual profit rate and the
average industry profit for a given year. It proposes that if entry and exit are sufficiently
free to eliminate any abnormal profit, then all firm profit rate will tend to converge rapidly
towards the same long run average value. But where existing firms are able to prevent
imitation and/or block or perhaps delay entry, normal profit will persist year on year and
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difference in firms long run average profit may be sustained indefinitely. Among the high-
lighted models, the Lerner index is used in this study for its strength in estimating bank
level competition. The Lerner index is considered in the next subsection below.
1.9.7 The Lerner Index
The Lerner index is used as a competition measure in banking; it was the brain child of
Abraham Ptachya Lerner, a Russian-born British Economist, in 1934. In Lerner (1934)’s
work on the concept of monopoly and the measurement of monopoly power, the economic
implication of monopoly and its social cost are explained. He measured competition as the
inverse of elasticity of demand, describing it as the difference between price and marginal
cost divide by price, and representing the extent to which market power allows firm to
price above marginal cost (Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss, 2009).
The Lerner index theoretically derived its roots from static oligopoly theory. Assum-
ing a Cournot model in an industry with one product, such that P is the market price of
product Q and qi the quantity produced by firm i. Then firm i ’s profit can be maximized
given the following expression:
max
qi
[P (Q) qi − C (qi, ψl)] (1.9.1)
where qi represents production quantity by firm i, Q, aggregate production, i.e, Q =∑J
j=1 qi, P(Q) equals market price and C (qi, ψl) denotes the total cost with ψl the vector
of employed production factor prices by the firm. Lerner (1934) therefore proposes the
measure of market power, known as the Lerner index, as follows;
LIi =
P (Q)− C ′qi (qi, ψl)
P (Q)
(1.9.2)
where C
′
qi (qi, ψl) represents the marginal cost of firm i. The index ranges from 0 to 1 with
the extreme cases representing perfect competition and monopoly respectively.
The Lerner index has been appraised for locating competition between monopoly and
perfect completion (Rojas, 2011), reflect the role of elasticity of demand in determining
firms markup and the fact that firms competitive behaviour can be computed at any
point in time (Demirguc-Kunt & Per´ıa, 2010). Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) criticized it for
the difficulties in identifying the required data for computing price and cost on the bank
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balance sheets making proxies for them often debatable. Nonetheless, the Lerner index
is popular as a measure of competition in literature (Aboagye, Akoena, Antwi-Asare, &
Gockel, 2008; Amidu, 2013; Beck et al., 2013; Guevara & Maudos, 2011, among others),
and adjudged one of the best two measures of competition by (Liu, Molyneux, & Wilson,
2013b).
1.9.8 Banks Efficiency Framework
The Measurement of efficiency began with Farrell (1957)’s description of a simple firm
efficiency measure that is able to accommodate multiple inputs (Coelli et al., 2005). Farrell
(1957) classified efficiency of firms as technical and allocative efficiencies. The latter being
the optimal usage of input given price and technology. The combination of these two
makes up the measurement of economic efficiency measured in two basic approaches; the
input-oriented measure and the output-oriented measure.
Figure 1.4: Input-Oriented Measure Technical and Allocative Efficiency
Source: Coelli et al. (2005), Pg.52
For input-oriented measures, assuming a constant return to scale (CRS) with banks using
two inputs (X1 and X2), following the concepts of Farrell (1957), then banks technical
efficiency, TE, can be measured in Figure 1.4 with the Isoquant, SS’. Such that banks
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using quantities of inputs at P to produce a unit of output is technically inefficient to the
amount of input percent of QP/OP7.
Hence, banks TE is measured as;
TE = OQ/OP (1.9.3)
Since TE values range from 0 to 1, equation (1) is expressed as 1−QP/OP . Thus gives the
indicator of TE of a bank, with 1 denoting fully technically efficient bank corresponding
to point Q in Figure 1.4
Therefore, banks input-oriented TE measure is given in terms of input-distance function
δi(x, q) as;
TE = 1/δi(x, q) (1.9.4)
Where TE = 1 and δi(x, q) since fully technically efficient bank is on the frontier.
Given that banks’ cost (interest rates) of mobilising funds (deposits) is known, their cost
efficiency can be measured. Assuming n equals the vector of bank deposits (input) prices
and m stands for the observed deposit prices at point P in Figure 1.4, i.e., point of techni-
cal inefficiency, then mˆ and m∗ are input vectors associated with fully technically efficient
point Q ; and cost-minimising input vector, Q’, respectively.
Therefore,
CE =
n′m∗
n′m
= OR/OP (1.9.5)
where, CE is the cost efficiency.
Where the price of deposits, which is represented by the isocost line AA’ in the figure
is known, the banks allocative efficiency (AE) can be estimated using isocost line as;
AE =
n′m∗
n′mˆ
=
OR
OQ
TE =
n′mˆ
n′m
=
OQ
OP
(1.9.6)
Where RQ denotes the reduction in production cost given that production is allocativelly
(and technically) efficient at Q’, as against being technically but not allocativelly efficient
7Represents the amount the percentage by which input has to be reduced to be technically efficient.
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(AE) at Q.
CE is thus the combination of the measures as;
CE = TE ×AE = OQ
OP
× OR
OQ
=
OR
OP
(1.9.7)
Note that both CE, TE and AE range between 0 & 1.
The output-oriented efficiency measure is different from the input-oriented measure be-
cause it explores how to increase output quantities proportionately without varying the
input quantities used. The reverse is what input-oriented measure of efficiency is con-
cerned with. Again, given the CRS assumption, banks output-oriented efficiency measures
is modelled assuming banks production involves two outputs (q1 & q2) and a single input
(X). The unit production possibility curve ZZ’ in Figure 1.5 represents technology in two
ways, where point A stands for an inefficient bank.
Figure 1.5: Input-Oriented Measure Technical and Allocative Efficiency
Source: Coelli et al. (2005), Pg.55
Given that AB is technical inefficiency representing the quantities by which banks outputs
could be increased without additional input, then the output-oriented TE measure is given
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as,
TE =
OA
OB
= δo(x, q) (1.9.8)
Where δo(x, q) equals output distance function at observed input vector x and output
vector q.
Hence, revenue efficiency can represent any observed output price vector p defined by
line DD’ in Figure 1.5. The revenue efficiency (RE) is expressed as;
RE =
p′q
p′q∗
=
OA
OC
(1.9.9)
Where q and q∗ are observed output vectors of banks at point A and RE vector at point B’.
Assuming bank’s interest incomes on its loans and other outputs are known, then the
isorevenue line, DD’ defines the AE and TE measures thus;
AE =
p′qˆ
p′q∗ =
OB
OC
TE =
p′q
p′qˆ
=
OA
OB
(1.9.10)
Where qˆ TE production vector at B. For all total revenue efficiency measures;
RE = TE ×AE = (OA/OB)× (OB/OC) = OA/OC (1.9.11)
All measures range from 0 to 1.
Notice that in both measures, AE has been measured from cost-minimising and revenue-
maximising point of views rather than profit maximising which normally include the com-
bination of both perspectives which are accommodated in different ways using data envel-
opment analysis (DEA) or stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) that are both equally used in
literature (Balk, 1998; Chung, Fa¨re, & Grosskopf, 1997; Chung et al., 1997; Kumbhakar,
1987).
1.9.9 Bank Fragility
The assessments of fragility in the banking system is based on the two-sides of their state-
ment of financial position (balance-sheet). On the liability side, fragility is rooted in the
prisoners’ dilemma theory. This is predicated on Diamond and Dybvig (1983)’s argu-
ments of loss of public confidence in banks that result in bank run. The basis being the
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interaction between banks’ assets and liabilities maturity tenors, that is, short-term liquid
deposits and long-term illiquid loans. In principle, banks are stable without instantaneous
and simultaneous withdrawals by depositors of their funds. Where deposit is stable, banks
will possess adequate liquidity to cope with depositors withdrawal demands and still be
able to make a margin from investing excess liquid assets in high return illiquid assets
to offset fluctuations. Any disruption in this normal course of banking business normally
heightens deposits liquidation, in which case, all depositors move their funds. The conse-
quence is banks’ capital get eroded as they have to dispose their illiquid assets at losses
to meet withdrawals demand, resulting in failure.
On the assets side fragility usually results owing to the problems of asset quality aris-
ing from disaster myopia, herd behaviour, negative externalities and preserve incentives.
Knight (2009) explained disaster myopia as one whose possibilities of occurrence is an
unmeasured uncertainty with a risk that can not be understandably measured actuari-
ally. It is a situation in which financial disaster is viewed to seldom occur, such that it
is difficult if not impossible to employ actuarial probability to predict future occurrence.
Banks hence rely on financial authority to salvage such looming adversity especially where
it is quite big with monumental effects on the financial institutions. According to Davis
(1995), herd behaviour is a manifestation of irrationality or acting rationally in condition
of uncertainty. It relates to the different aspects of loan disbursement that become prob-
lematic. Customers are advanced loans not according to their credit worthiness but on
the reference that other banks have extended loans to them. Banks in most cases assume
that because of the involvements of many banks authorities will be inclined to bailout if
problems arise with loan disbursement. Perverse incentive occur where management tends
to behave less cautiously in financial decision making process because of preserve incentive
system. Ross (1973) viewed this as a principal-agent problem in which the structure of
management compensation scheme generates suboptimal management performance. In
negative externalities, banks increasingly transfer their decision making costs to their cus-
tomers. This occurs mostly in banking because of the relative meagre capital cushion to
its total assets compared to other industries.
Moral hazard is principally the cause of principal-agent problem and negative externalities
as information asymmetry explains more generally the bias leading to banking instability,
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aggravated by competition. Disaster myopia is often encouraged by market power such
that creditors failing to account for the worse outcomes of their loan-pricing decisions get
more competitive than those taking them into consideration, making the later either leave
the market or push price into line. Meanwhile, credit decision is not effectively disciplined
by the disadvantage of negative results because they disguise to influence the healthy
behaviour of credit disbursement. Imperfect information publicly available to creditors
makes it much more difficult for them to assess the strength of the banks compared to
those of other industries. The difficulty of assessment is perceived as indicative of the
fragility of the system as against other institutions with similar business structures.
1.9.10 Competition and Stability Models
Studies that have considered competition and stability align towards two strands of the-
oretical and empirical literature; competition-stability and competition-fragility views.
The competition-stability found that the efficiency that comes with competition helps to
stabilise the banking system. The fragility view, however, found that risk appetite is asso-
ciated with competition which results in instability hence advocated a considerable market
power. Put more succinctly, these two opposing hypotheses relate bank competition to
stability.
The traditional competition-fragility theory argues high competition in banking causes
banks to forfeit their market powers, culminating in declining profitability. Hence they
become aggressive to invest in riskier portfolios as a way to recoup the financial losses.
Therefore, the proponents of this view posit that this risk-taking behaviour will erode
banking system’s stability. On the contrary, the competition-stability theory emphasises
the potential positive effects that competition has for the stability of the banking system.
Accordingly, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) considering the assets side of banks’ balance
sheets argue that the risk-shifting effects of banks market power in less competitive mar-
ket is the ultimate cause of instability in banks as their loan portfolio riskiness rises.
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) concur with this view but however added that the
higher interest rate charged improve the bank’s profitability, that is, the margin effect
and, as such, presented a U-shaped argument in the competition and stability relation-
ship. As we would see further in Chapter 4, both theories and empirical evidence have
been conflicting and inconclusive on these arguments.
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1.10 Structure of the Thesis
There are eight chapters in this thesis. Chapter 1 has provided the motivation for the
study with the problems of the study, the research objectives, the contributions of the
study, and the conceptual and theoretical frameworks. In Chapter 2 is the review of the
financial sectors of the SSA region with particular attention to the features of the banking
sectors of the countries included in the study. Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 take an essay
form, each having their literature reviews, methodology and empirical analysis. Specifi-
cally, Chapter 3 assesses the level of competitiveness of the commercial banking sectors of
SSA region including determining some of the bank specific variables that influence the
level of competition. Chapter 4 presents the competition and stability relationship and
Chapter 5 the relationship between competition, efficiency and stability. Chapter 6 brings
competition, regulation and stability together in a short-term structural model analysis.
For robustness and for the purpose of model building, Chapter 7 modelled competition,
regulation and stability relationship and with a long run perspective. Chapter 8, the last
chapter, contains the summary, conclusions and recommendations. Limitations of the
study as well as suggested future research area are also included in this chapter.
36
Chapter 2
SSA Region Banking Sectors
Review
2.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter provided the background to the study, the motivation of the study,
the research problem and research questions. In this chapter, we provide an overview of
the financial sectors of the SSA Countries in order to provide further insights into the na-
ture of the banking systems in terms of competition and the nature of threats to stability
cum developments in regulations.
Similar to the trend across the globe, the banking systems in the SSA region have witnessed
some remarkable growth, especially in terms of total assets. Apparently, some banking
sectors in the region have however shown a much stronger level of growth than others
owing to continuous reforms and improved financial sector policies. Since the 1980s, fi-
nancial reforms in many SSA countries have significantly contributed to development and
efficiency of their banking sectors. As a result, bank credit to private sector has im-
proved, risk management of commercial banks has also improved and capital bases have
strengthened. Most SSA banking systems were resilient to the 2007/2009 global financial
crisis. Mobile banking expansion and the emergence of regional banking groups are among
the notable changing landscape of banking in the region, that are considered healthy for
competition in national banking sector although not without their attendant regulatory
and supervisory challenges. The reforms and economic growth not withstanding, most
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SSA banking sectors are still underdeveloped, with low and inefficient intermediation with
marked concentration. Hence, the region lags behind its world counterparts in terms of
financial depth and access. Meanwhile, provision of credit to the private sectors consti-
tutes the most important way that banks could support poverty alleviation strategies.
In terms of macroeconomics, there are striking similarities across countries of the re-
gion and especially within the notable subregional economies. The region has witnessed
remarkable economic growth in the past two decades, averaging in excess of 5% year-
on-year1, and still persisting with the exception of few countries like Nigeria and Chad
in recession. This growth was supported mainly by booming commodity prices as most
countries in the region are endowed with natural resources (IMF Report). This explains
why they are mostly vulnerable to external shocks and having to most times depend on
aids and remittances to fund their national budgets. Despite gains in economies, poverty
is widespread ranging from about 23% of national population in Djibouti to 85% in Liberia
except for Uganda and Mauritius that have less than 20% of their population living in
abject poverty at 19.3% and 8% respectively. Inflation figures have been relatively low,
averaging less than 3% among West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU),
less than 5% in Southern African Development Community (SADC) with the exception
of Botswana and Malawi which both account for over 10%, 5% in East Africa Community
(EAC) with Ethiopia having well above the subregional average while it is averagely high
among members of the Economic community of West African States (ECOWAS), in the
range of 6-17%.
The rest of this chapter reviews the current state of the banking system in the region
based on the countries considered in this study with the summary of the reviews pre-
sented in Appendix A.
2.2 Banking Sector by Country
This section attempts the review of the banking sector of the SSA countries whose banking
sectors are included in this study. Information used in this review were synthesised largely
from the reports, statistical databases and bulletins of AFDB, WDI, IMF, CIA-World
1Authors approximation of WDI, IMF and AFDB Statistical data
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Fact Book and the national statistical body of the respective countries.
2.2.1 Angola
Angola’s banking sector has grown in the past decade, witnessing the increase of com-
mercial banks from nine to 23 of which two are privately owned and three managed by
the state. The growth in the banking has been due to economic expansion and increasing
foreign interest that was fuelled by the peace accord and oil boom. The banking sector
is dominated by five largest banks holding in excess of 79% of the total banking sector
assets. Although credit to the private sector has been growing post war, it witnessed
decline during the 2007-09 crisis. Yet, fewer than 10% of the population have access to
banking facilities with unfriendly conditions not conducive for lending and having only
few businesses applying for loan facilities. Nonetheless, the profitability of the banking
sector is good with ROE consistently in excess of 20%, relatively low nonperforming loans
(NPLs) cum a well capitalised sector with capital adequacy nearly twice the minimum 10%
requirement by national regulation at above 19%. Even though the banking regulatory
environment is improving and embracing transparency norms, they are locally crafted and
not aligned to international regulations like the Basel Accord, International Accounting
Standard Board (IASB), among others.
The non-diversification from the oil dominance pose risk of exposure to bad loans to
banks as oil sector is linked to manufacturing and service industries such that any down-
side in the energy sector as witnessed in the global decline in the oil price may spell doom
for the banking sector. This has continually been the potential for instability for Angola’s
banking system that calls for urgent redress.
2.2.2 Benin
Benin belongs to the common central banking system of WAEMU, the Central Bank of
West African States (BCEAO). The financial system remains underdeveloped and vul-
nerable, curtailing credit to private sector with low quality of banks portfolio. This is
worsened by a weak business environment and financial infrastructure that limit lending
to private sector including a frail judicial system that is unable to defend contract enforce-
ment. Meanwhile, the banking system dominates the financial sector accounting for about
90% of the total assets as the banks total worth are up to 62% of GDP as at June, 2015
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(AFDB, 2015). There are 12 commercial banks in the country holding 12.4% of the total
assets of the sub-region’s commercial banking sector. Of the 12 banks, the four largest are
Pan African banks, one controlled by foreign holding company and three owned by Nige-
rian banks. The banking system is characterised by high interest rates with conservative
lending processes resulting in only few firms having access to credit. Furthermore, there
is high NPLs, currently at about 22% and above WAEMU’s average of about 17%. This
has resulted from their vulnerability to government lending. Government has huge arrears
due to the banks. Consequently, the liquidity ratio defined as the ratio of liquid assets
to short-term liabilities is as low as under 25%. Moreover, high operational costs in the
banking sector and heavy reliance on lending to government and their clients mean low
profitability; the ROE and ROA are currently estimated at about 2% and 1% respectively.
Capital adequacy ratio is just above the 8% minimum regional average at 8.8%. Stress test
by IMF reveals that the banking sector is facing credit risk concern stemming from poor
loan portfolio quality, vulnerability to external shocks and weak judicial system, among
others.
Despite no immediate threat of financial fragility, the increasing concern for credit risk,
shocks to terms of trade with trading partners, rising NPLs and weak judicial system that
could mean that the financial system is sitting on a time bomb. These have to be urgently
addressed for a viable and competitive banking system.
2.2.3 Botswana
Botswana’s economic success is not without a well regulated and developed banking sector
that is dominated by commercial banks numbering 11 at the end of 2014. According to
the IMF, commercial banks dominate the deposit market with an average of 98% market
share and account for 89% share of total sector loan over the past decade. The sector is
greatly concentrated, with four largest banks holding an excess of 81% of the total sector
assets. It is also well-capitalised as banks have to comply with a minimum of 15% capital
adequacy ratio and 7.5% minimum Tier 1 capital and as such have maintained capital over
and above these requirements with as high as over 20% in most cases over time. Tied to
this is that the banking system is highly liquid and thus supports the high credit growth
rate in the economy which even though sluggish in 2009 has since picked up. Moreover,
the banking system according to Dyke (2013) has a well-diversified credit portfolio with
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loans to private sectors accounting for 43% of the total credits in 2011, for instance. The
Botswana’s banking system is also considered profitable having return on equity prior to
2009 in excess of 40% per annum and in spite of the 2007/09 financial crisis effects was
19.1% in 2014. Furthermore, NPLs have declined after they peaked at 6.1% in 2010 to
about 2% in 2014.
The business-friendly environment and good governance notwithstanding, Botswana still
remains predominantly dependent on natural resources most of which remained untapped.
It is hoped that the growing competitiveness of the banking sector with its attendant
lowering interest rate may assist in further opening up the economy and enhance the
diversification and privatisation efforts of the government in these regards.
2.2.4 Burkina Faso
As one of the members of WAEMU having a common central bank, the BCEAO and com-
mon banking system, Burkina Faso’ financial system is dominated by commercial banks,
with 12 commercial banks and five financial institutions accounting for about XOF2,283
billion (approximately US$3.7 billion) which is 13.2% of the total assets of banks in the
region. The banks are dominated by multinationals and Pan African banks that holds over
90% of their total assets. Other notable features of the system include concentration as
the three largest banks own close to 50% of the sector total assets. The sector is also well-
capitalised with the ratio of regulatory capital to risk weighted assets estimated to about
12.4%. However, it is confronting exposure to exogenous shocks affecting the commodity
prices. This makes issues of stability a cause for concern even though asset quality has
improved with NPLs on the decline from 15.8% in 2008 to 10.2% in June 2016. There are
high interest rates, ranging between 10% to 12% as well as low access to banking services
put at 7% of the population despite reforms instituted in 2009 to decentralise the financial
system.
Notable challenges include ongoing exposure to external shocks arising from changes in
commodity export prices, vulnerability to fluctuations in rain, political instability in the
country and the sub-region and lack of export diversification including openness to inter-
national trade. All these put in perspective will continue to determine the well-being and
future of the banking sector in Burkina Faso.
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2.2.5 Cabo Verde
Cabo Verde has a small and established financial system with improved product and ser-
vice offering and banks at the forefront of high-tech banking practices. The financial
landscape is dominated by banks with little financial sector activities outside the banking
system. The banking sector itself is dominated by Portuguese private capital, consisting
of onshore markets of five commercial banks and offshore market with eight international
banking institutions out of which lending activities are concentrated in the three largest
banks. The banks are generally sound though susceptibility has worsened with the 2007/09
financial crisis. Onshore banks are well-capitalised as capital adequacy stood at 12% as at
2010, but liquidity remain low with liquid assets to total assets at 15.6%. Profitability and
asset quality also deteriorated in the wake of the 2007/09 financial crisis, evident in their
ROE and ROA in spite of high number of branches per 100,000. In addition, NPLs have
increased tremendously, rising from 10% to 13% in between 2008 and 2010; however, they
dropped to 5.5% in 2010-11. Credit to private sector has also declined, from an average
of 18% in the 2000s; it has been dropping since 2007 having peaked at 40% shortly before
the crisis. Credit to private sector then fell to 10% at the end of 2010, zero in 2013 and
even negative thereafter. This has been attributed to slow growth in both business and
consumer credit. The deceleration in credit to private sector coincided with decline in
economic growth.
Diaspora deposits2 account for 37% of total deposits of banks and growing over 5% year-
on-year for which the attraction has been high onshore interest rates. This makes banks
highly vulnerable to any destabilisation in such capital flow thus leave much for consider-
ation in this area.
2.2.6 Cameroon
Cameroon is a key player in the Central African Banking Systems accounting for over
US$6 billion in loans and advances. Specifically, Cameroon to date has 13 licensed com-
mercial banks with foreign banks subsidiaries dominance (mainly from Europe and other
Africa countries) that represent 38% of the total bank assets in the Economic and Mon-
etary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) (AFDB, 2015). Besides the commercial
banks, there are 500 micro-finance banks with other four specialised financial institutions.
2Deposits by citizens abroad
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The banking landscape is highly concentrated with the three largest banks accounting for
over 50% of the share of the loans and deposits markets and holding more than 70% of
the banking sector total assets. Banking loans market has witnessed growth in the last
few years which average over 35% as a result of increased borrowing by companies partak-
ing in public investment projects. Yet, there is low banking penetration as according to
Mlachila, Park, and Yabara (2013), less than 5% of adults has access to formal financial
and/or banking services. This outlook becomes more glaring as commercial bank branch
per 100,000 adults was 1.9 in 2014.
There is rising concern of financial fragility in the banking sector as stress test by IMF
shows that less than 50% of banks in Cameroon comply with solvency ratio requirements
with capital shortfalls as a percentage of GDP amounting to 45%, as capital requirement
continues to decline and number of banks maintaining less than the minimum capital re-
quirement increasing. These raise questions for concern on the level of stability of the
banking system that also borders on gross non-compliance with prudential guidelines.
IMF reports indicated that two banks violated on large exposure in 2009, increased to
four and nine in 2010 and 2011 respectively. This increased the spate of fragility coupled
with undiversified credit risk that is concentrated in the country’s national oil refinery.
The position is also worsened by weak enforcement of creditors right that has exacerbated
the risk of lending to the private sector, leading to rising level of NPLs with increasing
number of banks facing insolvency resulting in the surge of the loan loss provisioning that
has recently increased up to 97% of gross NPLs. This is also reflected in the quality of
assets with the consequent impacts on ROA that have declined considerably down from
1.1% in 2007 to 0.8% in 2014, even though ROE increased from 12.08% to 21.8% in the
same period, with high interest rates spread in excess of 8% (AFDB, 2015; IMF, 2016).
Liquidity as an average of liquid assets to total assets is in excess of 35%, explained by
low loan to deposit ratio that is grossly below 50% with more than 75% of lending at the
short-term end of the market.
Government launched the Central Africa Cashless Interbank Group (GIMAC) in 2012
to deal with financial services access. However, the challenges of a weak regulatory frame-
work and the absence of viable restructuring plan to solve high incidence on NPLs still
subsist.
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2.2.7 Central Africa Republic
CAR has the smallest financial system among the members of CEMAC. The financial
system is underdeveloped and plays a limited role in supporting economic growth in the
country. It comprises four commercial banks, 11 microfinance institutions (MFIs), two
insurance companies and a social security fund. With the absence of capital market, the
financial system is dominated by the banking sector with commercial banks holding 93%
of financial sector total assets representing 2% of CEMAC region total banking assets
(AFDB, 2015). Banking activities are inhibited by weak market infrastructure, zero legal,
judicial, prudential and regulatory framework. Economic and security challenges limit
access to financial services concentrating bank branches and infrastructure in the capital
city. Consequently, financial intermediation is among the lowest around the world aver-
aging 11% of GDP over the study period with only about 1% of the population having
a bank account and 0.5% with an outstanding credit facility; in addition to low banking
penetration with high interest rates at over 15% in the study period. These translate to
poor credit portfolio as ratio of NPLs to total loans is over 30% with provisions in the
region of 52%. This credit exposure is worsened because lending is mainly to the public
sector and at the short-term end of the market.
The landlocked geographical location, highly unskilled labour, poor transportation sys-
tem, legacy of misdirected economic policies and political insecurity have continued to be
the bane of economic and financial development. There is an urgent need to improve access
to credit by putting in place legal and judicial system to serve commercial needs, increase
capital and reduce NPLs as well as diversify credit portfolio that currently concentrate in
the public sector to reduce sovereign risk exposure of banks.
2.2.8 Chad
The financial system of Chad is among the least developed in the CEMAC region; weak,
limited in depth, with low monetisation and having total assets amounting to 12% of
GDP which is less than the CEMAC average of 19% (AFDB, 2015). The financial system
is dominated by commercial banks, consisting of eight commercial banks, two insurance
companies, two pension funds and over 200 MFIs. The total assets of the commercial
banks account for 6.5% of CEMAC region banking total assets with XAF497 billion in
assets (approximately US$0.8 billion. The banking sector is as well concentrated with
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three foreign commercial banking owning over 65% of the total assets of the sector. The
banking system has improved overtime, as a result of the reforms undertaken in the 1990s
to streamline lending practices and improve NPLs volumes. The reforms also saw the pri-
vatisation of three largest government owned banks. Marred by informal financial services,
limited regulation and supervision, the banking sector offers a limited range of financial
products with most loan at the short-term end of the market. Resulting in low financial
intermediation resulting in limited access to financial services as on the average over the
study period, only about 2.1% of adults are bank depositors and just 0.3% are banks
borrowers. Although payment and clearing mechanism as well as loan reporting are fairly
developed, vulnerabilities still remains in the system arising from insufficient on-site su-
pervision, high credit concentration, lack of depth, fragility and judicial system disorder.
Fragility is largely due to government oil related risk, being almost the sole banks’ client
either directly or indirectly in the country.
Poor credit portfolio is a major exposure of the banking sector in the Chadian economy
that must be addressed with relevant regulations and reforms that will enhance diversifi-
cation.
2.2.9 Coˆte d’Ivoire
Coˆte d’Ivoire’s financial system is quite competitive consisting of 23 commercial banks,
72 credit unions and financial cooperatives and 10 microfinance institutions (MFIs). The
sector is dominated by a sound banking system, although the post electoral crisis in 2011
affected its operation; during which all foreign banks were closed. Despite this setback,
the banking sector is still the largest in WAENU accounting for 27.3% of the total assets
of the sub-region’s banking sector. Banks, which are either foreign subsidiaries of French
and Nigerian banks or owned by the government and other investors are expanding in
networks with branches up at 600 in 2014 from 473 in 2010 (AFDB, 2017). The banking
sector is regulated by BCEAO, concentrated with the four largest banks holding 48.8% of
deposits and 56.9% share of the loan market. The banking assets grew 15.4% year-on-year
in 2011 up from the previous growth rate of 12% in 2007, however, credit to the economy
declined from 51.7% to 46.0% within 2010 and 2011 due to post election crisis that also
saw an increase in NPLs that rose by 58.7% year-on-year in the same period. Estimates
reveal that 64.8% of total loans are in the short-term end of the market, deposits serving
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as the main source of funding grew to 74.4% in 2011 from 70.9% in 2010. The banking
system also experienced stable interest rates due to pegging of CFA franc to Euro that
has saved the impact of fluctuation in currency on the interest rates. As a result, interest
rates spread is consistently moderate at 3.3% as at 2011. Banks are also relatively well-
capitalised with capital adequacy ratio at 13% in 2011 but remain exposed to credit risk
arising from bank’s reluctance, NPLs and legacy issues, making provisioning to be high at
64.5% in 2010 for instance. Coˆte d’Ivoire’s banking sector is profitable but the profitability
is fluctuating due to NPLs and competition from new entrants; ROE was about 10.8% in
2010 up from 4.8% in 2007.
The regulatory environment indicates weak compliance with prudential banking regula-
tion requiring more resources to be allocated to banking supervision (World Bank, 2017).
Moreover, there is need to push for a sound credit risk management framework given
the high rate of NPLs. Other challenges still remain; political fragility, lack of collat-
eral and good credit assessment framework limiting access to finance by small businesses
and individual that required credit. Furthermore, the absence of credit reference bureau
to evaluate borrowers and share credit information worsens credit market and heightens
NPLs.
2.2.10 Djibouti
Djibouti has a shallow financial system, without a capital market and is dominated by
commercial banks. It is important to note that the banks represent the growing propor-
tion of the financial sector contribution to GDP. The banking sector is concentrated with
11 commercial banks of which two largest banks account for about 85% of total deposits.
Access to finance is enhanced by money transfer services that are currently expanding
due to policy directed at opening up the banking sector to facilitate loan provision while
improving financial intermediation (World Bank, 2017). Besides, entry of foreign financial
institutions put together, pushed domestic credit to reach 20% in 2011 of which credit
to private sector constitutes over 80%. Banks remain profitable as the policy of account
holding is increasing deposits post 2007/09 financial crisis. Lending increased even though
still limited as the ratio of credit to deposit rose to 41.6% in 2009 from 29.5% in 2006.
However, lending faces high exposure because enforcement of right of creditors is weak
including the absence of comprehensive Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures on po-
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tential and existing customers. This makes commercial banks loan portfolio to deteriorate
with rising NPLs estimated at 22% as at June 2015.
Continuous exposure to external shocks in addition to weak corporate governance and
judicial procedures for enforcement of contracts constitute a major exposure for the banks
with the absence of capital market unable to complement banking sector’s capital forma-
tion drives.
2.2.11 Equatorial Guinea
The country’s financial system is small, relatively underdeveloped with fairly limited cap-
ital market but sound. The constraints of limited access to finance, low consumer credit
facilities and high interest rate spread hinder entrepreneurial activities. The banking sec-
tor dominates the financial system with four commercial banks that represent about 16%
of total CEMAC banking assets and are mainly subsidiaries of international banks (AFDB,
2015). Ongoing development in the sector with the collaboration of government hope to
enhance issues of access to finance. The banking sector is characterised by high interest
rates spread that have curtailed access to credit facilities (IMF, 2016). As at 2011 only 30
of 1000 adults are bank borrowers when as much as 259 of 1000 are depositors of bank.
Notably, recent competition in the banking sector has largely driven down real lending
rates.
The major source of exposure of the banking system is that lending is targeted at govern-
ment contractors and public infrastructural projects which are at the short-term end of
the market. Moreover, the reliance on oil has continued to make the economy vulnerable
to external shocks each time there are issues with global oil prices.
2.2.12 Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, public banks account for 67% of the total assets and 55% of the total loans
and advances of the financial system of the country that is underdeveloped but now grow-
ing in leaps and bounds. It is dominated by the banking sector that is domesticated
with no foreign participation. By 2013 there were 19 commercial banks, 16 of which are
privately owned with government owning the largest bank. The largest commercial bank
is the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) representing 70% of the sectoral total asset
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as at 2012. The banking sector is generally sound but with excess liquidity and plagued
with most of the issues that bedevilled the regional banks, that include, a weak regulatory
framework, poor financial infrastructure, an absence of product diversification and low fi-
nancial education (World Bank, 2017). Financial intermediation is as well low having one
bank per about 40,000 people in 2013-14; which indicates poor access to finance. Mean-
while, the 2005 IMF Financial Sector Capacity Building project, meant to improve the
bank balance sheet and credit to the private sector, has to some extent addressed some of
the issues, as ratio of NPLs improved considerably from 20% in 2010 to 10% in 2011 with
an average increase in private credit and financial assets.
The financial system is largely unliberalised as it runs a close system with government
owned banks dominating the landscape. The implication is grievous for competition in
the system that may hamper the much desired development including the potential expo-
sure of the banking sector.
2.2.13 Gabon
The financial sector in Gabon is shallow and characterised by low financial intermediation.
It is dominated by the banking sector that is predominantly commercial banks. There are
nine commercial and one development banks that represent 21% of the total banking assets
of CEMAC. The composition of the commercial banks indicate that two of the nine are
owned by the state. The banks are highly concentrated with three largest banks holding
about 80% of sectoral total assets (AFDB, 2015). There is also limited access to finance
given that 131 per 1000 hold a deposit account while 73 out of 1000 are bank borrowers.
Although the banking system is highly liquid, credit is limited with high interest rates and
short-term repayment terms when companies seek for loans plus the fact that banks are
extremely prudent in granting loans resulting in low lending activities.
Hence, the potential for the growth of banks is constrained coupled with the small size of
non-oil sector component of the economy as the oil sector is financed by large syndicates
of international banks.
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2.2.14 Ghana
Ghana’s financial system consists of 26 commercial banks, 135 rural community banks and
49 non-financial institutions including; savings and loans, leasing and mortgage firms as
well as 402 credit unions and financial cooperatives among other informal deposits tak-
ing outfits. Out of the 26 banks, 11 are locally owned. The top five banks control the
markets share with 45.6% of industry assets, 29.0% of loans and 43% of deposits as at
2011 (Mlachila, Dykes, et al., 2013). Banking total assets grew at an annual rate of 28.2%
within 2007-11 so that by 2011 the total assets stood at US$13.39 billion as a result of
economic expansion, emergence of oil and gas sector and regulations driving capital raising
programs. The growth in assets however was not matched by credit as the ratio of loan
to total assets declined over the same period from 52.4% to 38.5% and by 2016 growth
in credit to private sector slowed from 36.3% in 2015 to 9.0%. According to IMF report,
financing opportunities on the local market are limited due to the high interest rates on
bank loans, which are generally higher than 25% given that the bank average lending rate
was up to 32.7% as of June 2016, from 27.5% in the same period in 2015. However, widen-
ing interest rates spread has increased interest income as deposits continue to dominate
the funding of banks, for instance, ratio of deposit to total assets increased from 66.0% in
2008 to 74.3% in 2011. Asset quality declined considerably during the 2007/09 financial
crisis that saw an increase in NPLs from 6.4% to 16.8%, caused mainly by defaults from
indigenous private enterprises. This has elicited increased loan loss provision standing at
7.9% in 2016 from 5.1% of gross loans the previous year. Banks remain solvent despite the
declining quality of assets with capital adequacy ratio increasing from 14.8% to 19.1% dur-
ing 2001-10 while ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets remained 16% even as
at 2016 which is over and above the national minimum requirements of 10% (IMF, 2017).
This is not without the recapitalisation efforts undertaking within the last decade in the
banking system. The conservative approach to lending by banks boosts liquidity, result-
ing in declining loan to assets ratio as banks direct more of their assets to investments in
government short-term securities. The ratio of liquid fund to liabilities rose from 41.6% in
2008 to 62.1% in 2011 while liquid fund to assets increased from 37.3% to 53.3% over the
same period. The banks also remain profitable despite the global financial crisis that saw
a deep in ROE to 17.4% which also is partly due to a surge in shareholders’ fund arising
from recapitalisation and increased to 29% by June 2015; even though declined to 23% in
February 2016, it remained strong.
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There were also a number of regulatory developments in the banking sector. Recently, the
Banking Act of 2002 and the new regulations in 2016 enhanced the powers of the Bank
of Ghana (BOG) to supervise and provide regulatory oversights on banking activities. In
addition, the recapitalisation efforts have continued to support a stable and strong bank-
ing system. Nonetheless, the banks are still relatively small in size and the rising interest
rates have continually provided a barrier to the much-needed financial intermediation and
a major source of exposure to the system as well.
2.2.15 Guinea
The financial system is small and dominated by the banks, specifically the commercial
banks. It consists of 13 commercial banks, six deposits-taking MFIs, six insurance firms,
among others. There are quite a number of reforms being pursued to improve the financial
systems among which are payment system modernisation, addressing credit and liquid-
ity management issues, and increased monitoring and regulation of banks. The banking
system is not also immune from the common challenges that other banking sectors in the
region faced, ranging from low financial intermediation, incidence of NPLs, high interest
rates spread, exacerbated by near absence of capital market whose investors are almost
80% commercial banks (IMF, 2017). The future of banking in the country will be largely
influenced by how far ongoing reforms could be effected, restructuring of fiscal imbalance,
diversification to reduce the vulnerability of the economy to external shocks as well as
curtailing the re-emergence of the deadly Ebola Virus.
2.2.16 Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau, a member of WAENU having common commercial banks, BCEAO, with
common banking system, has a small financial system dominated by a poorly developed
banking sector that holds only about 0.8% of the sub-region’s total banking assets (AFDB,
2015). The financial system has five commercial banks holding 94% of the total assets
financial sector assets and 18 licensed MFIs. It is characterised by high interest rates,
conservative lending processes that limits lending to a few firms. There is high NPLs as
the ratio of NPLs to capital stood at 41.2% in 2016 even though down from 65.2% in 2015
(IMF, 2016). As a result, authorities undertook a controversial takeover of two commercial
banks NPLs that are worth up to 5.5% of the total GDP in an attempt to improve bank
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balance sheets and open up the space for private sector credit. The bailout saw a decrease
in NPLs from 25.7% in 2014 to 6.2% and 5.6% in 2015 and 2016 respectively, reflecting
the decline in provision witnessed in 2016 and 2015 at 4.2% and 8.9% respectively from
19% in 2014. Therefore, the private sector credit picked post bailout and is growing at
an annualised rate of 18% though still remain low at 11% of GDP compared to 25% in
WAENU and 28% in SSA region. Most banks are barely making profits - ROA, 2.9% in
2013-15 and declined to 2.8% in 2016. Even though ROE showed a promising outlook at
17.5% in 2014-15 and down to 16.5% in 2016, excluding benefits from bailout suggest a
dire need for restructuring in the sector. However, the banking sector remains sound and
fairly liquid, capital to risk-weighted asset is at 19% as well as capital to assets is 16.8%
in 2016 above statutory requirements, while liquid assets to short-term assets remain 35%
2015-16. Interest rates spread is also seen to be low and stable over 2013-16 at 4.5%.
Strained fiscal activities due to political instability and suspension of budget support
by donors continue to put constraint on the economic outlook. NPLs is forecast to rise
post intervention where the needed structural changes are not addressed in addition to the
non transparent mode of the intervention that has continued to raise uncertainty within
the system. The way these play out will impact of the banking system in the near term.
2.2.17 Kenya
Kenya has the most developed banking and financial system in the East African Commu-
nity (EAC). The financial system consists of 43 commercial banks, one mortgage company,
14 money remittance providers, three credit reference bureaus and 66 other financial in-
stitutions that include MFIs at the end of 2015. It has the fourth largest banking sector
in the SSA region and the main regulator of the deposit-taking institution and the com-
mercial banks is the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). The banking sector is concentrated
with six top banks holding an average of 54.4% of the total market share of banking assets
even though it is open to foreign competitors with the presence of eight foreign banks
as at June 2014. Although, the ratio of capital to total risk-weighted assets reduced to
18.9% from 20.5% and having CAR of 12%, liquid assets dropped to 38.7% from 41.2%
respectively in 2015 from 2012, profitability increased by 5.3% from 32% ROE and 3.7%
ROA in 2012. Overall, the banks are liquid, well-capitalised and profitable (AFDB, 2015;
IMF, 2017; World Bank, 2017). Recent liberalisation, reforms and restructuring, among
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other factors, impacted the private sector’s credit as a percentage of GDP which increased
from 26% to 38% within 2002-11 and has continued to grow rapidly in recent years but still
limited in resources allocation to the country’s optimal capacity especially with interest
rate spread at 9.8% as per 2012 estimates. Furthermore, the repeal of the Banking Act
in August 2016 that capped lending rates to a maximum of 4% in excess of Central Bank
Rate (CBR) reduced interest rate thereafter to 13.84% from 16.75%. The heightened CBK
supervision, plus the introduction of tighter new credit facilities appraisal, coupled with
stricter monitoring of credit portfolios have reduced NPLs from 10.9% in 2007 to 5.4% in
2011 and further to 4.8% in 2012.
Even though economic and financial forecasts do not pose any stability challenge to the
banking system in the near term, significant challenges in the banking sector still remain.
The depth of the banking sector and intermediation remain low with a lot of room for
improvement in regulation; all these put together if not properly addressed could pose a
danger in the near future to the banks.
2.2.18 Lesotho
Lesotho’s financial system is small and underdeveloped. It consist of four commercial
banks and various other financial institutions including MFIs and non-banking financial
institutions. The banking sector is very liquid, concentrated and linked to the economy of
its main trading partner, South Africa. The three largest banks are South African Banks
holding an excess of 90% of sectoral assets limiting access to finance as only 41% adults
are bank borrowers and 341 of 1000 adults are depositors during the period under review
(AFDB, 2015). Liquidity ratio is about 82% at the end of 2014 with credit to deposits
just 41% in 2011 up from 35% in 2010. The banks are also well-capitalised and prof-
itable; however, lack of competition in the market causes a relatively high interest rates
spread even though ratio of NPLs to gross loans improved from 4% in 2009 to 2.9% in 2011.
Lesotho’s economy has been a mere appendage of those of South Africa. Therefore, the
major challenge that the country faces is that it will continue to be vulnerable to external
shocks which also keep the banking sector highly exposed.
52
2.2.19 Liberia
The financial sector in Liberia is fairly diversified consisting of nine commercial banks,
20 MFIs, one micro-finance deposit-taking institution among other financial and NBFIs.
The banking sector is open to foreign competitors as seven out of the nine commercial
banks are foreign owned. There is low access to finance as the commercial banks’ roles in
the economy are limited, serving mostly established businesses in the capital city and few
main towns and generally providing trade-credit on short-term basis to the service sector
(World Bank, 2017). There are currently four commercial banks branches per 100,000
adult’s population growing very slowly since 2010, 60% of which are concentrated in the
capital city, Monrovia. The banks are less profitable as they have been struggling with
low profitability for sometimes now despite high interest rates spread. This is partly
attributable to limited lending opportunities, poor asset quality that requires high provi-
sioning with weak lenders protection including absence of money market. ROA and ROE
have been consistently below 1% since 2010 and even negative in 2013.
The bane of the Liberian economy has been the continued low global commodity prices,
post-Ebola decline in official aid inflows. Besides, the costly judicial process and weak
contract enforcements makes banks risk averse, limiting business opportunity, poor infras-
tructure and weak communication, among others, affecting the viability of the banking
system, thereby exposing them to default and high operating costs.
2.2.20 Malawi
Malawi’s financial sector is improving. Though shallow, it has remained stable as it is
not integrated to the global financial system. It consists of 13 licensed commercial banks
and other financial institutions that are regulated by the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM).
Financial inclusion rates strengthened at 54% in 2013 up from 45% in 2008 despite high
cost of credit with lending rates as high as 25% in 2013 and the bulk of credit going to
government and its agencies (Mlachila, Dykes, et al., 2013). Commercial banks though
concentrated are well-capitalised and profitable. Robust prudential regulations help to
limit banks’ exposure to net-foreign exchange and ensured low NPLs as well. There is a
very low private sector credit at 14.2% in spite of having the ratio of credit to deposit at
70.9% as of 2010. Access to credit is an enormous challenge especially to the small and
medium scale enterprises (SMEs) as only about 19% of the population have access to the
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use of banking services.
The vulnerability to climate change as it continues to rely on agriculture and fiscal manage-
ment challenges that have scuttled access to the much needed aid are the biggest challenges
of the economy which do have their ways of impacting negatively on the financial sector.
2.2.21 Mali
A member of WAENU with common central bank, BCEAO, having a shallow financial
system with low financial intermediation and limited access to finance. The financial sector
consists of 13 licensed commercial banks with two financial institutions having total assets
of about 12.5% of subregional banking total assets (AFDB, 2015). It is characterised by
high interest rates, conservative lending processes with few firms having access to credit.
Out of the commercial banks, 11 are foreign owned holding over 80% of the total assets of
the sector, and concentrated with five banks accounting for two-thirds of the total assets
and 70% of deposits. Also, five of the banks are partly owned by the government holding
minority shares in four and majority shares in one. Bank loans are targeted mainly at
government and its agency that also provide the deposits substantially. Several reforms
have been undertaken that include recapitalisation and privatisation. The government
has also made efforts at creating schemes to guarantee commercial banks loans in order to
encourage long and medium term credit to the private sector as lending has been at the
short end of the market in spite of banks being liquid.
Economies especially in the WAENU subregion have continued to range from being vul-
nerable to external shocks in prices to weak judicial systems and institutions as well as
undiversified products that have various implications for the banking system.
2.2.22 Mauritania
Mauritania’s financial sector remains shallow, concentrated in the urban area and char-
acterised by low credit to private and household with limited access to finance and high
cost of funding as bank loans and deposits represents less than 12% of GDP. It consists
of 12 commercial banks and two other financial outfits that are not fully integrated into
the global financial system (AFDB, 2015). Commercial banks serve merely 4% of the
population even as banking dominates the financial sector with 88% of the sector held by
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the commercial banks with the country’s five largest banks combined reserves estimated
at about $100 million as at 2013 (IMF, 2017). The banking sector is well-capitalised but
less competitive despite the presence of foreign banks. The central bank of Mauritania
regulates the banks and has championed major repeals of regulations and legal frameworks
in the recent past that include, minimum capital requirements, regulations and lending
policies as well as measures to enhance a competitive banking system.
Economic risks still remain a recurring decimal, dependence on foreign aid and invest-
ments, insecurity in the neighbouring Mali, poor infrastructure and institutional capacity
and human capital.
2.2.23 Mauritius
Mauritius boasts of a well-developed financial system with necessary financial infrastruc-
ture that is sound and profitable. It was ranked first in Africa and 39th in the world
in terms of microeconomics and macroeconomics foundation of national competitiveness
by Global Competitiveness Reports (GCR) in 2014. In addition, Mauritius also ranked
26th in the world for financial deepening based on improved access to different modes of
financing and financial services. The financial system is dominated by the banking sector
holding a total assets that is about 330% of the GDP at the end of 2014 and accounting
for over 94.2% of the total assets of the sector during the same period. The banking sys-
tem is characterised by openness to international banks with a sound and safe regulatory
framework. There are 20 commercial banks in the financial system having 56% foreign
ownership, 32% large domestic banks and the rest 12% other domestic banks as at 2015.
The banks are concentrated with four largest banks holding 56.5% of the share of total as-
sets, profitable, though declining, and liquid, well-capitalised with capital adequacy above
the 10% regulatory minimum. Specifically, by 2015 the CAR was in excess of 17% as reg-
ulatory capital to risk-weighted assets stood at 17.6%, ROA at about 1.1% in 2015 down
from 1.4% in 2012, and ROE stood at about 11.4% in 2015 down from 18.1% in 2012 while
liquid assets ratio, that is, a ratio of liquid assets to total assets rising from 19.1% in 2012
to 25.1% in 2015 (IMF, 2017; World Bank, 2017). There is the history of past decades
of built-up bank lending that increased from 70% in 2004-05 to its current level of 100%
of GDP having peaked at 110% in 2013 (Mlambo & Ncube, 2011). Credit boom causes
deterioration in asset quality as NPLs began to rise with provisioning not keeping to pace
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as in 2015 un-provisioned NPLs reached 17% of the bank capital. NPLs to gross loans rose
from about 3.6% in 2012 to 5.7% in 2015. The Bank of Mauritius (BOM) regulates banks
and other financial institutions that include non-bank deposit taking financial institutions
(NBDTIs), foreign exchange dealers and money changers.
The banking system however, is not without its challenges. Presently, more than 90%
of banks’ assets and liabilities exposure to global business companies (GBCs) and non-
residence are estimated to be in foreign currency. This in addition to the deteriorating
quality of assets arising from rising NPLs and falling profitability with the inability to in-
tensify expansion to other markets as the markets are currently viewed as over-saturated
pose a threat to the future of banks and the financial systems of Mauritius.
2.2.24 Mozambique
The financial system is small, shallow and lack depth but growing with intermediation
deepening as bank branches now reach rural settlements and sub-urban areas. It is char-
acterised by limited access to credit as the private sector and individuals find it difficult
to access credit which is often at high costs. This is further complicated especially in
the rural areas by the lack of collateral as land leases are not admissible for collateral
purposes. The financial system is dominated by the banking sector having 18 commercial
banks. Four are foreign majority owned holding in excess of 90% of sectoral total assets.
Ownership of these four banks consist of two Portuguese banks, one South African bank
and one subsidiary of Barclays, a British banking group (AFDB, 2017). Banks have the
risk of asset concentration and according to an IMF 2011 stress test report, any default
in each bank’s largest borrowers will be catastrophic to the CAR of the sector as primary
borrowings stand at 65% of banks regulatory capital. However, the banks are profitable
with ROE in excess of 20% since 2002, NPLs consistently relatively low and the sector
remains well-capitalised holding capital in excess of 8% minimum requirements. Major
challenge thus continues to be that of poverty and undiversification especially as it affects
the credit portfolio of banks.
2.2.25 Namibia
Ranked 46 out of 148 countries in the world by GCR in 2014 for financial market devel-
opment, the Namibian financial system is very developed with the banking sector services
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quite developed and competitive. It has a large and stable financial sector that is domi-
nated by NBFIs with banks accounting for only 40% of sectoral total assets and banking
sector assets about 68% of GDP. Banks are concentrated and are five in numbers, three of
which are South African owned, one locally owned plus 11 other foreign-owned commercial
banks as at 2011 (Allen, Otchere, & Senbet, 2011; Mlambo & Ncube, 2011). The banks
are well-capitalised and profitable, with regulatory capital to risk-weighted capital at 15%
in 2016 from 14.4% in 2013, ROA at about 2.9% in 2016 from 3% in 2013 having peaked
at about 4.6% in 2015. Likewise, ROE peaked at about 55% in 2015 up from about 33%
in 2013 and currently at 37%. Banks also have high credit quality with low NPLs, having
liquidity ratio of 12.5% in 2014 in excess of 10% regulatory minimum. Credit to private
sector was at 12% in 2016 down from about 14% in 2013 while growth in banks loan have
been in the double digits in the last decades exacerbating households indebtedness and
buoyant housing prices. The banks also have high risk of asset concentration with the
financial sectors owning more than half of government debts. The financial system is reg-
ulated by the Bank of Namibia that is striving to establish a sound regulatory framework.
The linkages between banks and NBFIs financials and ownerships including foreign af-
filiations increase the complexity of the financial system making it increasingly difficult to
assess the capital and liquidity adequacy of individual institutions. The prospect of the
banking sector will depend on how much more inclusive the economy is, given unequal
income distribution, plus high household debts indicating formally banked population are
already highly indebted hence requiring diversification and upward movement in the soci-
ety.
2.2.26 Niger
One of the eight members of WAENU with common central bank, BCEAO, Niger has a
financial system that lacks depth with underdeveloped capital market dominated by banks
and government. It consist of 10 banks and one financial institution accounting for 5%
of regional banking total assets. The banking sector is concentrated having four largest
banks holding 90% of sectoral total assets, shallow, still low at development and dominated
by foreign banks (AFDB, 2015). Like other WAENU financial sectors, it is characterised
by high interest rates, conservative lending processes with only few firms having access to
finance. The ratio of credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP was estimated at
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15.4% in 2015 while depositors with commercial banks per 1000 adults were 43.9 in 2014.
The banks appear well-capitalised and efficient especially when compared to other banking
sectors in the subregion. The capital adequacy ratio was above regulatory threshold of
8% in 2016 as regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets fluctuated within 13.5% to 15.1%
for the periods 2011-16. NPLs is high at 18.1% of total loans in 2016 having peaked at
19.6% in 2011 and declining thereafter to 15.5% in 2014, the slight increase to the current
value are a cause for concern. It is also fairly profitable with ROE of 16.2% in 2012 up
from 7.3% in 2011 and ROA of 1.8% in 2012 from 1.0% in 2011. The banks liquid assets
are also declining with the figures at 22.4% of total assets in 2013 down from 33.3% in
2011. The banks credit portfolio is concentrated and tilting towards the government. Such
rising exposure to the public sector could generate financial risks to the banks and inhibit
growth.
2.2.27 Nigeria
The financial system of Nigeria is among the largest in Africa in capital base, quite de-
veloped and consists of Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) as the apex and regulatory bank,
Deposits Money Banks (DBMs) and other NBFIs. The financial system underwent major
transformation with banking sector recapitalised and regulations enhanced following the
2007-09 financial meltdown having through gone a round of consolidation in the periods
2004-06. The banking system consists of 20 commercial banks down from 89 in 2004 and
the banks remain adequately capitalised. CAR is above statutory minimum as regulatory
capital to risk-weighted assets stood at 17.5% in 2015 about the same position in 2011 at
17.9%. However, there are concerns about the rising NPLs and the declining liquidity in
the banking sector as increasing NPLs and reduced credit worthiness of borrowers indicate
vulnerability that could hamper credit to private sector (Mlachila, Dykes, et al., 2013).
As borrowers become more leveraged with foreign exchange exposures, banks get exposed
to changes in external liquidity and exchange rates. Liquid assets to short term liabilities
that were at 30.1% in 2011 and fell to 15.8% in 2015, likewise, liquidity ratio now stand at
10.7% as against 25.4% in 2012. Despite the taking over of banks NPLs by the creation of
Asset Management Company of Nigeria (AMCON) in 2009 that reduced the NPLs that
were as high as 16.7% on the average between 2004-10 to less than 5% in 2012, NPLs
have begun to rise and at 5.2% in 2015 up from 3.5% in 2012. Hence, has taken its toll
on banks profitability as there was only a marginal improvement in the last half decade
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given ROA at 2.5% in 2015 from 2.3% in 2012 while ROE declined from 21.1% in 2012 to
20.7% in 2015 despite high interest rates spread of 24% on the average over the periods.
The declining liquidity, deteriorating asset quality together with the prevailing economic
challenges pose ongoing risk to credit quality and put pressure on capital adequacy and
liquidity of the system thereby constraining the capacity of the banks to grant private
sector credit in the near to medium term.
2.2.28 Rwanda
The financial system is moderately developed with the banking sector dominating the
landscape having 67.6% of the industry total assets by 2013-14 and with the total assets
of the banking sector as a percentage of GDP 29.2% in 2012. It comprises 10 commercial
banks among which six have foreign ownership, four MFIs, one development bank and
one cooperative bank. The banking system is concentrated but competition in key mar-
kets, with top three banks holding an excess of 50% of sectoral assets. It is liquid, well
capitalised, profitable and quite regulated. However, some of these key financial sector
soundness fundamentals are plummeting in value and is raising some concerns. Regulatory
capital to risk-weighted assets were estimated at 20.7% in June 2016 down from 23.3% in
March 2015. The asset quality is also declining as NPLs as a ratio of gross loan increased
to 7% in the 2nd quarter of 2016 from 6.3% in the 1st quarter of 2015. Likewise, liquidity
though above the regulatory minimum of 20% is declining as liquid assets to total deposits
were 42.8% in 2016 from 54.2% in 2013-14. Furthermore, profitability declined given ROA
and ROE in 2013-14 at 2.1% and 12.1% compared to 1.7% and 9.2% in 2016 respectively
(IMF, 2016). Suffice to say that the solvency ratio is above the statutory minimum of
15%. It is also worth noting that significant progress has been made in reforming and
modernising the financial system and/or the banking sector with the development of mo-
bile and agency banking having the potential to transform the current business models of
banking.
2.2.29 Senegal
Senegal is one of the eight members of WAEMU having a common central bank, BCEAO.
Like other members of the subregion, Senegal’s financial system is plagued with high inter-
est rates, conservative lending process with few firms having access to credit. Nonetheless,
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the depth of financial system has improved overtime with credit to economy reaching 30%
of GDP and higher than in most WAEMU countries, but it is relatively short-term in
nature and directed towards oil, trade and food. The financial system consists of 27 in-
stitutions that are providing credit to the economy, 23 of which are well-capitalised banks
having significant foreign ownership (AFDB, 2017). Banks dominate the financial sector
with about 90% of the total assets of the sector. The banking sector is concentrated with
top five banks holding 66% of assets and 79% of deposits. As at 2012, only about 1.5
million of the population have bank accounts corresponding to about 10% level of pen-
etration posing challenges to financial services provision especially to the rural populace
that account for about 58.5% of the country’s total population (World Bank, 2017). The
banking sector is sound but the concentration of lending and the level of NPLs poses a
key concern. NPLs have only marginally declined to 18.9% in 2016 from about 20% in
2010-14 with lending concentrating in services, commercial and industrial activities sector
which could make financial system exposed to firm and sector-specific shocks especially
given the level of asset quality. Key features show that regulatory capital to risk-weighted
assets increased to 16.7% in 2015 from 13.8% in 2008 while capital to total assets declined
from 9.1% to 8.5% during the same period, ROA and ROE declined over the periods, from
1.4% and 13.0% to 1.0% and 11.9% respectively, while liquidity ratio increased with liquid
assets to total assets rising from 31.7% to 54.7%
The key challenges of lending concentration, high NPLs and declining features are pivotal
to the soundness of the financial systems and need closer monitoring and attention.
2.2.30 Seychelles
Seychelles has developed into a reputable offshore financial center on the African continent
with a financial sector that grew at the rate of 4.5% during 2014 and consists majorly
of banking sector, having a nascent insurance and pension fund institutions and only
introduced security exchanges in 2012. The financial system is regulated by the Central
Bank of Seychelles (CBS) and the financial services authority. The banking sector consist
of nine commercial banks as at 2014 with high foreign presence and is well regulated,
capitalised and liquid (AFDB, 2017). The regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets were
25.2% in 2016 from 26.7% in 2012, asset quality is relatively high and improving though it
needs to be closely monitored at 7.8% in 2016 down from 9.3% in 2012, while liquid assets
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to short-term liabilities declined to 55.2% in 2016 from 58.1% in 2012. The sector is also
very profitable with ROA at 3.8% in 2016 up from 3.1% in 2012 and ROE, 34.8% in 2016
from 29.8% in 2012. Recent liberalisation reforms implemented have improved private
credit growth but still remain low at 25% of GDP despite ample liquidity. A major
concern in the banking system is the quality of assets in addition to growing liquidity.
2.2.31 Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s financial system consists majorly of the banking and insurance sectors. The
banking system was restored having been destroyed during the 1991-2002 civil war. The
financial system embarked on comprehensive reforms in 2008 to strengthen supervision,
enhance competition, access to credit and payment system as well as jerk up minimum
capital requirements. In spite of this, the sector is constrained by high financing cost,
concentration and limited access to credit by the private sector. There are 13 commercial
banks that are highly capitalised but with soundness concerns due to high incidence of
NPLs especially with the two large state-owned banks. The banking system is dominated
by state-owned banks that are in poor shapes. Banks are suffering from high NPLs and
exposure to large borrowers. Such a scenario prompts the Bank of Sierra Leone (BSL) to
strengthen bank supervision in other to address the issues of high non-compliance with
prudential guidelines. The banking sector is also concentrated with three largest banks
accounting for 54% of the total banking assets. It is riddled with high interest rates spread
at 11%. Low efficiency is limiting banks from performing their key roles in the private sec-
tor credit that is now below 5% of GDP and declining. This is worsened with high shares
of loan going to five largest borrowers making access to finance by businesses nearly im-
possible (IMF, 2017). The problem of poor governance, effects of Ebola outbreak and the
crisis of NPLs in the banking sector made asset quality and capital buffer to deteriorate
in the recent years. NPLs doubled in the two years preceding 2015 and as at June 2015
has accounted for over 40% of gross loans. The sector is liquid but also deteriorating with
24.4% liquidity ratio in 2015 down from 41.3% in 2011.
BSL needs to urgently address banks’ balance sheets quality and strengthen supervision
to stem the spate of banks flouting prudential guidelines. Concentration of banking assets
in five largest borrowers makes the banks even more vulnerable to shocks in any of the
borrowers.
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2.2.32 Swaziland
Swaziland has a small financial system with NBFIs that is growing fast in recent years and
dominating the financial landscape. The financial sector is tied to that of South Africa
reflecting the economic ties between the two countries. The financial sector is a part of
Swaziland’s development strategy that is aimed at restoring banks’ solvency, making the
stock exchange more independent of government and exploring the potential to become
an offshore financial center. The banking sector has four commercial banks. It is highly
concentrated with three of the four banks accounting for 85.5% of sectoral total assets,
which are owned by South African banking institutions. Banks are well-capitalised, liquid
and the financial soundness indicators indicate a sound banking system. The total capi-
tal ratio as at 2013 was above 8% national regulatory minimum at 24.4%, Tier 1 capital
decline from 77.5% to 21.5% but still above 4% regulatory minimum while regulatory
capital to risk-weighted assets was 22.4% in 2015 down from 23.0% in 2010 (AFDB, 2017;
IMF, 2017). Banking assets increased by 16.6% during 2012-13 with liquidity ratio about
statutory minimum of 20% for commercial banks at 28.1% with liquid assets to short-term
liabilities declining from 18% in 2010 to 12.4% in 2015. Some of the banks have relatively
high NPLs with high credit concentration to large borrowers and having unitary business
models including high levels of concentration on both sides of the balance sheet. Asset
quality shows a large exposure to capital at 94.9% in 2015 as NPLs to gross loan increased
to 6.4% in 2015 from 3.5% in 2011. However, the banks are profitable with ROE of 30.9%
in 2015 from 28.7% in 2010 and ROA of 4.6% in 2015 from 3.4% in 2010.
The steep fall in SACU receipts and drop in commodity prices pose solvency and liq-
uidity risk to banks. In addition, increasing links between banks and NBFIs that is now
dominating the financial landscape is potential greater risk to the financial stability of
banks.
2.2.33 Tanzania
Tanzania’s financial system is shallow though it has witnessed some improvement in terms
of development in recent years, and has been able to contribute 40.9% to GDP at the end
of December 2014 with the sector dominated by the banks holding 70% of sectoral total
assets in 2014. The banking system is small and inefficient, limiting access to finance but
it is expanding with growth of 11.4% in 2015%. There are 45 banking institutions with
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foreign ownership of 48% of banking industry total assets that are sound overall but with
wide variations within the system (AFDB, 2015). The presence of foreign banks brought
in competition that is now resulting in significant efficiency and financial services qual-
ity. The banking system is also concentrated with three largest banks controlling 64% of
market shares. Series of reforms were introduced by the government for financial sector
development that translate to new regulations; the Bank and Financial Institution Act,
the Capital and Security Act and the Bank of Tanzania Act, bringing about the creation
of Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE). The banking sector is sound with core capital
adequacy ratio at 20.0% in 2016 up from 17.9% in 2013. Liquid assets are above statutory
limit of 20% with liquid assets to short-term liabilities at 36.2% in 2013 and increased
marginally to 36.6% in 2016. The sector is characterised by relatively high interest rates
though credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP has grown overtime with 16.% in
2016 up from 13.9%% in 2013. The concentration of credit in the hands of large borrowers
has increased the sector’s vulnerability with the banking sector being exposed to personal
loans and crop financing. This has affected the quality of assets that is declining with
NPLs net of provision to total assets rising from 15.6% in 2013 to 18.8% in 2016. Fur-
thermore, the sector is profitable reflecting the hike in interest rates with ROA at 3.5% in
2016 up from 2.5% in 2013 and ROE 18.2% in 2016 from 12.8% in 2013.
The prospect of the banking sector will anchor on how well reforms can institute right to
property and instigate further growth in the economy. Moreover, declining asset quality
must be closely monitored.
2.2.34 The Gambia
The financial system of Gambia consists of 13 commercial banks and 11 insurance compa-
nies. Commercial banks dominate the financial sector and are mainly foreign owned. The
banks grew rapidly in recent years during 2007-10 due to competition from the increased
number of banks and foreign direct investments (FDI) inflows. Adequately well-capitalised
and liquid, with risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio in excess of the threshold of 8% set
by the Financial Institution Act 2003 at 27.1% in 2011 (IMF, 2017). The banking system
is sound with quality of assets improving as NPLs ratio declined from 14% in 2011 to 7%
in 2012-13. The Central Bank of Gambia (CBG) embarked on measures to ensure solvency
and stability that include, establishment of credit reference bureau (CRB) in July 2009,
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recapitalisation during 2010-12, as well as the revision of the supervisory processes among
others. However, recent government fiscal imbalance culminated into holding substantial
high cost, domestic debt, estimated at 46% of GDP that is undermining the stability of
the financial sector.
2.2.35 Togo
Another member of WAEMU having common central bank, BCEAO, Togo’s financial sys-
tem consist of 12 commercial banks and two financial institutions accounting for 7.7%
share of WAEMU financial sector total assets (AFDB, 2015). Like other subregional
members, the financial system is characterised by high interest rates, conservative lending
process with few firms having access to credit. Although financial depth has improved
over the past decade, the degree of financial intermediation in terms of the structure of
loan terms and loan portfolio diversification is still limited. The Togolese financial sector
is competitive with a significant numbers of foreign banks that account for 66% of system’s
total assets as at 2016. The banking system is sound overall but financial conditions vary
with banks as some of the banks’ soundness have weakened, resulting in declining declin-
ing solvency and assets quality indicators while profitability and liquidity also suffering.
Solvency is slightly above the 8% threshold with the risk-weighted CAR at 8.9% in 2015
down from 11.7% in 2011. Large exposure to single creditor is a significant vulnerability
point with exposure increasing as the banks credit concentrate on infrastructural projects.
Moreover, there is widespread flagrant defiance of prudential guidelines with banks taking
excessive risk as competition intensifies. Hence NPLs ratio of gross loans has worsened at
15.6% in 2015 up from 10.9% in 2011. Profitability outlook has dampened as ROA falls
to 0.9% in 2014 from 2.0% in 2011, even though ROE improved from 13.6% in 20111 to
19.4% in 2014. Liquid assets to total assets were at 41.7% in 2015 up from 33.4% in 2011.
2.2.36 Uganda
Uganda is characterised by a small financial system that is dominated by the banking
sector. It consisted of 26 commercial banks as at the end of 2014 and are generally con-
sidered to be sound and moderately liquid. Risk-weighted CAR was at 23.2% in 2015 up
from 20.2% in 2012, which was considered to be more than double the minimum require-
ment. Liquid assets as a ratio of total assets was 44.2% in 2015 from 39.8% in 2012 while
profitability is moderate but declining with ROA of 2.5% in 2016 down from 2.7% in 2012
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while ROE was 15.6% in 2015 from 18% in 2012 (IMF, 2017). The financial system is
growing, continuously improving as credit assets grew by 201% during 2013-14. Mobile
money financial services are also developing with about 40% registered users thus improv-
ing access to formal financial services. Although sound, its financial intermediation role is
weak, constrained by high operating costs, low credibility of policies and insufficient com-
petition resulting also in high interest rates spread of about 22% during 2012-15 on the
average. However, the recent stress test by the Bank of Uganda (BoU) indicates that banks
are generally positioned to absorb specific shocks of increased NPLs, large deposits with-
drawals and currency depreciation, suggesting that credit, liquidity and foreign exchange
risks are largely well-contained. But there is the concern of loan portfolio concentration
of which the default of largest borrowers will hurt capital, low rate of NPLs provisioning
at 55% with over dollarisation having about half of loan portfolio denominated in dollars.
The regulatory body is the Bank of Uganda.
2.2.37 Zambia
The financial system is small and undeveloped consisting of a banking system that is
profitable and well-regulated. It comprises of commercial banks, NBFIs, pension funds,
insurance firms and capital market regulated by the Bank of Zambia (BoZ). There were
20 commercial banks by 2015, four of which account for 65% of total assets and 13 foreign
owned with 69% of sectoral total assets. The banks are well-capitalised. By the end of
2014, the total CAR was 23.8% more than twice the 10% statutory minimum and also
profitable with ROE in excess of 20%. Nonetheless, the system is low in financial inter-
mediation as according to the 2009 FinScope report more than 62.7% of the population
has no access to finance; this has been worsened by high interest rates averaging 20% and
generally the low confidence from the public. Which made the financial services sector to
contribute less than 15% to GDP during 2011-12 and thereafter. Excess liquidity also arose
from the inability of banks to extend credits to the under-serviced area of the economy.
The financial system has benefited immensely from having proper financial regulatory
framework achieved by the financial sector development plan (FSDP) that was started
in 2004 (World Bank, 2017). The aim was to set up a stable, sound and market based
financial institution that will provide support for the much needed resource mobilisation
for growth sustenance and diversification of the economy. In 2012, the BOZ embarked on
the recapitalisation of the banking sector from the then US$2.4 million for both local and
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foreign banks to the new US$20 million for local and US$100 million for foreign banks
respectively. This was aimed at maintaining a stable banking system that will propel the
right environment for economic growth.
2.3 Summary
This chapter provides a highlight of the background of the countries whose banking sectors
are included in this study. The specific profile of the countries captured are based on
macroeconomics, financial and banking sector reviews. Resources for this review drew
heavily on the AFDB, WDI, IMF, CIA-World Fact Book and the national statistical body
of the respective countries. As noted in Chapter 1, this review provide evidence that
SSA region is predominantly poor with underdeveloped financial and banking system -
dominated by commercial banks. While statistics showed relatively profitable and sound
banking systems overall, key challenges of exposure to fragility in most of the banking
system remain. Such challenges largely result from weak regulation, concentration of
assets portfolio with exposure to government or individual organisation borrowers among
others. A lot still has to been done in areas of institution strengthening, diversification
and ultimately disentangling the region from being appendages to developed nations and
heavy reliance on aid.
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Chapter 3
Competitive Condition
3.1 Introduction
The starting point of policy on stimulating competitiveness in banking sectors of the SSA
region is the awareness by policy makers and regulators alike of the subsisting competitive
nature of the banking environment. This will inform the right approach to fathom the
possible way forward. Chapter 1 presented the motivation for this study and the spe-
cific features of SSA banking systems were reviewed in Chapter 2. This chapter assessed
the degree of competitiveness and the bank-specific factors that drive competition in the
region. The level of competition and its determinants will help to gauge competition im-
pacts on stability and how well regulation has helped shape the relationship. These will
be explored in the chapters that follows.
Competition has attracted attention in banking and finance literature for decades. An
extensive body of theoretical and empirical studies has reported the significant role of
bank competition in ensuring access to finance (Chen et al., 2010; Clarke et al., 2006;
Love & Per´ıa, 2014; Mudd, 2013; Rice & Strahan, 2010; Tan, 2013). Mlambo and Ncube
(2011); Ningaye et al. (2014); Pasiouras et al. (2009); Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008) have
also argured that competition engenders the efficiency of the banking system. Yet some
other scholars have associated bank competition with the stability of the system (Ariss,
2010; Beck et al., 2013; Fu et al., 2014; Schaeck & Ciha´k, 2014). As noted in Chapter
1, Casu et al. (2015) state that competition is good for many reasons; it is an essential
force in any economy, it encourages firms to be more efficient and provides better alloca-
tion of resources. In banking, efficiency should entail lower costs, which should be passed
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onto consumers in the form of lower charges, higher deposit rates and reduced lending
costs (Casu et al., 2015). Essentially, competition in banking improves access to finance,
increases overall competitiveness in other sectors of an economy, fosters innovation and
increases quality, widens consumer choice and promotes economic growth (Leon, 2015b).
As is the trend across the globe, SSA countries have witnessed quite a number of reforms
in their financial sectors that are predominantly banking in nature in the last two and a
half decades. The thrust of these reforms has been the opening up of the financial system
for competition to engender a robust banking system that is capable of harnessing the
potentials of the region for economic growth (Senbet & Otchere, 2006). The main reforms
which are homogeneous across the region include recapitalisation, liberalisation, privati-
sation, deregulation, removal of credit controls, establishment of new refinancing policies
and relaxing of indigenisation policies among others. The region has made some good
progress from these reforms but whether they have translated to the much anticipated
competitive banking environment, is still to be seen. According to Mlachila, Dykes, et al.
(2013), the SSA banking system is highly concentrated and generally inefficient in finan-
cial intermediation. Basic indices of a competitive banking system like cost of banking,
service charge, interest rates spread, interest costs, among others, are very high in this
region compared with other regions of the world. The African Progress Panel in 2014 rose
from the understanding that stimulation of competition will help to bridge interest rates
spread that stifle savings and investments and consequently drive the needed economic
growth in the region. How informed is this assertion? Is the SSA banking sector truly
uncompetitive and how best should competition be stimulated?
The essence of this chapter is then to investigate the competitiveness of the SSA commer-
cial banks1 and consider at bank level the drivers of competition. This becomes imperative
because, the starting point of devising a good policy is for policy makers and regulators
alike to know how competitive is the banking system and the likely drivers of the compe-
tition in response to existing regulations and policies that have been put in place in order
to forge the possible way forward. This study contributes to extant literature in develop-
mental finance as being the first to our knowledge that has comprehensively investigated
the competitive condition of the banking sector of the region using the Lerner index that
1Commercial banks account for more than 70% of the region’s banking sector Allen, Otchere, and
Senbet (2011)
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is capable of analysing bank level competition. Available literature has only focused on
few individual countries in the region and in doing so focused on just the banking market
competition, more so as a component of studies’ variable. This regional analysis of bank
level competition is particularly necessary in the face of the increased tendencies towards
regional integration. Also, to the best of our knowledge, no study has explored the deter-
minants of competition for the region as well. Our study revealed that, while there are
pockets of market power within a number of individual banks in the region, the market as
a whole is monopolistically competitive and thus highly contestable. We also found the
size of banks and the level of their capital, among others, to play vital roles in helping
banks gain competitive advantage.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 lays out the review of previous
literature on competition especially how it affects the banking system. This includes the-
ories and empirical literature. The study’s methodology is considered in Section 3.3, then
the analysis of results Section 3.4 and finally Section 3.5 contains the chapter summary.
3.2 Review of Literature
The efficiency, stability of a banking system and access to finance relate to the level of
competitiveness of that banking sector (Fu et al., 2014; Love & Per´ıa, 2014; Mudd, 2013;
Ningaye et al., 2014; Schaeck & Ciha´k, 2014). Hence the need for a competitive banking
system. But quite a number of reasons account for imperfection in the banking sector and
the fact that the conventional application of competition may not be admissible. These
reasons include regulatory requirements - charter value and capital requirements, existence
of double market where a bank may want to create monopoly, for instance, in the loan
market and compete in the asset market, among others. The imperfections however do not
suggest that the productive efficiency benefits of competition do not apply in the banking
sectors. In this section, we review a range of underpinning theories of competition in the
banking system and the empirical models that explain this banking phenomenon.
3.2.1 Theoretical Literature Review
Smith (1776) in his work on ‘Wealth of Nations’ laid the foundation of the concept of
competition, where he analysed free competition as an ordering force towards equilibrium.
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He considered competition as a rivalry that in the long run forces price to equal the cost of
production. This concept subsequently birthed two major reviews of competition, namely;
competition as a static state and as a process of rivalry. The Cournot oligopoly theory
formed the basis of the static state view. Cournot (1838) defined the ideal of competition
as an equilibrium condition because the price of costs approaches zero as the number of
producers increases. According to this standard theory, competition is a static state in
which firms cannot overprice and then earn abnormal profit. Competition as a process
of rivalry was a product of the Austrian school under Schumpeter, Hayek and Von Mises
who criticised the static state theory with the argument that the traditional neoclassical
economists misused the term competition by applying it to a state instead of a process.
They view competition as a complex process of rivalry between firms and related the core
of competition to the behaviour of the firms in the market. This school’s perspective
maintained that a market is competitive when rivals are sufficiently aggressive to give an
incumbent incentive to improve (lower price, better quality, etc.), in order to maintain
its advantage. Competition thus acts as a selection mechanism through the destructive
creative principle in which less efficient incumbents are removed and replaced by more
efficient entrants.
The Chicago School Industrial Organisation approach to market structure theory ex-
tended these theories and argued that many if not most markets tend to approximate
perfect competition in the long run. According to Posner (1979), positive profits in com-
petitive markets are considered transitory since their presence stimulate entry yet result
in their demise. Perrakis et al. (1982) formalised this idea with the theory of contestability
which states that markets behave competitively in the absence of entry and exit barriers.
They argued that in a contestable market, regulation is unnecessary as the threat of entry
will both restrain incumbent market power and satisfy the requirement for static welfare
maximisation. Market forces ensure that monopoly power will usually be short-lived such
that the intensity of competition is unrelated to market structure but linked to market
contestability. In contrast, the Austrian school argues that disequilibrium and monopoly
power are the normal functioning of competitive markets. The constability theory has a
major impact on the conduct of competition policies and provides a framework to unify
industrial organisation that is applicable in a wide range of industrial markets. Abdelka-
der and Mansouri (2013) argued that an efficient industrial market pricing environment
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results from the threat of potential competition due to free entry and costless exits. The
threat of potential competition guarantees an efficient banking system regardless of the
existing players in the market (Dietsch, 1993). The empirical works of Claessens and
Laeven (2004) found relevance of contestable market theory with a number of banks and
the level of market structure in their study of 50 countries’ market structure. However,
Northcott et al. (2004) among others found that the existence of regulation that promotes
competition determine the workings of the theory.
Overall, most of these theories assumed a perfectly competitive market with free entry
and exit. However, the existence of friction in banking markets (for instance, barriers to
entry and information asymmetry, among others), mitigates the direct application of the
welfare theorem that is associated with perfect market, thus allowing room for the exercise
of market power. Meanwhile, a healthy degree of rivalry is considered necessary for the
dynamic efficiency of the sector, the principle that is at the basis of the trend towards
fostering greater competition in banking markets across the globe.
Various attempts to test the foregoing theories have brought about a number of empirical
models. The fact that the neoclassical conception poses some clear testable hypothe-
ses explains the two strands of literature dominating the empirical measurement models
in banking competition study, the structural and the non-structural models which are
based on the traditional and the new industrial organisation theory that are rooted in the
competition as a static state. The structural model includes the structure conduct hy-
pothesis (SCP), relative market power (RMP) and efficiency structure hypothesis (ESH).
Structural models, (Chirwa, 2003; Shepherd, 1983; Smirlock, Gilligan, & Marshall, 1986),
except ESH that found a reverse causality between structure and performance (Amidu,
2013; Demsetz, 1973), argued that structure causes performance. Non-structural models
such as Lerner index (Lerner, 1934), Panzar-Rosse H-statistics (Panzar & Rosse, 1977,
1987), conjectural variation (Bresnahan, 1982; Iwata, 1974; Lau, 1982), Boone indicator
(Boone, 2008a, 2008b) and persistence of profits (Mueller, 1977, 1986) constitute the new
empirical industrial organisation (NEIO), introduced in a number of attempts to collect
empirical evidences on the nature of competition by observing conduct directly (a short-
coming of the structural models). The Lerner index (Lerner, 1934), which is found to be
consistent with the industrial organisation theory is employed in this study. It measures
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market power as the difference between price and marginal cost expressed as a percentage
of price. The market power of a bank is identified by the disparity between the bank’s
price and its marginal cost. The price and marginal cost should be equal in perfect com-
petition but will be at disequilibrium in an imperfect competitive market environment.
A wide disparity between price and marginal cost is an indication of high market power.
The Lerner index is hence a measure of the extent to which a bank is able to charge price
above its marginal cost.
The theoretical foundation of the Lerner index is rooted in static oligopoly theory (Cournot
model). Although the index has been around since in the mid-30s, its application in bank-
ing is relatively recent due to the inability to econometrically estimate price and marginal
cost. Two approaches have been developed to surmount this, the production and interme-
diation approaches. The production approach considers banks’ sole activities as servicing
its account holders. Banks in this case offer a number of financial services such as sav-
ings and credit by mobilising labour and physical capital (Heffernan, 2005). Klein (1971),
Monti (1972) and Sealey and Lindley (1977) used the intermediation approach as an al-
ternative with the argument that banks intermediate between depositors and borrowers.
Under this approach, it is believed that a bank employs labour and physical capital to
attract deposits which are used to fund loans. Labour, physical capital and deposits are
considered as inputs and proxy as costs while bank output is defined as total assets or
total loan proxing as the price respectively. To the extent that prices are not directly
observable, researchers use balance sheets and income statements to infer prices. The
marginal cost is estimated in two ways. The first is by estimating the average variable
costs, defined as the total variable costs divided by the total assets or total income. This
method according to Casu et al. (2015) has the advantage of being straightforward but
lacks in accuracy. The second approach requires the estimation of a cost function which is
usually a translog cost function with a single output (total assets) and three input prices
(deposits, labour and physical capital) based on the intermediation approach, (Beck et al.,
2013; Berger et al., 2009).
On the related theory for the determinants of competition in the banking sectors, the
study draws mainly on the structure component of SCP framework. This corresponds to
the number of banks in the industry which react to variables such as competition and
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regulation that are endogenous to the industry. SCP assumes competition affects perfor-
mance, hence the degree of concentration of banks in the market affects the competitive
condition of the banks. According to Nabieu (2013), this is premised on the fact that
the more the concentration in the market structure, the more likely it is to produce more
effective collusion. Various forms of proxies have been adopted in literature to account for
concentration in the banking system, among which are HHI, CRn and size, among others.
3.2.2 Empirical Literature Review
A number of studies have empirically attempted to measure banking competition by aver-
aging the individual Lerner indices. Weill (2013) analysed the evolution of bank competi-
tion measured with the Lerner index for the EU banks between 2002 and 2010 and obtained
an index for all 27 EU countries ranging from 12.20% to 20.34%. This represents a highly
competitive banking environment, but revealed a less improved competitive EU banking
system compared to an earlier period of 1994 to 2004 conducted by Carbo´, Humphrey,
Maudos, and Molyneux (2009) with an index ranging from 11% to 22%. De Guevara,
Maudos, and Pe´rez (2007) observed an average of 20.45% for Spanish banking system be-
tween 1986 and 2002. Likewise, Maudos and Sol´ıs (2011) found that the Mexican banking
system between 1993 and 2005 was monopolistically competitive. Furthermore, Agoraki et
al. (2011) in a study of 13 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries between 1998-
2005; Ariss (2010), 60 developing countries including 14 African countries, 1999-2005;
Amidu (2013), 55 developing countries inclusive of 22 African countries, 2000-2007; Beck
et al. (2013) 79 countries between 1994-2009; Fu et al. (2014), 14 Asian countries between
2003 and 2010; Berger et al. (2009), 23 industrialised countries, 1999-2005; employed the
Lerner index as a proxy for competition in their various studies and found varied degree
of market imperfection in the banking markets considered.
Only few empirical studies have measured competition of the banking soectors in the
African region following the era of carrying out sweeping banking reforms. Specifically,
Kouki and Al-Nasser (2014) on the implication of competition in 31 African countries with
focus on deposit money banks (DMBs), used Lerner index to compute their competition
variable and found index waving between 58% in Sudan and 74% in Mauritania with an
overall average of 62.21% between 2005 and 2010. This study captured Africa as a conti-
nent without taking cognisance of the peculiarity of the SSA region. Other specific country
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studies sighted were those of Abdelkader and Mansouri (2013) for the period 1999-2003
and Simpasa (2011) between 2004 to 2008 both in Tanzania and Ajisafe and Akinlo (2013)
in Nigeria for the period 1990-2009 for which all the authors employed PR H statistics.
While Abdelkader and Mansouri (2013) found monopoly condition in the Tanzania bank-
ing market for the periods considered, Simpasa (2011) found a condition of oligopoly for
later periods up to 2008 in Tanzania, suggesting an evolution in the competitive condition
of Tanzania. Ajisafe and Akinlo (2013) however, found monopolistic competition in the
banking market of Nigeria.
We found just (Hussain & Mustapha, 2010) in literature who have considered the determi-
nants of banking competition using banks’ specific variables in European Union banking
sector including some Latin American countries. Their study covered the period 2000 to
2008 and with a panel OLS regression they found that banking market structure depends
on the characteristics of the industry. They showed that net interest margin (NIM) and
return on assets (ROA) are negatively related to competition while equity capital ratio
(ECR) shows a positive relationship.
The foregoing discussion therefore constitutes the gap that our study fills by measur-
ing the competitive condition of 37 SSA countries commercial banking sectors for the
periods of 2006 to 2015 using the Lerner index that is capable of measuring individual
bank level competition in the short run and on year-on-year basis. Besides, to the best of
our knowledge, no study in this region has explored the bank specific factors that drives
bank competition.
3.3 Methodology
A competitive banking environment drives efficiency, access to finance and stability (Casu
et al., 2015). The goal of bank under competition according to the industrial organisation
theory is to manage its volume of loans and deposits such that its corresponding interme-
diation margin equals its technology (Freixas et al., 2008). In other words, competitive
banks induce savings by offering high deposit rates, as well as lower their real interest
rates for loan to sell more; moreover, the contestable market theory argues that potential
competition is enough to drive an efficient pricing banking system. The case is however
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different for a monopoly bank that is facing a downward sloping demand for deposits and
an upward sloping supply for loan, giving it the power to charge very high price for loans
and at same time low price for deposits. These suggest that for SSA to harness its po-
tential for growth, its banks must be competitive to mobilise its savings and investment
capabilities. It has been argued that SSA developmental aspiration will be unlocked once
issues of competition in SSA banks is addressed (Watkins, 2014). Then the question is,
how competitive is SSA commercial banks?
3.3.1 Model Specification
To answer the question of how competitive SSA commercial banks are, this study will
compute the bank level competition index of SSA commercial banks using the Lerner in-
dex2 This method has been widely used in literature and in some studies of the degree
of competitiveness of African banking sectors, Aboagye et al. (2008) in Ghana, for one
country study of SSA and Kouki and Al-Nasser (2014) for a panel of 31 countries in Africa.
This study adopts the Lerner index because among its contemporaries, it is one of two
most superior competition measures following the outcome of the correlation of all indi-
cators by Liu et al. (2013b). In addition, the index allows for short term estimation and
so can be used to compute competition of the banking market at any point in time, (Ago-
raki et al., 2011; Amidu, 2013; Ariss, 2010; Berger et al., 2009; Fu et al., 2014; Kouki &
Al-Nasser, 2014). Finally, it is theoretically sound because it helps to locate the degree of
competition between perfect competition and monopoly (Berger et al., 2009; Rojas, 2011).
The Lerner index has a number of criticisms; there are divergent views on the estimation
of price, for instance, while Casu and Girardone (2006) favoured both the traditional and
non-traditional activities for price measurement, Molyneux, Lloyd-Williams, and Thorn-
ton (1994) and Bikker and Haaf (2002) among others considered just the traditional loan
deposits services, this could result in the variation of Lerner index. In addition, it has
been argued that the index ignores risk that formed a major part of the costs of banks
and the attendant effect would mean an inflated index (Tan, 2013). However, research
has supported the use of both the traditional and non-traditional bank activities in price
2For the purpose of hindsight, H statistics (Panzar & Rosse, 1987), Boone indicator (Boone, 2008a)
conjectural variation approach (Iwata, 1974), persistence of profit (Mueller, 1977) are other alternative
methods that could be used.
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determination because of the increase in non-interest income overtime in banking (Ajisafe
& Akinlo, 2013). Morever, studies that have adjusted the Lerner index to risk found
results that are not fundamentally different from the conventional Lerner index. Liu et
al. (2013b) did a correlation analysis of results of competition measurement models and
found that the Lerner index is one of the two most valid measures of bank competition.
To this extent, the Lerner index approach which is modelled going forward is considered
plausible for this study.
Given that the optimal output, QTYi, of banks i, i = 1, · · · , N at time t, is at the point
where marginal cost, MCi, equals its marginal revenue, MRi, the ratio of the difference
between the price, Pi, and the marginal cost, MCi, on price is the Lerner index denoted
as LIi and expressed algebraically as shown in equation (3.3.1), (Flamini, Schumacher, &
McDonald, 2009).
LIi =
Pi −MCi
Pi
(3.3.1)
Where Pi is the estimate of average price of bank production in country i which is proxied
by the ratio of bank total revenue to total assets (Berg & Kim, 1994; Berger et al., 2009;
Carbo´ et al., 2009; Ferna´ndez & Gonza´lez, 2005; Shaffer, 2004). To estimate MCi, the
first derivative of translog cost function3 with respect to QTYi is computed. The inability
to econometrically estimate marginal cost account for the recent application in literature
of Lerner index that has been known among economist since the mid-1930s. Marginal cost
is extracted from the cost function through a translog approach.
The translog cost function, used generally in finance (Berger et al., 2009; Kouki & Al-
Nasser, 2014) is an expression of a specific production model which for this study is
assumed to be specified as the translog production function4. The name translog stands
for transcendental logarithmic, in other words, translog cost function is a second-order
Taylor series expansion of banks cost in natural logarithm. The general form of Taylor
series expansion for functions involving more than one variable is given by the expression
3Another way to estimate cost function is the average variable cost expressed as the ratio of total
variable cost to total asset or total income. Although this seems a simpler and straight forward approach,
it has been argued to be inaccurate.
4Some other common production functional form include; linear, Cobb-Douglas, quadratic, normalised
quadratic, constant elasticity of substitution and generalised Leontief functions.
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below;
T (x1, ..., xd) =
∞∑
n1=0
...
∞∑
nd=0
(x1 − a1)n1 ...(xd − ad)nd
n1!...nd!
(
δn1+...+ndf
δxn11 ...δx
nd
d
)
(a1, ..., ad)
= f(a1, ..., ad) +
d∑
j=1
δf(a1, ..., ad)
δxj
(xj − aj) + 1
2!
d∑
j=1
d∑
k=1
δ2f(a1, ..., ad)
δxjδxk
(xj − aj) (xk − ak) + ...
(3.3.2)
Based on the definition of translog cost function, the generalised translog production
function which takes into account of n inputs (Coelli & Rao, 1998) is given below;
ln(Y ) = β0 +
N∑
n=1
βnln(Xn) +
1
2
N∑
n=1
N∑
m=1
βnmln(Xn)ln(Xm) (3.3.3)
Where Y is output, ln is the natural logarithm, Xn are the inputs, β0,βn, and βnm are
the model parameters. More precisely, βn and βnm are the first and the second partial
derivatives.
Relying on the intermediation approach for measuring bank output (Ajisafe & Akinlo,
2013; Sealey & Lindley, 1977) the total cost of banks consists of one output, QTY, and
three inputs, W1, W2,and W3, representing price of labour (ratio of personnel expense to
total assets), price of physical capital (non-interest expense to fixed assets) and price of
fund (interest expense to total deposits) respectively. Hence, the total cost function of
banks is given by;
C = F (QTY,W1,W2,W3) (3.3.4)
We substitute equation (3.3.4) in the generalised translog production function in equation
(3.3.3). This produced the translog cost function as shown in equation (3.3.5) which was
obtained by approximating the logarithm of the total cost function by a function of the
logarithm of the output and inputs. For the purpose of this work and for simplicity, we
drop subscript it and denote W1,W2 and W3 as K,L,and M respectively in subsequent
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equations unless otherwise stated.
ln(C) = β0 + βqln(QTY ) + βK ln(K) + βlln(L) + βmln(M) +
1
2
[βqqln(QTY )ln(QTY )
+ βqkln(QTY )ln(K) + βkqln(K)ln(QTY ) + βqlln(QTY )ln(L) + βlqln(L)ln(QTY )
+ βqmln(QTY )ln(M) + βmqln(M)ln(QTY ) + βkkln(K)ln(K) + βklln(K)ln(L)
+ βlkln(L)ln(K) + βkmln(k)ln(n) + βmkln(M)ln(K) + βllin(L)ln(L) + βlmln(L)ln(M)
+ βmlln(M)ln(L) + βmmlnMln(M)] + µ
(3.3.5)
Recall from basic partial derivatives that fxy = fyx for any function with two variables.
Hence, the second order cross derivatives of the form, βnm = βmn. Based on this, equation
(3.3.5) is simplified thus:
ln(C) = β0 + βqln(QTY ) + βK ln(K) + βlln(L) + βmln(M) +
1
2
βqqln(QTY )
2
+
1
2
[2βqkln(QTY )ln(K) + 2βqlln(QTY )ln(L) + 2βqmln(QTY )ln(M)] +
1
2
[βkkln(K)ln(K)
+ βklln(K)ln(L) + βlkln(L)ln(K) + βkmln(k)ln(n) + βmkln(M)ln(K) + βllin(L)ln(L)
+ βlmln(L)ln(M) + βmlln(M)ln(L) + βmmlnMln(M)] + µ
(3.3.6)
Rearranging equation (3.3.6) and simplifying it further by collecting like terms, it becomes,
ln(C) = β0 + βqln(QTY ) +
1
2
βqqln(QTY )
2 + βK ln(K) + βlln(L) + βmln(M) + βqkln(QTY )ln(K)
+ βqlln(QTY )ln(L) + βqmln(QTY )ln(M) +
1
2
[βkkln(K)ln(K) + βklln(K)ln(L) + βlkln(L)ln(K)
+ βkmln(k)ln(n) + βmkln(M)ln(K) + βllin(L)ln(L) + βlmln(L)ln(M) + βmlln(M)ln(L)
+ βmmlnMln(M)] + µ
(3.3.7)
We chose for simplicity to represent the parameters; βq = β1, βqq = β2, βk,l,m = θ1,2,3,
βqk,ql,qm =
∮
1,2,3, βkk,kl,km = Ø11,12,13, βlk,ll,lm = Ø21,22,23, βmk,ml,mm = Ø31,32,33, and to
transform the variables back to their original form such that equation (3.3.7) becomes
ln(C) = β0 + β1ln(QTY ) +
1
2
β2ln(QTY )
2 + θ1ln(W1) + θ2ln(W2) + θ3ln(W3) +
∮
1
ln(QTY )ln(W1)
+
∮
2
ln(QTY )ln(W2) +
∮
3
ln(QTY )ln(W3) +
1
2
[Ø11ln(W1)ln(W1) + Ø12ln(W1)ln(W2)
+ Ø13ln(W1)ln(W3) + Ø21ln(W2)ln(W1) + Ø22ln(W2)ln(W2) + Ø23in(W2)ln(W3)
+ Ø31ln(W3)ln(W1) + Ø32ln(W3)ln(W2) + Ø33lnW3ln(W3)] + µ
(3.3.8)
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The reduced translog cost function (equation (3.3.9)) in panel form by bringing back the
subscript i that we dropped for simplicity and in introducing time, t, to the model is
shown below.
ln(C) = β0 + β1ln(QTYit) +
1
2
β2ln(QTY
2
it) +
3∑
k=1
θkln(Wkit) +
3∑
k=1
∮
k
ln(QTYit)ln(Wkit)
+
1
2
3∑
k=1
3∑
j=1
Økjln(Wkit)ln(Wjit) + µit
(3.3.9)
Where QTYit is bank output measured as the natural log of total assets of bank i in time
t (Guevara & Maudos, 2011), Wkit is the vector of the three input prices and µit is the
error term.
Taking the first derivative of the translog cost function with respect to output give the
marginal cost as follows:
MCit =
δCit
δQTYit
=
1
QTYit
(
β1 + β2ln(QTYit) +
3∑
k=1
∮
k
ln(Wkit)
)
(3.3.10)
Substituting equation (3.3.10) for marginal cost in equation (3.3.1), the degree of compe-
tition will be computed using;
LIit =
Pit − 1QTYit
(
β1 + β2ln(QTYit) +
∑3
k=1
∮
k ln(Wkit)
)
Pit
(3.3.11)
According to Leon (2015a) the Lerner index for market j is obtained as follows;
Lj =
∑
ij
φijLij (3.3.12)
Where Lij is the Lerner index of bank i in market or country j and φij the weighting
of bank i (often the market share of bank i in market j ). An unweighted Lerner index
implies that φi =
1
N , where N is the number of banks in market j. Market share has
been proxied in literature using the total assets of banks relative to industry, market or
country’s total asset (Ahokpossi, 2013).
The model for the estimation of the determinants of the competitive condition of the
SSA commercial banks is based on Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover
(1995) generalised method of moments modelled in Subsection 4.3.1 in Chapter 4. This
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permits the capturing of the commercial banks specific variables that drive competition
while controlling for a range of macroeconomic variables. The estimable version of the
model is expressed below;
likit = δkit + λlikit−1 + ψkitΣχkit + %kitΣℵkit + υkit (3.3.13)
Where the subscripts kit signify bank, country and year respectively. Li measures bank
level competition with its one period lag value, δ is the intercept while λ, ψ, % are coef-
ficients. Σχ represent the range of banks specific variables that drives competition, these
are; equity capital ratio (ECR), liquidity ratio (LAR), assets quality (QLTY), return on
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and net interest margin (NIM). The macroeconomic
variables considered are gross domestic product annual growth (GDPG) and annual infla-
tion rate (INF) denoted by Σℵ with υ as the error term.
3.3.2 Data
To compute the degree of competitiveness of SSA commercial banks, this study uses the
individual bank level annual data sets of 440 banks financial profiles from 37 African coun-
tries for the periods 2006 - 2015. The choice of period is informed by data availability on
BankScope database compiled by Fitch/IBCA Bureau Van Dijk. We excluded countries5
with issues on data integrity and those we considered outliers.
Data on personnel expenses include wages and salaries, social security contributions, con-
tributions to pension funds and other related labour expenses (Delis, Staikouras, & Var-
lagas, 2008). For interest expenses, data collected include interests on current accounts,
savings accounts, time deposits, repurchase agreements and alternative funding sources
such as retail bonds (Tan, 2013; Wang, Zeng, & Zhang, 2014). Non-interest expense
comprise data on administration expenses which include rents, service charges, security,
communication and information systems, other office and insurance expenses, professional
charges, publicity and advertising, plus depreciation. Data on total revenue include both
interest revenue, other operating income and non-interest income. The increase in non-
interest income overtime in banking has prompted the use of total revenue in banking
5for instance, South Africa considered outlier because of the sophistication of the banking sector and
countries like Congo, Sudan among others for paucity and integrity of data due their economies been
ravaged by wars
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research in the recent time (Ajisafe & Akinlo, 2013; Berger et al., 2009; Prasad & Ghosh,
2005).
Our main variable for the determinant of competition in the SSA region commercial banks
is the size of the bank. This is proxied by the natural log of banks total assets. Nabieu
(2013) argued that the total assets of a bank represent the bank’s specific market share and
is expected to be negatively related to competition based on SCP assumptions. Further-
more, we follow Hussain and Mustapha (2010) to select bank specific variables of capital,
liquidity, quality of assets and profitability measures of banks as potential determinants
of bank competition. They argued that changes in these variables have the effects of
changing the overall banking conditions, thus hypothesise a logical link to competition. In
addition, we included two macroeconomics variables of annual GDP growth and inflation
due to the macroeconomic nature of the banking system.
3.4 Empirical Results
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below present the results of the competition indices for SSA commer-
cial banks for the period 2006-2015. We had in subsection 3.3.1 modelled the translog
cost fuction for the variant of Lerner index used to capture the core activities of com-
mercial banks in SSA region based on Sealey and Lindley (1977) as their activities to the
present are still predominantly intermediation in nature. Hence, Table 3.1 contains the
summary statistics of the bank level competition reflective of this model. This summary
revealed some interesting features of the competitive nature of the banking environment in
the SSA region. We found that competition index/degree of market power for individual
banks range between 0.0000 in 2013 and 0.9978 in 2012 as depicted by the minimum and
maximum values. The implication of this is that while some banks have absolutely very
low market power others have very high degree of market power with the ability to control
a sizeable proportion of the banking environment. However, we found that despite the
degree of variation of market power, the means of the indices are close to the minimum
value. We can deduce two possible implications from this. Firstly, the result implied that
banks with a very high degree of market power are very few and in some cases, they are
isolated cases. This is consistent with literature that used the concentration ratio as com-
petition measure and found some degree of concentration in banking sectors. Secondly, the
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Table 3.1: Bank Level’s Competition Index Summary Statistics
Year Mean SD Min Max
2006 0.2557 0.1656 0.0006 0.8370
2007 0.2694 0.1557 0.0129 0.7842
2008 0.2884 0.1773 0.0109 0.9674
2009 0.2939 0.1884 0.0102 0.9213
2010 0.2959 0.1829 0.0004 0.9790
2011 0.2822 0.1728 0.0030 0.9767
2012 0.3237 0.1945 0.0050 0.9978
2013 0.3350 0.3143 0.0000 0.9881
2014 0.3318 0.1855 0.0003 0.9963
2015 0.3244 0.1964 0.0006 0.9957
Sources: Authors’ Estimation, 2017, based on data
collected.
means being close to the minimum suggests some form of competition within the banking
sector as the minimum values are close to zero which meant a monopolistic competitive
banking market. The standard deviation which measures the deviation from the mean
affirms our suspicion providing credence to the conclusion of a monopolistic competitive
banking system.
3.4.1 Competition analysis
Table 3.2 below shows the results of competition depicting a varying degree of market
power in the commercial banking sectors during the periods considered. The total column
shows the average index for the countries in the sample and the row total show the yearly
distribution of the index of market power from 2006 to 2016 for the SSA region as a whole.
Overall, SSA regions commercial banks competition index stood at 0.2460 approximately
during the period of this study. While most countries have their indices below this mean,
we found that only about six countries are above it. Furthermore, the results show that
out of the six countries with index above the mean, Botswana, Malawi and Namibia be-
long to the Southern Africa region with 0.3454, 0.3804 and 0.3784 respectively. Ghana
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and Nigeria in West Africa also having 0.4352 and 0.3448 with Uganda in East Africa
having 0.4221. This suggests that these regions may have the most concentration of mar-
ket power compared to other regions of the SSA. Aligning with the summary statistics in
Table 3.2: SSA Region Competition Index
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
Angola 0.065421 0.097832 0.120411 0.124526 0.258332 0.207652 0.31061 0.230903 0.204018 0.213769 0.183347
Benin 0.18813 0.268522 0.074342 0.079369 0.109372 0.179535 0.191783 0.028362 0.139927
Botswana 0.41853 0.495537 0.415291 0.398058 0.352876 0.261277 0.290714 0.280079 0.279677 0.261429 0.345347
Burkina Faso 0.071393 0.135803 0.046363 0.068002 0.103534 0.154452 0.086129 0.095664 0.035652 0.018208 0.08152
Cameroon 0.226445 0.100812 0.12154 0.35474 0.38554 0.391537 0.495393 0.515827 0.372902 0.247272 0.321201
Cape Verde 0.080306 0.08957 0.166683 0.126485 0.097364 0.065904 0.016599 0.091845
CAR 0.466527 0.28377 0.567765 0.092447 0.127969 0.132734 0.077789 0.046362 0.122516 0.213098
Chad 0.837031 0.387705 0.275987 0.261423 0.207221 0.296301 0.092021 0.181206 0.147656 0.146466 0.283302
Djibouti 0.101319 0.092217 0.187151 0.074287 0.274413 0.518477 0.467877 0.380818 0.358804 0.272818
E. Guinea 0.274265 0.188215 0.23124
Ethiopia 0.036623 0.01417 0.021523 0.054223 0.061985 0.037705
Gabon 0.304602 0.339941 0.300123 0.257721 0.235867 0.167995 0.148784 0.282051 0.099412 0.119971 0.225647
Ghana 0.445172 0.351556 0.348728 0.462851 0.457683 0.4031 0.429117 0.455854 0.48128 0.516627 0.435197
Guinea 0.141299 0.312424 0.370526 0.074505 0.109427 0.071267 0.145692 0.175163 0.175038
Ivory Coast 0.134617 0.161376 0.143645 0.064083 0.102507 0.119813 0.097698 0.115092 0.11904 0.126009 0.118388
Kenya 0.245114 0.232857 0.277526 0.287116 0.291172 0.302607 0.409676 0.40179 0.385031 0.39278 0.322567
Lesotho 0.2254 0.358871 0.233187 0.171759 0.134115 0.215399 0.285591 0.213069 0.133109 0.218944
Liberia 0.023647 0.20779 0.115718
Malawi 0.456018 0.353385 0.270827 0.30436 0.311011 0.322545 0.390127 0.436769 0.503659 0.455597 0.38043
Mali 0.017308 0.053635 0.075161 0.110276 0.067184 0.092172 0.117589 0.116763 0.075745 0.018696 0.074453
Mauritania 0.236234 0.093693 0.392847 0.255537 0.117236 0.544336 0.109889 0.190124 0.275192 0.246121
Mauritius 0.222107 0.247908 0.292037 0.261771 0.313006 0.250943 0.235541 0.176467 0.059297 0.590743 0.264982
Mozambique 0.228342 0.351254 0.383867 0.308581 0.297472 0.381043 0.385831 0.285624 0.339606 0.306047 0.326767
Namibia 0.444722 0.428396 0.45753 0.460304 0.415033 0.343708 0.281095 0.304976 0.292295 0.355685 0.378374
Niger 0.053738 0.213415 0.186278 0.312917 0.080205 0.070264 0.119265 0.075966 0.105901 0.135328
Nigeria 0.224949 0.308661 0.336525 0.450728 0.336709 0.279205 0.379483 0.392744 0.376448 0.362907 0.344836
Rwanda 0.224498 0.264563 0.303845 0.361105 0.300362 0.269553 0.327953 0.297518 0.293675
Senegal 0.248176 0.282613 0.299681 0.292004 0.21978 0.275542 0.147133 0.251955 0.194679 0.123176 0.233474
Seychelles 0.021818 0.27152 0.166672 0.083041 0.135763
Sierra Leone 0.230387 0.238683 0.239474 0.278006 0.238491 0.270726 0.262031 0.275976 0.331167 0.290639 0.265558
Swaziland 0.187937 0.283316 0.398314 0.247199 0.151684 0.087821 0.083403 0.051569 0.11542 0.114098 0.172076
Tanzania 0.177395 0.25941 0.252369 0.281637 0.225099 0.19494 0.303348 0.288705 0.294501 0.289103 0.256651
The Gambia 0.276819 0.346128 0.418295 0.459172 0.348642 0.258864 0.301389 0.189866 0.199847 0.271667 0.307069
Togo 0.159375 0.170577 0.102373 0.059697 0.065713 0.018235 0.157644 0.188696 0.136832 0.09098 0.115012
Uganda 0.367278 0.359364 0.3989 0.404256 0.442976 0.395169 0.425404 0.48976 0.492994 0.445247 0.422135
Zambia 0.297172 0.188736 0.294294 0.292279 0.346161 0.320364 0.185807 0.534413 0.277874 0.337614 0.307471
Total 0.257709 0.256949 0.265927 0.244954 0.23796 0.240631 0.232604 0.257376 0.235889 0.229959 0.245996
Sources: Authors’ Estimation, 2017; based on Leon (2015a)’s market Lerner index, Lj =
∑
ij φijLij
Table 3.1 range of market power indices presented in the table suggests each of the coun-
tries commercial banking sectors considered have a condition of monopolistic competitive
banking environment for the study period which in aggregate makes the banking sector of
the subregion as a whole highly competitive and largely contestable.
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Figure 3.1: SSA Competition Index by Country
Figure 3.2: SSA Competition Index by Year
The graphs in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 above provide a cursory look at the foregoing
results, depicting the analysis of the trend of competition in the regions within the pe-
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riods under review. Specifically the graph in Figure 3.1 represents the country analysis
of competition providing a pictorial view of the descriptions attempted above. It suffices
to say that the graph shows clearly the distinction of market power amidst the countries
of the region. With Ethiopia having the least at 0.0377 and Ghana with the highest at
0.4352. Figure 3.2’s graph depicts the evolution of commercial bank year-on-year compe-
tition/market power in the SSA region from 2006 to 2015. The indices peaked in 2008 at
0.2659 and least in 2015 at 0.2300. We noted from the graph that there is a downward
trend in market power over the period as indicated by the trend line. This downward
movement was maintained except in 2013 that it rose and dropped thereafter.
3.4.2 Determinants of Competition in SSA
The correlations between the endogenous and the exogenous variables are reported in Ta-
ble 3.3 below. This is followed by the regression results of the determinant of competition
in the commercial banking sectors of the SSA region in Table 3.4. We found a generally
weak but significant correlation between competition and the determinant variables for
most part of the study period. The size of banks for most periods of the study is neg-
atively related to competition, though not significant except for 2014, which may have
largely been due to the weakness in association. This association of size and competition
is consistent with the expectation of the SCP framework, however, we will rely on the
result of econometric analysis for a robust conclusion on this. CAP shows a negative cor-
relation throughout the period while LAR exhibits the same association except in 2006
and 2007 that it is positive but rather too weak and insignificant. Although ALQTY
shows a positive association, the results are not statistically significant. The measures of
profitability, ROA, ROE and NIM show positive correlation in most cases but with mixed
significance. This is the same for the macroeconomic variables, GDPG and INF. How
much this influences competition will depend on whether the signs are consistent with the
results of the econometric analysis in Table 3.4 below.
Our analysis followed the efficient estimation technique of Arellano and Bond (1991) to
improve on Hussain and Mustapha (2010) and as well account for endogeneity. Hence, we
employ the two-step system GMM approach to analyse the determinants of commercial
banks competition in the SSA region. The regression result is presented in the second
column of Table 3.4. We included the economic impact of the regression coefficients of the
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Table 3.3: Correlation Analysis
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
li & size -0.0981 0.0395 -0.0537 -0.0435 -0.0477 -0.0671 -0.0396 0.0781 0.0939 0.0615
p-value 0.1783 0.5649 0.3976 0.4726 0.4137 0.2312 0.4552 0.1227 0.0518 0.1977
li & cap -0.1436 -0.2827 -0.0457 -0.1453 -0.3373 -0.3327 -0.3059 -0.0126 -0.0977 -0.0227
p-value 0.0481 0.0000 0.4716 0.0159 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8032 0.0428 0.6346
li & lar 0.0047 0.0352 -0.0197 -0.2795 -0.0902 -0.1441 -0.2842 -0.1451 -0.163 -0.1059
p-value 0.9492 0.6111 0.7599 0.0000 0.1269 0.0107 0.0000 0.0044 0.0008 0.0282
li & aqlty 0.0758 0.0349 0.0108 0.0482 0.0499 0.026 -0.0389 0.0432 0.0328 0.0402
p-value 0.335 0.6355 0.8726 0.4533 0.4252 0.662 0.4946 0.4294 0.5316 0.4409
li & nim 0.1885 0.1625 0.1994 0.184 0.266 0.1151 0.112 0.2204 0.0122 0.1136
p-value 0.0102 0.0184 0.0019 0.0025 0.0000 0.0416 0.0362 0.0000 0.8027 0.0186
li & roa 0.0338 0.2649 0.0771 0.3189 0.039 -0.0596 0.1213 0.0559 0.0715 0.0062
p-value 0.6433 0.0001 0.2244 0.0000 0.5041 0.288 0.0219 0.2699 0.1389 0.8966
li & roe -0.0005 0.0496 0.0788 0.1581 0.0224 0.0099 0.0358 0.0302 0.0072 -0.0118
p-value 0.9943 0.4716 0.2184 0.0092 0.7027 0.8609 0.5002 0.5521 0.882 0.8057
li & GDPG -0.0514 0.0093 0.0748 0.0724 0.0667 0.0464 0.0672 0.0416 0.1092 0.0335
p-value 0.4851 0.8921 0.2387 0.2314 0.2526 0.4085 0.2051 0.4119 0.0235 0.4937
li & inf 0.0609 -0.0169 0.0409 0.0925 0.0333 0.0342 0.0624 0.1036 0.0735 0.1339
p-value 0.404 0.8058 0.5195 0.1258 0.5687 0.5418 0.2399 0.0404 0.1287 0.0083
Sources: Author’s Estimation, 2017, based on data collected.
explanatory variables on the dependent variable (competition). This indicates by what
percentage competition will change as a result of one standard deviation change in the ex-
planatory variable. The results at a glance show that previous year banking competition
is a strong determinant of their current competition with competitive condition persis-
tent overtime. This is evidenced by the positive and statistically significant coefficient
of the lagged value of competition variable, LI. Size is strongly positive and statistically
significant to explain competition in the SSA region’s commercial banks.
Table 3.4: GMM Regression Result
Model
VARIABLES lerneri ecoimpact
L.lerneri 0.575***
(0.000703)
size 0.0978*** 0.8463
(0.0186)
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Table 3.4: (GMM Regression Result continued)
Model
VARIABLES lerneri ecoimpact
ecr 4.439*** 3.4818
(0.245)
lar -0.647*** -1.7196
(0.0429)
aqlty -0.980*** -0.2512
(0.29)
nim 1.157*** 0.8063
(0.195)
roa 0.0279*** 0.0076
(0.00609)
roe -0.00324*** -0.0080
(0.000817)
gdpg 0.524*** 0.1082
(0.145)
inf 0.00844*** 0.2830
(0.00126)
Constant -1.724***
(0.248)
Observations 2,306
Number of id 393
Wald χ2 (9) 1.31E+06
Prob > χ2 0.000
AR2 0.297
Hansen J Stats 0.388
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017
ecoimpact = S.D of explanatory variable×R.C of explanatory variableS.D of dependent variable
Where ecoimpact represents economic impact of regression, S.D is standard deviation
and R.C is regression coefficient.
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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The results show that the economic impact of the size of banks on the competitive condi-
tion is significant. Indicating that a one standard deviation increase in the size of a bank
will increase its competitive potential by 84.6%. This is a direct relationship that is almost
inconsistent with the result of the correlation found in Table 3.3. Theoretical expectation
is that as size of banks increases the industry becomes more concentrated, hence reduces
competition. This is the position of SCP for which this finding negates. This result aligns
with the monopolistic competitive market reported earlier in subsection 3.4.1 above. One
reason why size may not reduce competition despite the concentrated nature of the market
as reported in literature can be explained by Perrakis et al. (1982)’s market contestability
theory that argued that incumbent market participant get disciplined by potential new
entrant and therefore becomes competitive irrespective of the level of concentration. More-
over, existing banks still have to fight for available market share thereby creating a quite
competitive banking environment. Contrary to the signs of the correlation results, but in
line with our expectations and consistent with the study of Hussain and Mustapha (2010),
we found capital, CAP, to be positive and strongly significant to explain competition at
1% level of significance. The economic impact suggests that a one standard deviation
increase in capital will induce about 348% direct influence on the competitive condition
of the SSA banking system. Liquid assets, LAR, exhibit strong significance but negative
relationship with competition. While this is consistent with the correlation results, we
expect positive signs as banks are most likely going to find incentive to compete with
more liquidity at their disposal, although issues of how much liquidity could be used up
in the ordinary cause of their business is a subject of regulation. Similarly, asset quality,
AQTLY was found to be negatively related to competition in line with the signs of their
correlation association. The better the quality of assets of banks the more competitively
dispose we expect the industry should be, however, the result might as well reflect the
reality as the banking sectors in the region did not fair quite well in terms of asset quality
over the study period as reviewed in literature and will be seen hereafter. All the perfor-
mance measures employed, NIM, ROA and ROE, are significant and positively related to
competition, with the exception of ROE that is negative. The results of ROA and NIM
do not follow the study of Hussain and Mustapha (2010) who found them to be negatively
related to competition in their studies, making ROE the only performance measure that
align with their empirical findings. We indeed expect a profitable bank to find incentive
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to compete and this is the case with SSA commercial banking sector. In closing, GDPG
and INF are found to be positive and strongly significant to determine competition in
the banking sector of the SSA region. These are consistent with the correlation signs on
the two macroeconomic variables and in fact in line with a priori, growth period encour-
ages more economic activities while in periods of rising price level banks would strive to
keep their firm’s value by competing the more. Notably, the periods of inflation may also
compel banks to be conservative in order to maintain their charter value.
3.4.3 Discussion and Inference
The variation in the bank level market power index as shown by the margin between the
maximum and the minimum values in the competition summary statistics in Table 3.1 of
this study is an indication of the pockets market concentration that is found to be preva-
lent in most Sub-Saharan African banking markets (Mlachila, Dykes, et al., 2013) and and
also referred to in our reviews in Chapter 2. These call to mind whether or not the vari-
ous regulations implemented to ensure a competitive banking system have fully actualised
their aims. We have also found results that align with and in some cases consistent with
studies in the extant literature as per the behaviour of bank level competition in a number
of African countries in which similar studies have been carried out. A monopolistically
competitive commercial banking sector in Tanzania for instance shows an improvement in
the competitive condition of the banking sectors of the country. The two previous stud-
ies on competition in Tanzania by Abdelkader and Mansouri (2013) from 1993–2003 and
Simpasa (2011) from 2004–2008 found monopoly condition and oligopolistic competition
respectively in the banking sector. Our study, covering 2006-2015 is therefore a validation
of the evolution of competitive behaviour of banking in the country. We found consistency
of our result with the Ajisafe and Akinlo (2013)’s monopolistic competitive behaviour
of Nigerian banking markets. Comparing the monopolistic competition we found in the
SSA region with a more oligopolistic competitive condition found by Kouki and Al-Nasser
(2014) in their study or 31 African countries is an indication that competition is evolving
in the African region as whole. Kouki and Al-Nasser (2014) found an average market
power index of within 58% and 74% within the period 2005-2010. Other studies that our
findings are consistent with include, works in EU by Weill (2013) and Carbo´ et al. (2009),
Spanish banking sector (De Guevara et al., 2007), and Mexican banking sector (Maudos
& Sol´ıs, 2011) all concluded on monopolistic competitive banking conditions. Studies
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by Berger et al. (2009), Fu et al. (2014), Aboagye et al. (2008), Amidu (2013) and Ariss
(2010) found a varying degree of market power in a number of countries that were studied.
In the case of market competition, it is not surprising, as already stated, to find a com-
petitive market, which in this case is in the form of a monopolistic competitive market.
This, no doubt, is informed by the contestable market theory of Perrakis et al. (1982) who
argued that even in the face of market power and/or market concentration, a market could
be contestable, as the threat of entry will impact on the behaviour of the incumbents in
the market. How much this competition has impacted on the extent of financial interme-
diation as the core banking function in the region has left much to be desired. As shown
in statistics by World Bank Development Indicators over our study period, interest rates
spread is high, banks credit to the private sector is low, lending cost is high, while deposit
rates could not be said to be moderate, and banking coverage is low on aggregate. These
indices are not consistent with a competitive market environment, which should mean that
they are good. Unfortunately, banks in the region are being accused of competing for gov-
ernment funds rather than mobilising surplus for deficit financing of the real sector of the
economy, which could engender an overall growth in the long term. The policy implication
will be to seek macroeconomic policies that gel with relevant statutory pronouncements
and will complement the current level of market competition, while continually working
to encourage the antitrust authorities to keep market power as low as practicable.
Ultimately, we found all the bank specific variables considered to be significant in deter-
mining the level of competition in the region. As against theory and a priori expectation,
bank size has the ability to increase the level of competition. This we consider a plus
but will need to be monitored closely to preclude its antitrust tendencies. In a similar
way, capital especially increases the level of competition considerably as well as the level
of performance including macroeconomics variable of annual GDP growth and inflation.
Both the quality of assets and liquid assets were found to be indirectly related to the level
of competition when in fact we expect a direct relationship. The fact that these variables
can significantly influence competition in the region suggests that they can be tinkered
with to moderate as well as increase the level of competition especially for a region that
seeks to increase the competitive conditions of its banking sectors.
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3.5 Summary
The Lerner index was used to analyse the bank level and market competitive condition
of SSA commercial banks. GMM was also employed to determine the bank specific and
macroeconomic factors that influence competition in the region. We took account of the
various forms of criticism of the Lerner index notably that it ignores risk which is funda-
mental in bank cost and price measurement that has no single acceptable measure. As
plausible as the arguments may be, empirical evidence has shown that studies that have
adjusted for these issues have not achieved much remarkable difference from the results of
the conventional Lerner index. Moreover, studies of Liu et al. (2013b) found the Lerner
index to be one of the two most valid ways of measuring competition hence validating
our methodology. We also modelled the translog cost function to reflect that the core
activities of commercial banking sectors in SSA region still remain that of intermediation.
The study found a mixed market power at bank level across the 37 SSA countries that
have been considered. Meanwhile, at market level lower market power is seen depicting
a relatively competitive banking sector. Hence the study concludes that SSA banking
sector is competitive notwistanding that it is laced with varying degrees of market power.
This thus gives credence to the theory of contestable market that or though there may
be high market power residing in the banks, the threat of potential entry will make the
market contestable. Mlachila, Dykes, et al. (2013); Senbet and Otchere (2006) argued that
banks in the region countries jostle for government funds rather than performing the main
financial intermediation role of mobilising surplus unit saving to bridge the gap of deficit
units. This study does recommend that while the antitrust agencies still need to concen-
trate more efforts at devolving the market powers that reside in the individual banks, it is
vital to continuously maintain and improve on the current market competition. Fiscal and
monetary policies must be harnessed to take advantage of the subsisting competitiveness
of the region’s banking sector so as to cash in on the much needed economic growth.
For determinants of banking competition, we found the size of banks, capital, and banks
performance measures, among others, to influence competition in the SSA banking sector.
As such, attention should be paid to capital and other bank specific variables that impact
on bank competition in the region.
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Chapter 4
Competition and Stability
4.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the relationship between competition and stability in the SSA
region’s commercial banking sector. It draws on the previous chapter of the competitive
condition of commercial banking sectors of the region. Various literature, theoretical and
empirical on this relationship is reviewed with the empirical results analysed and conclu-
sion drawn.
There are ongoing debates in literature on the relationship between competition and sta-
bility. Yet not much has been done on this in Africa let alone the Sub-Saharan African
region whether on regional or individual country basis (Leon, 2015b). Theoretical propo-
sitions argue that competition affects the stability of banks both through the charter value
and the franchise value, but are far from reaching concensus regarding the direction of re-
lationship. However, the main arguements have been across two divides; that competition
could be good or bad for the banking system. It is good where it enhances stability of the
system, hence the competition-stability view argument. On the other hand, competition
is bad if it leads to distress in the banking sector thereby causing the system to fail. This
is in line with competition-fragility view which argues that banks margin effects are lost in
competition that heightens banks incentives to take more risk which in turn threatens the
stability of the system. Yet another view which is now gaining momentum in literature is
the non-linear relationship between competition and stability that was theoretically mod-
elled by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) and found in empirical literature Berger et al. (2009);
Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro (2012).
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The SSA region is underdeveloped and confronted with abject poverty. The financial
systems in the SSA region are dominated by the banking system that is also immature.
Given that competition in the banking system has the potential to drive other sectors of
the economy, increase access to finance that could spur economic growth in the region,
there was the debate about increasing competition in this sector. While empirical work
has chatted the course of dealing with the issue of competition and especially as it bothers
on systemic stability in most regions of the world, no such work has focused on this region.
This is the gap that this study wants to fill beside investigating what the implication of
increasing competition is for stability in the region.
The study therefore contributes to extant literature in three ways. Firstly, we use large
datasets of commercial banks in 37 SSA region countries to test competition and stability
relationship. This is the first of its kind. Secondly, based on the agitation for increasing
competition in SSA region, this study provides evidence to guide policy makers in dealing
with issues of competition and stability relationship. And finally, we analysed whether
risk appetite has effects on the stability of banks in a competitive banking environment
and particularly identify a range and/or nature of risks to inform policy measures. Our
results thus provide evidence that support the competition fragility view over the study
period as we found negative and statistically significant relationship between competition,
surrogate by Lerner index and stability proxied by Zscore, in the dynamic panel data
model. In addition, we found that competition relates negatively with both surrogates
of credit and overall banks’ risks. This implies that risk-taking behaviour of banks, es-
pecially as it relates to their loans portfolio and charter value is significant in explaining
the cause of failure in a competitive banking environment. These provide a bit of caution
for policy makers in dealing with issues of competition and stability in SSA region while
highlighting flashpoints for focus when crafting policies to stimulate competition. Fu et al.
(2014) provided evidence to show that the recent financial crisis is a problem of excessive
competition in the banking system.
Going forward, the chapter is structured to capture the review of related literature that
includes both theoretical and empirical framework in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 are de-
scribed the various methods adopted to arrive at the results in Section 4.4 .Section 4.5
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concludes this chapter.
4.2 Literature Review
There is a substantial amount of theoretical and empirical evidence on the relationship
between competition and stability around the world. Yet specific literature telling the
SSA region part of the story is lacking. The perception about the relationship between
competition and stability in the banking system aligns with the industry disposition and
dates back to the periods of the great depression (Vives, 2016b). These periods up until
the 60’s in the US and 80’s in the EU (Carletti, 2008) were characterised by the feelings
that competition was inimical to the stability of the banking system and the systemic
well-being as whole and hence saw complacent regulators and practitioners preferring
collusion and/or a concentrated banking system. The fact that competition might mean
allocative efficiency that could help the stability of the system heralded the change in
this trend that procreated the waves of liberalisation that took place in the industry to
induce competition. This pattern continued until the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009
of which Africa was not spared as since in the 80s structural adjustment programs were
implemented across SSA as a hallmark for liberalising the banking system and putting an
end to indigenisation policies that characterised the nations after their independence. The
financial crisis however brought mixed feelings as per the role of competition in bringing
about the crisis and in some quarters the crisis was blamed on liberalisation and excessive
competition in the sector (Fu et al., 2014).
4.2.1 Competition and Stability: Theoretical Perspectives
The foundation of theories on competition and stability is at the heart of the debates that
competition accounts for the overweening risk taking in the loan market (in other words,
the assets side of banks’ financial position) culminating in probability of individual bank
runs and eventual failure (Casu, Girardone, & Molyneux, 2012). The dominance of the
assumption in conventional theories is that solving banks’ portfolio problem determined
by the allocation of banks’ assets have in recent literature provided plausible evidences of
the likelihood of competition being favourable to their risk portfolio. It follows that in
competitive banking markets, banks face the temptation to offer higher rates in the deposit
market while neglecting competition in the loan market thus causing earnings to decline.
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And so banks more often than not have no further options than to take on more risky
investments to compensate for the lost income. Conversely, when faced with competition
restrictions, banks arrogate market power with the propensity to charge higher deposit
rates with its attendant high profits. The tendency is that markets become uncompetitive
with banks overly reluctant to invest in projects that will fetch them as much returns as
in the deposit market, hence the probability of banks failure becomes low if not impossible.
Apparently, banks may fail in the absence of competition. Matutes and Vives (1996)
modelled the combined Diamond’s 1984 Banking Model, differentiated duopoly structure
a` la Hotelling and standard deposit contracts for investors show how banks could become
fragile as a result of depositors’ expectations rather than due to competition. The authors
argued that the chances of failure are embedded in vertical differentiation among banks
such that safer banks have larger margin cum higher market share that allows them to
better diversify their risk because the probability of success depends on the quality of the
bank. In their view, this likelihood of success is frail since it is based on depositors’ expec-
tation. Their model took into account multiple equilibria, with corner solution where just
one bank is active or equilibrium where no bank is active. It explains that system-wide
crisis of confidence occurs not due to market structure but happened due to coordination
misalignments among investors/depositors.
Matutes and Vives (2000) did a theoretical review on the relationship between compe-
tition and risk taking incentives in banks on the assets-side of the statement of financial
position, while focusing on competition for loans without taking cognisance of investment
activities. They argue that at a higher level of competition with apparent portfolio risk
on the asset side of the market, banks have no incentives to undertake risk if there are
regulatory constraints on the maximum banks can charge on their deposits; given the close
complementarity between the liability and the asset sides of their statement of financial
position. They however posit that where moral hazards exist, banks take as much risk
as they can as depositors are oblivious as to how deposit rates and asset allocation affect
expected returns as well as the probability that a bank may fail. Moreover, deposit insur-
ance with risk free premium based has the capacity to induce maximum asset risk taking
incentives on the parts of the banks when competition is high in the deposit market be-
cause depositors pay less attention to banks’ risk taking behaviour. On the other hand, a
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risk-based deposit insurance demands accountability from banks forcing them to minimise
their assets risks. In another study, Allen and Gale (2004) considered banks competing
a` la Cournot on the liability side of the banks’ balance sheet and chose a risk level in
the loan market, they show with insured deposits that banks’ have maximal incentives
to undertake risk as the number of banks grow. Meanwhile, Niinima¨ki (2004) modelled
the joint effects of competition and deposit insurance on banks’ risk taking and concludes
that the size of risk taking depends on the structure and the side of the market in which
competition takes place. With deposit insurance, competition induces fragility as banks
compete for deposits in the deposit markets, deposit rates becomes excessively high forcing
banks to undertake high risk; while deposit insurance has no influence if its monopoly or
banks competing in loan markets.
Theory modelling competition on both sides of the statement of financial position as-
sumes the main preoccupation of banks is solving the optimal contraction problem. The
argument is, with little or no competition in the deposit market, banks can take advantage
of monopoly rents by offering a very low rate, while they are also able to exploit the loan
market by charging very high interest rates. The bane of an uncompetitive market is that
the less competitive the market, the more banks are able to charge higher rates and such
rates make risk of default imminent as borrowers take on more risky investments. This
situation is worsened with the presence of moral hazards on the borrowers’ side. Thus,
banks become even more risky in less competitive markets. Dam, Escrihuela-Villar, and
Sa´nchez-Page´s (2015) also model the loan and deposit sides of banking sector balance sheet
based on spatial competition and came to the conclusion of stability in deposit market
- market power results in prudent investment and, fragility in loan market - as market
power makes borrowers indulge in risky behaviour.
Assuming investment is financed by debt which generates strong limited liability effects,
Koskela and Stenbacka (2000) examined the relationship between credit market and bank
risk taking by modelling risk-shifting investment technologies in banks. They concluded
that introducing competition lowers interest rates charged in credit market to borrowers.
Hence, the result is higher investments without increasing the probability of borrowers’
default. Limited liability effects get alleviated where investments are financed by debt and
equity thereby resulting in further reduction in risk with competition.
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In their work on theory of bank risk-taking and competition, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)
argue that portfolio problem is transformed to contraction problem in the face of moral
hazards. The authors found theoretical analysis of competition stability relationship to be
delicate as there are fundamental risk-incentive mechanisms operating in the opposite di-
rection that make more concentrated bank market to become even riskier. They assumed
project risk to be a function of the interest rates charged to borrowers while allowing their
model to capture both the loan and deposits side of the bank balance sheet. Banks with
market power are able to offer low deposit rates to depositors and charge higher interest
rates to borrowers. In this scenario, portfolio theory suggests that banks lack incentives to
take risk following the arguments that lower competition results in more stability. A new
perspective to this is that contracting problem provides competition with another role as
higher loan rates force borrowers to seek more risky investments creating risky portfolio
for banks so that less competition increases risk. Whereas, competitive banks offer lower
interest rates in loan markets reducing moral hazard problems, consequently, borrowers
have less incentives to undertake risky projects implying lower risks for the banks.
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) concluded that a non-linear relationship exists be-
tween competition and stability in banks. They argued that Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)’s
competition-stability view may not hold when loan defaults and the banking market power
are imperfectly correlated. They further state that intense competition may result in risk-
shifting effects, reduce borrowers’ default probability but result in margin effects, that is,
reduce interest payment from performing loans that should serve as a buffer against loan
losses. Measuring competition by the number of banks, they found competition to have
a U-shaped relationship with bank stability. Their position was that, risk-shifting effects
dominate more concentrated markets such that risk is reduced with competition; while
margin effects are associated with highly competitive markets that erode banks’ franchise
values in an increased competitive environment hence increase risk. In a related study,
Arping (2014) conducted a dynamic modelling of banks assets, deposits and capital and
submitted that competition may be good or bad for the stability of the banking system.
He argued that competition portends lower risk-taking to banks and at the same time
makes banks riskier. Margins decline with rising competition driving reduced risk-taking
to respond to it. However, direct destabilising effects of declining margin supersedes
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competition disciplinary effects, besides, banks’ incentives to build precautionary capital
buffer declines with increasing competition, thus making competition and risk-taking good
or bad.
Thus, there is no consensus in theory on how best competition relates with stability
and/or risk-taking behaviour in banks. Theorists have so far argued for both stability
and fragility while in very rare cases, a non-linear relationship. According to Casu et al.
(2012), it is not clear whether the opposing views of competition-fragility and competition-
stability hold because inconsistencies in risk and competition measure, methodologies and
samples chosen have made previous interpretations in empirical literature controversial.
Post 2007-09 crisis evidence now points to less competition with a risk-averse banking sys-
tem, suggesting the prevalence of competition-fragility views in developed banking system.
Recent studies of Vives (2016a) argued that competition is not responsible for banking
system fragility, but aligns with trade-off between the two along some dimensions such
as information asymmetry, externalities. His reviews reveal average positive association
of market power and bank-level stability but with country variation and some indications
that an intermediate level of bank competition maximises bank stability. As well as pos-
itive association of some measures of bank competition (e.g. ease of entry) and systemic
stability. We therefore go ahead to search into how consistent empirical evidences aligns
with theoretical positions.
4.2.2 Competition and Stability: Empirical Evidence
Table 4.1 below summarises some of the notable works on the relationship between com-
petition and stability on individual and panels of countries, including a number of devel-
oping African countries. We must note from the onset that empirical literature provides
evidence that aligned with the above theoretical reviews that could be described as divi-
sive, ambiguous and at best mixed. One of the earliest empirical works on competition
and stability relation was by Rhoades and Rutz (1982) who in testing the ‘quiet life’ hy-
pothesis investigated whether firms in monopolistic market will be more risk averse than
firms in competitive markets. Using concentration ratios for competition measures and
the coefficient of variation of profit rates for risk, they found results consistent with the
competition-fragility view in a study of 6500 US banks between 1969-1978. The impact
of concentration and foreign penetration on competition and risk in eight Latin American
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countries’ banks were investigated by Yeyati and Micco (2007) for the period of 1992-
2002. Similar to Rhoades and Rutz (1982), they found a positive relationship between
risk, proxy by Zscore and competition proxy by Panzar-Rosse H-statistics. Further, the
test of both competition-fragility and competition-stability views was carried out by Berger
et al. (2009) on 23 industrialised countries for the periods 1999-2005. They found a non-
linear relationship between competition and stability using Zscore, non-performing loans
and equity capital ratio as stability measure and Lerner index as competition measure.
Their results show that banks with higher degree of market power have less overall risk
exposure, while at the same time market power increases loan portfolio risk. This found
consistency with the theoretical model of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005). Boyd et al. (2009)
investigated models in which banks invest in less risky assets and compete in both loan
and deposit markets for the periods 1993-2004 for 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialised
countries and 2500 banks in the US (in 2003). Based on HHI and Zscore, competition and
risk measures respectively, they concluded that the relationship between competition and
stability is better described as ambiguous because different scenarios played out in their
result. Firstly, they found that the probability of failure may increase or decrease with
increase in competition and that loans and assets increase with increase in competition.
They also found that the influence of competition on loan-assets-ratio is unclear pointing
to evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability. Their results further
revealed that competition favours the propensity to lend and that at higher competition
levels there is low probability of failure with loan-to-asset ratio being positive and signifi-
cantly related to measures of competition.
Schaeck et al. (2009) found competition-stability relationship in an investigation of the
relationship between competition and systemic stability in 45 countries that include four
African countries for the periods 1980-20005. Their evidence show that competitive bank-
ing systems are less susceptible to systemic crises with longer lead time to crisis. In other
words, competition reduces the probability of a crisis and increases the time it takes for
a banking system to get into crisis. The result holds even when concentration is con-
trolled, revealing that concentration is associated with higher probability of crisis with
shorter time to crisis. They argued that concentration measures are not good proxies
for competition as their result shows that both competition and concentration measures
captured different banking features. This result suggests that if policies promoting com-
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petition are well-crafted they will improve systemic stability. On their part, Uhde and
Heimeshoff (2009) examined the impact of bank consolidation on banks soundness in 25
European markets for the periods 1997-2005. As consolidation is meant to increase capi-
tal that should provide incentives for competition, hence they measure competition using
concentration ratios like HHI, CR3 and CR5
1 and stability with Zscore. They show that
competition is good for stability as their result found Eastern European banking markets
more prone to financial fragility because the banks exhibit lower level of competitive pres-
sure and as such held down by fewer diversification opportunities. Meanwhile Ariss (2010)
carried out the investigation on the relationship among market power, efficiency and sta-
bility in 60 developing countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Middle East, East and
South Asia, the Pacific and including 14 African countries between 1999 and 2005, and
found that increase in market power increases stability with Zscore and Lerner Index as
stability and competition measures, respectively. In considering whether regulation effects
are transmitted through market power to bank risk-behaviour, Agoraki et al. (2011) use
Zscore, NPLs and Lerner Index to study competition and risk taking behaviour in Central
and Eastern Europe banking sector for the periods 1998-2005. They found that banks
with market power take on lower credit risk, hence low probability of default.
In another US banks study, Hussain and Hassan (2012) investigated how the degree of
competition, risk-taking and efficiency relate among small, medium and big banks in
the US between 2003-2007 with simultaneous equation modelling of stability and Lerner
Index for Zscore. Unlike Rhoades and Rutz (1982) who found fragility in competition
stability relationship, Hussain and Hassan (2012) found that collusive behaviour among
US banks causes the rise in their risk taking behaviour. Tabak et al. (2012) modelled
stability-inefficiency using stochastic frontier analysis in a regression on competition using
Boone indicator surrogate and found a non-linear relationship between competition and
risk-taking behaviour. Their work bordered on 376 banks in 10 Latin American countries
from 2003 to 2008. They revealed that both high and low degree of competition levels
enhance financial stability with average competition showing opposite effects, implying
that competition could be both good or bad for the banking system under review. Fur-
thermore, trying to know why banks maintain capital above the regulatory requirements
1These are various proxies for industry concentration. HHI represents Herfindel-Herschman Index, while
CR3 and CR5 are concentration ratios of 3 and 5 and firms.
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level, Schaeck and Cihak (2012) studied 2600 banks in 10 European countries for the pe-
riods 1999-2005. They measured competition by H-statistics and capital and/risk with
equity capital ratio. They found that competition encourages high capital ratio, implying
positive relationship between competition and stability. Similarly, Amidu (2013) found
competition-stability relationship in a study of 55 emerging and developing countries that
included 22 African countries. His study covered periods of 2000-2007 with Zcsore, NPLs
and equity capital ratio as stability measures and Lerner index cum H-statistics as com-
petition measure. The study showed that as competition reduces internal capital, market
power increases, and banks utilise internal funds to invest in non-interest income gener-
ating ventures. He further stated that market power explained the low insolvency risk
experienced by the banks during the financial crisis.
Demirgc¸-Kunt et al. (2013) studied the relationship between bank competition and sys-
temic risk by examining the correlation in risk taking behaviour of banks to measure
systemic risk. Samples of 1872 listed banks were obtained from 63 countries for the pe-
riods of 1997-2009. They adopted market measure, distance-to-default as a measure for
stability with Lerner Index, H-statistics and HHI as measures of competition. Their results
provide evidence which support competition stability views. They also found that greater
competition encourages more diversified risk with the banking system responding more
robustly to shocks and that increases in competition show a reduction in systemic risk.
Large samples of 17055 banks across 79 developing and developed countries that included
seven African countries were investigated for periods between 1994 and 2009. Beck et
al. (2013) analysed how the relationship between competition and stability varies accord-
ing to geographical location and found that competition has great influence on stability.
However, they argued that such influence depends on the market, regulation as well as
the institution in which the banks operate. They reiterated that studies on banks in indi-
vidual countries have reached mixed conclusions on the relationship between competition
and risk while cross-country studies tend to indicate a positive relationship between the
duo. Korean mutual savings and commercial banks constituted the study area for Jeon
and Lim (2013) when they attempted to examine the influence between competition and
concentration on Korean financial industry stability. The study was implemented for the
periods 1999-2011 using Boone indicator and Zscore for competition and stability measures
respectively. They found that the nature of the financial institution determines the kind of
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relationship that subsist between competition and stability. This is because, their results
provided evidence that supports different conclusions for the two types of banks consid-
ered. The Korean commercial banks were less stable with competition and non-linear
relationship over the period considered. For the mutual savings banks, competition shows
positive impact on stability even with greater business risk and weak corporate governance.
In a related study of commercial banks in the Spanish banking system, Jime´nez et al.
(2013) investigated the franchise value assumption role in limiting banks risk-taking. The
focus was over the periods spanning 1988-2003 on 107 banks with non-performing loans
and Lerner Index, CRn, HHI as surrogates for both stability and competition. In the
case of concentration ratios, they found non-linear relationship between competition and
bank risk taking in both deposits and loan markets while the outcome of the Lerner index
supports fragility. This obviously is in tandem with the argument of Schaeck et al. (2009)
that discourages the use of concentration ratios as competition measures. Ten European
countries banking system were the studies of Liu et al. (2013b) on a regional measure of
competition and stability. Their evidence was built on an unbalanced panel analysis of
2322 banks over the periods 2000-2008. Surrogate Zscore for stability and Lerner Index
for competition and found an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and
stability in the 10 European countries banking sectors over the study period. Like the
studies of Beck et al. (2013) their studies also found that regional economic condition to
play a role in competition-stability relationship in the region. For Liu and Wilson (2013),
competition and stability relationship exhibit a mixed result. While they found competi-
tion to increase the risk of regional banks, it reduces the risk of national banks. This is
based on their investigation of the relationship between competition and risk in Japanese
banking sector for the periods 2000-2009 with Lerner index and Zscore as competition and
stability surrogates.
Soedarmono et al. (2013) in a study of 11 Asian emerging countries, 636 commercial banks
over the period of 1994-2009, found result consistent with competition-stability view. They
probed the impact on financial stability of bank competition in emerging markets of Asian
with Lerner Index as competition measure and Zscore. The authors show that higher
degree of market power is associated with higher capital ratio, higher income volatility
and higher risk of bank insolvency. Although banks in less competitive markets hold more
103
capital, their results revealed that the extent of capitalisation was inadequate to offset the
impact on default risk of higher risk taking. They however admitted that banks market
power provided the necessary cushion for stabilising the system during Asian financial
crisis in 1997. Overall, with closer investigation they however showed that such findings
only hold for countries with a smaller proportion of the largest banks, suggesting that the
impact of bank competition is conditional on the extent to which the banking industry
may benefit from too-big-to-fail subsidies. Ferna´ndez et al. (2013) included a sample of
23 African countries in their study of the effects of market concentration, regulation and
institution on 68 systemic crisis in 54 countries. Using HHI plus other concentration ra-
tios to account for competition and pre-/during crisis growth rate value added, they found
that between 1980 and 2000 concentration of banks helped to reduce systemic failure.
Marques-Ibanez et al. (2014) also found fragility in competition and stability relationship
in their study of US and nine European countries for the periods 2007-2009. Their study
analysed the role played by securitisation and capital in competition risk relationship dur-
ing 2007-2009 crisis. A total of 495 largest listed banks parent companies were studied
with a number of banks that received assistance during the crisis as risk measure and
boone indicator for competition. They show that more intense competition is correlated
with higher levels of realised risk and that as competition increases, banks that relied
more heavily on securitisation had more incentives to undertake more risk. Fiordelisi and
Mare (2014) found a result consistent with the models of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)’s
competition stability view, arguing that banks’ market power negatively Granger cause
the soundness of banks. They found this result in their assessment of both the short and
the long run dynamic relationship between competition and stability with focus on Euro-
pean countries cooperative banks for the period 1998-2004. The study used both Zscore
and Lerner Index as stability and competition measures respectively. In a related study
Schaeck and Ciha´k (2014) found competition to be positively related to stability using
Boone indicator and Lerner Index to empirically assess this relationship in 10 European
banking sectors over the periods 1995-2005. This suggests that competition may generally
be good in relation to stability in Europe as evidence has shown the consistency of direct
relationship between the two phenomenon in literature.
Theories have alluded to a potential trade-off between competition and stability in competition-
stability relationship. To test these theories in 14 Asian countries for the periods 2003-
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2010, Fu et al. (2014) surrogates distant-to-default for stability and Lerner Index for
competition and came to a rather ambiguous conclusion. Their results show that greater
concentration fosters fragility and at the same time lower pricing power increases bank
risk exposure. This suggests that a middle way must be sought. Kouki and Al-Nasser
(2014) studied the implication of market power on stability of 127 banks in 31 African
countries for the period 2005-2010 and argue against competition-stability views. They
found consistency with the ’quite life’ hypothesis with evidence showing that market power
has benefits for risk and stability. Included in their stability and competition measures
are Zscore and Lerner index. Recently, Maghyereh and Awartani (2016) uses Zscore and
NPLs for stability as well as Lerner Index for competition to test for the average relation-
ship between competition and stability. This study covered the period 2001-2011 and for
70 Gulf Cooperation countries. The authors’ result aligns with the competition-fragility
view as they found that as competition increases so does instability abounds. Akins et
al. (2016) also recently used large samples of US banking sector and concluded based on
evidence in favour of competition-stability views. Specifically, they considered 7351 US
banks between 2006-2010 with a number of bank failures as surrogate for stability and
concentration measures to represent competition in studying how competition and stabil-
ity relationship faired in the course of the 2007-09 financial crisis. They found that more
competitive banks charged lower interest margin and held less risky portfolio, among oth-
ers, before the crisis. They also found that during the crisis, the probability of enforcement
actions and bank closure reduced with competition.
In summary, there is no straight answer for competition and stability relationship as
shown by the evidence around the world. Apart from pockets of empirical works that
incorporated a number of African countries which peradventure will include some SSA
region we have found no studies dedicated to study this case in SSA region and on com-
mercial banks in particular as they account for the largest shares of market and assets
of the SSA financial sectors that are burdened with underdeveloped capital market. It
is this gap that this study is out to fill especially at a point when policy makers are out
to stimulate competition in the region’s banking sectors as a catalyst to drive economic
growth.
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4.3 Methodology
Extant literature has employed various methods to investigate the relationship between
competition and stability in the banking system. Notable among these methods are OLS
(Akins et al., 2016; Beck et al., 2013; Ferna´ndez et al., 2013; Jeon & Lim, 2013, among
others); fixed and random effects regression (Demirgc¸-Kunt et al., 2013; Hussain & Hassan,
2012; Kouki & Al-Nasser, 2014; Schaeck & Cihak, 2012, among others) and Tobit model
(Ariss, 2010). Others include logit model and duration analysis (Schaeck et al., 2009),
probit regression (Marques-Ibanez et al., 2014), 2SLS (Soedarmono et al., 2013), Granger
causality (Fiordelisi & Mare, 2014) and GMM (Agoraki et al., 2011; Amidu, 2013; Berger
et al., 2009; Boyd et al., 2009, among). Each of these methods has its merits and demerits.
In this study, we employ the system GMM because of its ability to deal with endogeneity
issues that are inherent in the regression of stability on competition. Fiordelisi, Mare, and
Molyneux (2015) argue for the need to account for endogeneity problem in competition
and stability regression because of issues of reverse causality, simultaneity and variables
omission notwithstanding the inclusion of a number of control variable. This ensures the
robustness and validity of our regression results. Besides focusing on commercial banks
and particularly a SSA region study, this is another area that our study is different from
Kouki and Al-Nasser (2014) who studied the implication of market power on stability in
Africa with fixed effects regression that does not account for endogeneity. Based on the
literature reviewed and for want of data in the study area, we surrogate the Lerner Index
for competition and Zscore for stability. Moreover, the Lerner index is best at measuring
bank level competition which makes it a better choice for the study and the fact that it
has strong theoretical basis. Zscore has wide application in literature and it measures the
overall stability of the banking sector incorporating most risks that banks may face.
This study pooled together cross-sectional time series data of the sampled banks in the SSA
countries under consideration using GMM. The choice of panel data analysis is informed
by the benefits that the technique offers to the study. According to Baltagi (2008), panel
data analysis accommodates the creation and analysis of more difficult behavioral models.
Moreover, the technique provides for additional degree of freedom, efficient when com-
pared to time series and cross-sectional data and offers more explanatory analysis. Panel
analysis generally meant more variability, fewer collinearity and controlled heterogeneity
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within individual data (Baltagi, 2008).
4.3.1 Model Specification
The implementation of the regression of the relationship between competition and stability
in the SSA region commercial banks is done using the Generalised Method of Moments
(GMM) regression. Quite a number of approaches have been employed in extant litera-
ture and none seems to have adequately resolved the ongoing debate in this area. The
commonly used model in the study of competition and stability in the banking system has
been probit/logit framework (Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, & Levine, 2006; Demirgc¸-Kunt, De-
tragiache, & and, 1997). The only known study to the best of our knowledge that has been
done in Africa on competition and stability (Moyo, Nandwa, Council, Oduor, & Simpasa,
2014) employed survival analysis (duration model with time varying covariates). Besides
being a static model, they are also limited in accounting for endogeneity issues between
competition and stability. The prevalence of individual cross-sectional data over–time has
resulted in the development and the increase in the popularity and/or acceptability of
panel data techniques. This no doubt has ignited the application of dynamic panel data
(DPD) that allows finance and economics experts alike to accommodate individual dy-
namics in their studies. At the same time, the inclusion of lagged endogenous variables
in a model where individual effects may be present poses a problem of dynamic panel
bias (DPB). Meanwhile, the conventional DPD estimators like; first difference, pooled
ols, GLS, among others are inefficient in handling DPB, hence the use of instrumental
variables was proposed to alleviate the issue of endogeneity in the lagged endogenous vari-
ables. In addition, it is a normality free regression technique, having great adaptability
and data generating process assumptions with dependent variables being instrumented by
their lagged variables.
Here we assume the relationship between competition and stability of the commercial
banks in SSA region to take following general form of linear dynamic panel model;
Γit = ρ1Γit−1 + χ
′
itρ+ it (4.3.1)
Where i = 1, 2, · · · , N , t = 1, 2, · · · , T , χ′ is a (1 × κ) vector of explanatory variables, ρ
is a (κ × 1) vector of coefficients to be estimated and it = γit + ψit; where, γit denotes
the individual fixed effects capturing individual differences of the cross–sections (banks in
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the sample), and ψit is the idiosyncratic term such that γ ∼ iidN(0, δ2γ), ψ ∼ iidN(0, δ2ψ),
assuming that;
E [γit] = [γitψit] = 0 (4.3.2)
Since Γit brings up DPB given that γit is correlated with Γit, it therefore follows that, if Γit
is a function of γit, then Γit−1 will also be a function of γit making one of the explanatory
variables to correlate with one of the composed error terms thus given rise to endogeneity
problem.
OLS could not be used to estimate equation (4.3.1) because the correlation between Γit−1
and it, in other words, E [Γit−1, it] > 0, leading to overestimation of ρ1 and so the result
will be bias upward as well as inconsistent. One way to fix this endogenity bias is to
remove the individual fixed effects through data transformation. Another way is to look
for a valid instrument of the lagged endogenous variable. For the purpose of simplicity,
lets assume a model competition and stability relationship with just one regressor;
Γit = ρ1Γit−1 + it (4.3.3)
Taking one more lag from equation (4.3.3) will remove individual fixed effects;
Γit−1 = ρ1Γit−2 + it−1 (4.3.4)
This gives;
(Γit − Γit−1) = ρ1(Γit−1 − Γit−2) + (γi − γi) + (ψit − ψit−1) (4.3.5)
Therefore;
∆Γit = ρ1∆Γit−1 + ∆ψit (4.3.6)
Where ∆ = (1− L) represents the first difference operator. The problem with the trans-
formation is the loss of degree of freedom as T first–period observations is dropped which
could pose a serious challenge for unbalanced panel data. In the views of Griliches and
Mairesse (1995) the first differencing transformation is able to get rid of the individual
effects. The transformation prompts Moving Average (MA(1)) for ∆ψit given the assump-
tion of ψ ∼ iidN(0, δ2ψ). This requires the application of GLS that is able to transform
data by means of subtracting the time averaged model from equation (4.3.3);
Γi = ρ1Γt−1 + γi + ψi (4.3.7)
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so that the transformed model becomes;
(Γit − Γi) = ρ1(Γit−1 − Γi,−1) + (γi − γi) + (ψit − ψi) (4.3.8)
In equation (4.3.8), (Γit−Γi) is regressed on (Γit−1−Γi,−1) using OLS within group estima-
tor. Although within group estimator manages to eliminate individual effects, according
to Nickell (1981), it is inconsistent due to its inability to deal with dynamic panel bias.
Thus makes first difference conversion a better approach than the within group conversion
in resolving endogeneity issues. For instance, in the first difference transformation, only
previous error term realised is included in the model, meanwhile, in within group conver-
sion, all preceding realisations are incorporated into the model. For this reason, all OLS
estimators are unable to resolve dynamic panel bias and therefore require an alternative
approach.
The work of Anderson and Hsiao (1982) among others, argued that the failure of the
OLS estimator in dealing with the issues arising from the dynamic panel bias orches-
trated the popularity that instrumental variable estimator gained in literature. Equation
(4.3.6) requires instrumental variable estimator for implementation since the first differ-
ence conversion is unable to recover consistency with the application of OLS estimator.
To deal with this, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) proposed a two stage least square (2SLS)
approach that is able to utilise the first difference transformation to eliminate the fixed
effects, as well as employ the lags of the explained variable to instrument the transformed
lag endogenous variable. The essence is that, since Γit, a component of ∆Γit−1 is corre-
lated with it−1 which is also contained in ∆it, then the deeper lags of the explanatory
variables are not correlated with the error term, as such could be used as instrument.
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) proposed Γit−2 to be used as instrument for ∆Γit−1 because it
is correlated with Γit−1−Γit− 2 but orthogonal to ∆it if error terms are assumed not to
be serially correlated. Be that as it may, 2SLS does not utilise all the valid instruments
available, thus suffers similar setback as the OLS - not efficient.
Consequently, the generalised method of moments (GMM ) proposed by Arellano and
Bond (1991) is applied to efficiently and consistently estimate the relationship between
competition and stability of SSA region commercial banks in equation (4.3.1). GMM is
able to take equations both in first difference and in levels with its specific sets of instru-
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mental variables. To deal with banks specific effects, first difference is taken as in equation
(4.3.5) and the utilisation of the appropriate lag instruments needed resolves the issues
of the correlation between Γit − Γit−1 and ψit − ψit−1. The same approach is deployed
to generate instruments for other regressors that are permitted to be dependent on the
past and the current realisation of the explained variable. Given the assumptions that
regressors are weakly exogenous and that the error term is devoid of serial correlation,
dynamic GMM employs the following moments conditions;
E [Γi,jt−s· (i,jt − i,jt−1)] = 0 for s ≥ 2, t = 2, · · ·T (4.3.9)
E [χi,jt−s· (i,jt − i,jt−1)] = 0 for s ≥ 2, t = 2, · · ·T (4.3.10)
The outcomes of the above moments of condition produces the first difference GMM. One
major drawback associated with this is that, where the lagged endogenous variables and
the regressors are persistent overtime, there is every likelihood that the lagged levels may
be weak instrument for the first differenced variables. Hence, amount to finite bias with
reduced accuracy culminating in the need to regress at levels as well as to complement the
regression at the first differences. The lagged first differences instrument the regression in
levels of the same variables. Additional moments of condition for the regression in levels
are as stated below.
E [(Γi,jt−s − Γi,jt−s−1) · (γi + i,jt−1)] = 0 for s = 1 (4.3.11)
E [(χi,jt−s − χi,jt−s−1) · (γi + i,jt−1)] = 0 for s = 1 (4.3.12)
We however applied the orthogonal deviation of Arellano and Bover (1995) which Rood-
man (2006) argues to be more applicable in the case of an unbalanced panels with pockets
of missing data. To be consistent, the instrument of the GMM regressors must be valid.
This is verified through the Hansen J statistics in a robust estimation Mileva (2007).
Also, test of serial correlation among the error terms is required for valid GMM results.
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Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation assumes no serial correlation and its applied to the
differenced residuals. Once the null hypothesis is acceptable order two, inferring the ab-
sence of serial correlation, the study will then employ corresponding moment of conditions.
To estimate the relationship between competition and stability of SSA region commer-
cial banks therefore we employ the following estimation equation;
ækit = βkit + ækit−1 + pikitLIkit + ζkitΣXkit + ξkit (4.3.13)
Where aekit measures the stability and other risk proxies for bank i in country k at year
t. The risk measures include, loan loss provision to gross loan ratio (LLPRATIO), loan
loss provision to equity ratio (LLPERATIO), off-balance sheet obligations to assets ratio
(OBSARATIO), off-balance sheet obligations to equity ratio (OBSERATIO) and capital
to asset ratio (EQCAPRATIO). βkit is a constant; pikit is the coefficient of competition
measure, LI, for k ’s regression in year t ; ζkit is the coefficient of the vector of bank specific
variables and other macroeconomics/non-financial variables; ξkit is the error term. The
banks’ specific variables employed include, log of total assets (LNABV) to control for size,
liquid assets to total assets (LAR), performance measures (ROA and ROE). While the
macroeconomic variables are annual GDP growth (GDPG) and inflation (INF) measured
by consumer price index.
4.3.2 Data and Variables Description
Data for this study were mainly sourced from BankScope that is considered to house the
most comprehensive database on banks. We employed an unbalanced panel of 440 com-
mercial banks from 2006 to 2015 to account for entry and exit and also cater for periods
of data unavailability. The focus on commercial banks ensured uniformity in our choice of
banks as quite a good number of other deposit money banks still enjoy government support
at one time or the other, besides accounting for more than 70% of the total assets and
market share of the region’s financial system. Data required for the estimation of Lerner
Index, competition variable that were collected include personnel expenses, total assets,
total revenue, interest and non-interest expense, fixed assets and total deposits. For the
stability measure, the Zscore, we collected equity capital ratio (ECR) and return of assets
(ROA). A range of risk measures data included loan loss provision (LLP) and off-balance-
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sheet activity. Other data collected include Return on equity (ROE), GDP annual growth
rate and corruption perception. The GDP annual growth rate and inflation are available
from WDI of World Bank while corruption perception is from Transparency International.
We adopt the Zscore of Roy (1952) as the measure of stability of the SSA region commercial
banks. The Zscore measures the probability of insolvency of a bank as follows;
Z =
ROAikt − ECRikt
σROAikt
(4.3.14)
where ROAikt is average return on asset, ECRikt is the average equity capital ratio and
σROAikt denotes the standard deviation ofROA, and ikt is bank i in country k at time
t. It measures banks overall stability by combining their individual profits, capital and
return volatility. The estimates predict the number of standard deviation that bank profit
must fall below before its equity becomes negative. Higher scores indicate a more stable
bank and/or less risky bank with less likelihood of becoming bankrupt (Berger et al., 2009;
Laeven & Levine, 2009; Lepetit & Strobel, 2013, among others). Specifically, the Zscore
presents the advantage of serving as a health check for banks and can reflect the various
forms of risk that a bank may face.
For robustness, we consider a range of risks faced by banks as far as data is available.
Measures of risks used in this study are majorly credit risks and off-balance-sheet risks.
The main concern of credit risk is the quality of banks’ assets which has traditionally fo-
cused on banks’ loan portfolio. Chiou and Porter (2015) argue that attention of banks’ risk
measure have extended to considering all banks’ assets due to the possibilities of potential
default risk. Hence we collected data on off-balance-sheet activities to gauge the sensitiv-
ity to competitive banking environment because in highly competitive banking markets,
banks employs creative accounting measures to conceal their toxic assets off-balance-sheet,
thus distorting their outlook thereby exacerbating risk of default.
The variable of competition, Lerner Index (estimated in Chapter 3 Subsection 3.3.1) is
a measure of market power, gauging the ability of a bank to charge a price above its
marginal cost. Increase in market power represents concentration of the banking sector
which implies absence or low degree of competition. When market power is low, compe-
tition is high within the banking sector. This measure of competition is largely used in
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literature and has been adjudged as one of the two best measures of competition (Liu et
al., 2013b).
The ECR wears two caps in this study; firstly, as a measure of capital and secondly
as a measurement of risk. Bank capital defines the amount of capital a bank must hold in
order to carry out banking business. This is highly a subject of regulation and according
to the Basel Accord, it currently stands at 10% minimum capital adequacy. Capital re-
quirements have constituted a major variable in competition stability studies Agoraki et
al. (2011) and we expect it to be positively related to bank stability. As a risk measure,
ECR is a measure of bank overall risk (Chiou & Porter, 2015) and a control for differences
in the risk propensities that banks faces. Coccorese (2013) and Bikker, Groeneveld, et al.
(1998) argue that high ECR may suggest high risky loan portfolio. We proxy performance
with ROA and ROE. While ROE relates to equity shareholders, ROA measures the overall
outlook of banks performance in relation to assets employed. They have been employed
in this study to serve their different purposes in relation to bank stability and have been
used in a number of studies, (Chiou & Porter, 2015; Naceur & Omran, 2011, among others).
Based on existing theories, we expect competition to be positively related to stability
as much as we anticipate better performance to mean a more stable banking system. We
also expect liquidity to be negatively related to bank risk because low level of liquidity
implies higher loan exposure which increases default risk and reduces stability. Further-
more, we expect bank size to be negatively related to risk, in line with Berger (1995) who
argues that economies of scale and market power meant that larger banks are synonymous
with higher stability or lower risk. On the contrtary, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2010);
Herring and Carmassi (2012); Stern and Feldman (2004) provide evidence which shows
that higher returns induced by risky projects entice larger banks’ managers to take on
more risks, confident that governments will not let them fail, ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF).
This makes risk and size relationship unclear in literature.
Regarding the effects of macroeconomics variables on the stability of SSA commercial
banks; GDPG and INF are used. We expect GDPG to be negatively related to bank
stability. Banks tend to lend excessively in times of boom and are much more cautious
during recessions, (Agoraki et al., 2011; Berger & Udell, 2004; Dell’Ariccia & Marquez,
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2006). Similarly, a negative relationship is expected between inflation and stability. This
is consistent with the arguments of Lown and Morgan (2006) and BUCH, EICKMEIER,
and PRIETO (2014) that economy and financial systems suffer more adversely during
inflation. Moreover, the period is usually associated with distorted decisions, aggravated
information asymmetry and high price volatility.
Given the SSA region profile, we control for the impact of corruption. We used corruption
perception index of the Transparency International that indicates the perception of both
the administrative and political environment to corrupt practices. The index ranges from
0 to 1 and the closer to 1 the better for an economy. An economy with very low corruption
perception index may face some kind of instability in their banking system.
4.4 Empirical Results
We present the results of the relationship between competition and stability of SSA coun-
tries commercial banks in this section. Competition is measured using Lerner index that
has the ability to capture bank level market power. We surrogate stability with Zscore.
Zscore has been used in literature as a stability test for banks and banking sectors’ sta-
bility. The measurement is based on banks’ performance in terms of assets employed in
relation to their capital. We also considered a range of bank risk measures, specifically
credit and off-balance-sheet risks for robustness. Ongoing results in literature provide evi-
dence that competition may be good or bad for the banking sectors. Specifically, empirical
works have supported both stability and fragility of the banking sector due to competition.
Most of these debates have largely been domiciled in the advanced world, especially in US
and Europe, with few of the literature in emerging markets like China. We do not expect
the SSA commercial banking markets to behave differently like most of these economies,
SSA banking market is monopolistically competitive in nature (as found in Chapter 3).
Moreso, most of the banking systems in the region were applauded for their resilience
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis that was partly blamed on excessive competition. To
this end, we hypothesise that competition may have contributed significantly to such sta-
bility in this part of the world2. In the next three subsections are the summary statistics
providing insight to the data used in this study, the correlation results which though not
2Following the evidence of Moyo et al. (2014) that found competition to be good for the region’s banking
sector. We do differ in scope, extent and method of study.
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an econometrics analysis, gives a precursor to what the econometrics analysis might be,
and finally the regression analysis results.
4.4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 4.2 below presents the summary statistics which provides insight into the nature of
data used in the study. Columns 3 - 6 in Table 4.2 relate exclusively to the competition
measure. For the purpose of hindsight, Lerner index is a measure of market power that
ranges from 0 to 1, with indices close to 1 signifying high market power and/or low degree of
competition/concentration in the banking sector. Banks at this end of the markets are said
to be oligopolistic or at the extreme, monopolistic. Whereas, indices close to zero denote
low market power and/or high competition, with banks either competing in monopolisti-
cally competitive banking market or faced with perfect competition3. We found market
power to range almost between 0.0000 in 2013 and 0.9980 in 2012 giving the minimum
and the maximum indices across the 440 banks considered over the study period of 2006
- 2015. This momentarily suggests a mixture of high and low market power. However,
further analysis by the mean and the standard deviation suggests a highly competitive
commercial banking sector having mean of market power that are below 0.50 with a total
bank level competition average of about 0.30 over the study period. Thus implies that the
means are closer to the minimum than the maximum in all the years considered and the
standard deviation substantiated our claim by not being fundamentally far from the mean.
The other parts of Table 4.2 are the mean of Zscore, stability measure; size, representing
the log of total assets used as a control variable; equity capital ratio, which is the ratio of
capital to total assets and most times used to denote regulatory capital; ROA and ROE,
as performance measures. Others include the means of of the various risk measures, ratio
of liquid assets to total assets (LAR), GDP annual growth and corruption perception.
Taking a staggering insight at the mean of these listed variables, the Zscore is minimum
at 2.9889 and having a total mean of 3.3433 depicting a relatively stable banking sector.
The mean of the risks measures are also presented. The eqcapratio tends to support this
assertion as its mean over the period suggest that most banks have capital above the
Basel regulatory benchmark of 10%. The banks however performed poorly in terms of
3The two extremes of monopoly and perfect market Moltiklein theory argued as unattainable in the
banking industry.
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ROA over the period ranging from 0.01 to 0.02 with a total average over the study period
approximating 0.014. Even though ROE provides a better outlook with minimum aver-
age at 6.9% in 2015. Overall, the SSA commercial banking system could be adjudged to
have faired quite well over the period and we expect this to also have some implication
on the stability of the banking sector apart from competition; this will be confirmed in
the econometrics analysis. The COP, corruption perception seems to be commendable
on the average though with much improvement desired. The index of COP increases as
the perception about corruption of the economic environment in which the banks operate
improves which should mean a better avenue for banking business and investment. We ex-
pect this to impact positively on the banking sectors’ stability. Consistent with our review
in Chapter 2, we found the overall mean of annual GDP growth approximating 5% over
the study period, indicating a fair economic performance compared to the global average.
Next is the correlation analysis of how each of these variables relates to competition.
4.4.2 Correlation Analysis
Correlation describes the degree of association between variables. The coefficients range
from -1 to 1 and both the sign and size of the coefficient are vital in explaining the re-
lationship between the variables and the implication it might have for our econometrics
analysis. We provide a robust correlation analysis over the study period among stability,
the dependent variable of interest and the regressors in Table 4.3. Zscore shows a quite
weak but significant inverse association with Lerner Index, the variable of interest. This
relationship is negative over the study periods except in 2013 when there is a positive
association. This is contrary to our expectation and a pointer to the fact that competition
may be detrimental to stability in the study area. If that is the case, it will align towards
the competition-fragility view. As we have expressed, we do not expect competition to
be negatively related to stability, however, the level of banking development in the region
impacting its competition management may have accounted for this. Further econometric
analysis will validate this view. Surprisingly, bank size also showed a significant and inverse
relationship with Zscore over the study periods. Our expectation is positive relationship
given that larger banks have advantages of economies of scale. However, large banks have
been said to provide impetus for increased risk taking which in essence will lower stability.
The question also arise as to how large a bank may be to benefit from this advantage.
Depending on the results of the econometrics analysis, policies may need to be crafted to
117
Table 4.3: Correlation Results
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
zscore & lerner index -0.1346 -0.2072 -0.0259 -0.0098 -0.3066 -0.3131 -0.2533 0.0038 -0.0681 -0.0174
p-value 0.0640 0.0023 0.6834 0.8715 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9409 0.1586 0.7166
zscore & size -0.4253 -0.2936 -0.3279 -0.2966 -0.1474 -0.0913 -0.1588 -0.2291 -0.3007 -0.2238
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0111 0.1031 0.0026 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
zscore & eqcapratio 0.9478 0.9480 0.7938 0.8324 0.8105 0.8167 0.6661 0.5692 0.6157 0.6990
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
zscore &lar 0.0521 -0.0384 0.124 0.0569 0.0105 0.0033 0.1415 0.0329 0.0926 0.1552
p-value 0.4788 0.5781 0.071 0.3505 0.8575 0.9528 0.0076 0.5172 0.0552 0.0011
zscore & roa 0.1778 0.2587 0.3241 0.1765 0.3096 0.5014 0.3173 0.2496 0.3083 0.5687
p-value 0.0141 0.0001 0.0000 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
zscore & roe 0.0650 -0.0466 0.0490 0.0224 0.1126 0.0175 0.0990 0.0958 0.0883 0.0895
p-value 0.3751 0.4991 0.4443 0.7131 0.0546 0.7564 0.0621 0.0585 0.0683 0.0608
zscore & cop 0.1158 -0.0587 0.0541 -0.0115 0.0865 0.0918 0.0448 0.0889 0.1023 0.1291
p-value 0.128 0.4057 0.4073 0.8541 0.1685 0.1183 0.4186 0.0789 0.0339 0.0071
zscore & GDPG -0.0215 -0.0165 -0.0713 0.0853 0.0069 0.0532 -0.0787 -0.0177 -0.1646 -0.0532
p-value 0.7701 0.8102 0.2613 0.1582 0.9065 0.3427 0.1379 0.7262 0.0006 0.2772
zscore &inf 0.127 0.1497 -0.0179 0.2154 0.0693 0.0864 0.1227 0.088 0.1095 0.0555
p-vlaue 0.0808 0.0282 0.7785 0.0003 0.2348 0.123 0.0204 0.0819 0.0234 0.276
Authors’ estimation, 2017, based on data collected
optimally utilise banking assets for the improvement of banks in this region. But in the
case of the association between competition and equity capital ratio, the relationships over
the study periods are strong, positive and significant showing that a very sound capital
base is consistent with the stability of the banking system. This is in line with a priori
expectation as well as literature. This is a plus to the commercial banking sector in this
region with its attendant policy implications. Liquidity, LAR, is over the study period
positive associated with stability except in 2007. This again negates our expectation of
negative relationship as lower liquid assets implies high default rate of loan portfolio. It
important to note that the banking sectors of SSA region are relatively liquid which may
have explained the positive relationship. We expect more insight from the econometric
analysis on which the study inference will be predicated.
The two performance measures show weak but positive and significant overtime asso-
ciation with stability. For want of generalisation, ROE is most weak with a maximum of
11.3% in 2010 with an inverse association in 2007. But ROA seems a bit of an average
overtime ranging between 17.8% in 2006 and 56.9% in 2015. While we expect performance
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to boost stability, this weak relation provides us a bit of some concerns and although we
do not pre-empt the outcome of econometrics analysis, this should also constitute a flash
point for policy issues. Corruption perception should bear direct relationship with stabil-
ity. Because, when a banking environment is less corrupt, bank loans are likely to be less
defaulted. Over the study period, we found COP though positive in 8 out of 10 years our
study but very weakly related to stability and mostly insignificant as well. The negative
coefficient signs of GDPG association with stability align with literature and our expecta-
tion. On the contrary, inflation appeared positively related to stability against literature
evidence. These are subjects of further analysis in the next section of econometric anal-
ysis as only EQCAPRATIO has given a particularly good result from the stand point of
correlation analysis.
4.4.3 Econometrics Analysis
We regressed stability on competition and some measures of bank risks including some
banks specific variables as contained in literature to explain the stability of the commercial
banking sector in the SSA region. We have analysed the summary statistics as well as
the correlation results previously in Subsections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. Our main objective is to
measure the impact of competition on stability in SSA commercial banks. The essence of
the other variables is to also look at other factors that may also impact on stability and so
the emphasis will be on competition and stability relationship. Our dynamic panel data
analysis model employs the two-step system GMM with orthogonal deviation as contained
in subsection 4.3.1. This has been proven to resolve panel data bias with the ability to
handle unbalanced panel data analysis. The regression results are presented in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
VARIABLES zscore llpratio llperatio obsaratio obseratio eqcapratio
L.zscore 0.361***
(0.00203)
li -0.0244*** 6.22e-05*** 0.00179*** -0.00210*** -0.0218*** 0.00122***
(0.000232) (7.22E-06) (9.92E-05) (5.11E-05) (0.00334) (0.000165)
size -0.0529*** 0.00484*** 0.0252*** 0.0697*** 0.0949** 0.0152***
(0.0076) (0.00016) (0.000991) (0.00111) (0.0469) (0.00343)
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Table 4.4: (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
VARIABLES zscore llpratio llperatio obsaratio obseratio eqcapratio
eqcapratio 8.603*** 0.0228*** -0.0597*** 1.183*** -3.507***
(0.0708) (0.00145) (0.005) (0.0103) (0.465)
lar -0.802*** 0.0152*** 0.00672*** 0.312*** 2.274*** 0.114***
(0.0357) (0.000582) (0.00251) (0.00456) (0.27) (0.0138)
roa 11.16*** -0.488*** -1.999*** 0.259*** 10.92*** 0.758***
(0.138) (0.00544) (0.0255) (0.0156) (2.452) (0.0966)
roe -0.00261*** 3.36e-05*** -0.000216*** 0.000130*** 0.00161 -0.000201*
(0.000184) (4.94E-06) (3.05E-05) (7.15E-06) (0.00273) (0.000113)
cop 0.00699*** -0.000157*** -0.000464*** -0.00168*** -0.00806** 0.000208
(0.000771) (1.51E-05) (7.48E-05) (0.000146) (0.00344) (0.000188)
gdpg 0.378** -0.0319*** -0.288*** 0.0781*** -1.684** -0.0805**
(0.154) (0.0027) (0.0168) (0.0149) (0.764) (0.0342)
inf 0.00648*** 0.000434*** 0.000510*** -0.00289*** -0.0320*** -0.000309**
(0.000763) (2.10E-05) (7.44E-05) (6.63E-05) (0.00513) (0.00015)
L.llpratio 0.449***
(0.00272)
L.llperatio 0.0200***
(0.000819)
L.obsaratio 0.000701***
(3.94E-05)
L.obseratio 0.000901***
(7.36E-05)
L.eqcapratio 0.770***
(0.0167)
Constant 1.160*** -0.0471*** -0.165*** -0.891*** 0.601 -0.206***
(0.0866) (0.00195) (0.0117) (0.013) (0.607) (0.0427)
Observations 2,513 2,169 2,174 2,024 2,024 2,510
Number of id 420 385 387 368 368 420
Wald χ2 (10) 381655.81 102465.91 16909.67 50990.1 635.3 4520.78
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Table 4.4: (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
VARIABLES zscore llpratio llperatio obsaratio obseratio eqcapratio
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 0.150 0.336 0.642 0.178 0.592 0.242
Hansen J Stats 0.287 0.311 0.158 0.192 0.738 0.470
Sources: Author’s Estimation, 2017, based on data collected; Note: Standard errors in
parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Model 1 represents the results of competition and stability regression while models 2
to 6 are results of competition and bank risks regressions. Table 4.5 below shows the
economic impacts of the variables on which we regressed stability and risk measures, that
are significant in explaining stability and risks in the banking system. Depending on the
signs of the regression coefficients, the values in Table 4.5 indicates how in percentage one
standard deviation increase in the explanatory variables economically impacts on stability
and the risks measures respectively.
A quick look at the model 1 result shows that the lagged value of stability (L.Zscore) is
positive and strongly significant signifying that stability in the past periods has a consid-
erable effects in ensuring current period stability and is persistent overtime. In fact, it has
an impact of up to 0.36% on the current banking system stability. We found competition,
measured by Lerner Index, to be negative and strongly significantly related to stability. In
other words, if competition increases, stability goes down. This is consistent with the cor-
relation coefficient obtained earlier. Although it is against our expectation, it is however
consistent with the competition-fragility views that argues potential risk associated with
competition results in banks’ instability. We therefore posit that competition-fragility
view may well be the relationship that exists between competition and stability in the
commercial banking sectors of the SSA region. This aligns with the studies of Maghy-
ereh and Awartani (2016), Kouki and Al-Nasser (2014), Beck et al. (2013), Ariss (2010),
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) and Allen and Gale (2004) among others, most of
whom employed the Lerner index and Zscore to study the relationship between competi-
tion and stability in different regions of the world and found competition to be inversely
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Table 4.5: Economic Impacts of Regression Results
variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6
lerneri -0.0015 0.0002 0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0016
size -0.0274 0.1427 0.0807 0.1587 0.0262 0.1677
ecr 0.4044 0.0609 -0.0173 0.2441 -0.0878
lar -0.1277 0.1377 0.0066 0.2182 0.1929 0.3863
roa 0.1821 -0.4528 -0.2015 0.0186 0.0949 0.2632
roe -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0006
cop 0.0232 -0.0296 -0.0095 -0.0244 -0.0142
gdpg 0.0047 -0.0225 -0.0220 0.0042 -0.0111 -0.0212
inf 0.0130 0.0496 0.0063 -0.0255 -0.0343 -0.0132
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017, from Table 4.4 with
Economic Impact = S.D of explanatory variable×R.C of explanatory variableS.D of dependent variable
Where S.D is standard deviation and R.C is regression coefficient.
related to stability. These authors also included a number of African banking sectors in
their studies. Competition-fragility views argued that competition encourages banks to
take further risks as their franchise values get eroded which consequently results in fragility.
Given this evidence, we negate the arguments of Schaeck and Ciha´k (2014), Amidu (2013),
Soedarmono et al. (2013), Schaeck et al. (2009), Demirgc¸-Kunt et al. (2013), and Boyd and
De Nicolo (2005) among others, who provided evidence to a support positive relationship
between competition and stability.
The economic implication of the result of the regression of competition on stability shown
in Table 4.5 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in competition will result
in 0.2% fall in the banking system stability. In other words, the more competitive the
banking system the worse off the stability of the banking system. A decrease in the values
of Lerner index means more competition, hence less stability. It logically follows that the
model supports market power and stability hypothesis that argues more market power
more stability. Thus a further substantiation of the competition-fragility debate that ar-
guably implies more market power, better stability as found in Kouki and Al-Nasser (2014)
in their study of 31 African countries.
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Similarly, we found evidence to show that the size of banks is negatively and significantly
related to stability at 1% level of significance. Signifying a confirmation of the studies of
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Herring and Carmassi (2012) and Stern and Feld-
man (2004) who argued that managers of larger banks have more incentives to undertake
more risk which induce instability, while the result proved otherwise for Berger (1995).
The economic impact of the result shows that a one standard deviation increase in the size
of banks brings about an approximate 3% decline in the stability of banks. This may well
provide further explanation for the result of competition and stability relationship dis-
cussed above. Size causes banks to be more competitive, as suggested by our estimation
of determinants of competition in Chapter 3 subsection 3.4.2, which then provides more
incentive for banks to undertake increased risk that lowers the stability of the system.
This is another salient potential contribution of this study as these connections suggests
linkages among bank size, competition and stability hence a potential transmission from
size to competition to fragility is apparent.
In the other results, we found capital to be positively and significantly related to stability
and consistent with the correlation results. This again reiterates the literature rooting
for stability as the cardinal reasons for capital regulation in the banking sector (Casu et
al., 2015; Llewellyn, 1999, among others). The result however, does not support Kouki
and Al-Nasser (2014) who found capitalisation as not only insignificant with Zscore but
also negative. Table 4.5 above shows that capital has a considerable impact on the stabil-
ity of the banking sector as one standard deviation increase in capital increases stability
of the banking system by 40%. Giving result consistent with Bolt and Tieman (2004)
who found that capital increases stability, thus advocated increased capital stringency,
Maghyereh and Awartani (2016) that level of soundness depends on size of capital, among
other studies. In line with our expectation, liquidity is negatively related and statistically
significant with stability. Although inconsistent with correlation results, the argument is
that low ratio signifies rising risk of default while otherwise high ratio may as well mean
lack of profitable investment which in either way will be detrimental to stability. While
ROA shows positive and significant relationship with stability, ROE is negatively related.
Both are performance measures that we expect positive relationship. We noted that while
the ROE is very weakly correlated with stability, ROA showed a noticeably fairly strong
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correlation. This may have been partly the reason for the negative relationship between
ROE and stability over the study period. The result of COP in the regression model is
consistent with the correlation result as the coefficient is significant and positive to explain
stability in SSA commercial banks. This substantiates the fact that corruption perception
has signalling effect on the stability of the banking system in the region as data suggest a
more improved perception over the periods under review. Both annual GDP growth and
inflation show significant and positive relationship with stability. The results negate our
expectations and suggest that economic boom favours banking stability as well as inflation
in the region. While it may be plausible to argue the case for economic growth, it seems
more of an aberration in the case of inflation and needs a further investigation.
Results in Models 2 to 6 show the regression results of competition on risk. All the
lags of the risk proxies considered show positive and strongly significant relationship with
the present. This mplies that a volatile prior period has the potential to increase the risk
of the present period. Competition showed positive relationship with three among the
five risk measures considered. This provides an indication that increase in competition in-
crease credit risk specifically as well as capital risk (overall risk measure). These align with
literature and substantiate the foregoing results of competition fragility as increase in risk
results in decline in stability. Again we found evidence to support literature that argues
for increased risk with large banks as size becomes uniformly significant and positively re-
lated to all the risk measures employed. This further substantiates our initial proposition
of possible transmission from size to competition to fragility in the banking system, as size
increases competition and then risk. We found a 50 percent chance based on our result
of increased capital increasing risks of banks. In other words, out of the four measures of
risks capital is regressed on, two show increased risk with increased capital and the other
two show reduction in risk. Thus partly supporting Chiou and Porter (2015) studies on
bank capital and risk-taking behaviour. Liquidity is positive and significantly related to all
the risk measures indicating that the more liquid the banks are the the more the chances
of risk, in terms credit, off-balance-sheet engagement and capital risk. The two perfor-
mance measures showed mixed results with the risk measures. While ROA is positive and
significantly related to capital and off-balance-sheet risk measures but negatively related
with the credit risk measures, ROE shows weak and negative significance to capital and
insignificant to explain the equity related off-balance sheet risk. As expected, corruption
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perception reduces risks of credit and off-balance-sheet engagement and confirms its posi-
tive relationship with stability. As against literature, the macroeconomics variables largely
show a negative relationship with the risk measures. As previously expressed, one may find
reasons to argue for the results in GDPG but those of inflation would call for further work.
The regression results presented above warrant a deeper discussion and have several policy
implications. Careful attention will be paid to the variables of interest, that is, compe-
tition and stability relationship. To begin with, the persistent, positive and significant
relationship of stability in the immediate past period with the present reflects the fact
that stability in the past is fundamental for the current and future periods’ stability. This
is a wakeup call for unrelenting efforts in ensuring a stable banking environment at all
time for the smooth running of the monetary economic system as in the words of Vives
(2016a), the banking system is so pivotal to an economy to the extent that the mod-
ern monetary economy stops functioning with bank failure. This study found a negative
and significant relationship between Zscore and Lerner index. In other words, stability
is negatively related to competition as measured by the Lerner index in the SSA region
commercial banks. We had reported a monopolistic competitive banking market given
the outcome of the commercial banks’ market power computation in the SSA region in
Chapter 3. This result suggests that competition is associated with instability and con-
sistent with the competition fragility view of Yeyati and Micco (2007) in a study of eight
Latin American countries between 1993–2002; Beck et al. (2013) in 79 countries between
1994–2009; Fu et al. (2014) in a study of 14 Asian countries from 2003–2010; Agoraki
et al. (2011) who studied 13 Central and Eastern European countries between 1998–2005
and Ariss (2010) who studied 60 developing countries that included 14 African countries.
Most of these studies had employed both Lerner Index and Zscore to measure competition
and stability respectively making our study directly comparable with them. Although,
the summary statistics about bank capital base, bank performance and the stability mea-
sures estimated, do not suggest any form of instability in the SSA commercial banking
sectors, banks in this region continue to face the risk of high non-performing loans NPLs
among others in their asset portfolios. These are likely to arise from undue competition
that makes banks to either wave or not to pay proper attention to credit due diligence
and loan appraisal processes including other corporate governance issues that arise during
selection of loan assets portfolio. Knowing that potential instability is associated with
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competition in this region is a call for caution among players, regulators and practitioners
alike, such that their priorities should be aligned to avoid any eventualities. A point to
note is that the proponents of competition-stability view emphasise the role of efficiency in
the relationship between competition and stability. This we have not taken account of in
this chapter but later in Chapter 5 to further investigate the role of efficiency in mediating
this relationship in the commercial banking sector of the SSA region.
The emphasis on banks’ capital base and why it is made as the cardinal point of reg-
ulation is justified by the direct influence it has on the stability of the banking system
as found in this study. This again underscores the relationship between bank capital
and competition in Chapter 3. As such, banks must at all times maintain adequate and
sound capital bases to withstand stress and provide cushion for their survival. Liquidity
is found to pose a great danger for the stability of the banking sector in the region. This
is explained by its negative and positive relationship with stability and the risk measures
respectively. As explained previously, both high and low liquidity are likely to pose great
danger to the health of the banking system. Shortage of liquid assets is an immediate risk
of inability to meet up with ongoing obligations while excess liquidity reduces quality of
earning assets. The implication is determining an acceptable balance for the workability
of the system as each case has stability consequences either in the immediate or in the
long-term. Therefore banks must on the basis of these findings model the level of liquid
assets that is considered adequate for normal course of business to reduce the stability
challenges it portends. Both measures of performance employed were found to be signifi-
cant in explaining the stability of the region’s banking sector. However, ROE showed an
inverse relationship. Perhaps this might be as result of accounting measurements as it is
not clear why this is the case, hence, we briefly like to draw the attention of stakeholders in
this region to it and the need for further studies as well. The revelations on the impact of
competition on risk-taking behaviour of banks in this region is cardinal to policy making.
Both credit and banks overall risks are seen to increase with competition indicating that
risk-taking behaviour of banks especially as it related to their loans portfolio and charter
value is significant to explain the cause of fragility in a competitive banking environment.
This substantiates the negative relationship between competition and stability and thus,
highlight the flashpoints for focus when crafting policies to stimulate competition.
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The macroeconomic variables, annual GDP growth and inflation, also proved to be impor-
tant determinants of stability. It makes economic sense to think that banks may become
more stable during economic boom as the risk of defaults is likely to reduce, even though
some literature argue otherwise. We noticed that during the periods under review most of
the economies improved in spite of the global economic crisis. This again may have helped
the stability experienced in the banking sectors in the region. A possible explanation to
banking system being more stable during inflation may well be that banks become more
sceptical and meticulous in granting loans in order to protect its charter value. However,
this probably warrants further investigation. On corruption perception, it will make sense
to increase anti-corruption crusades in the region given that our result suggests that cor-
ruption perception plays a significant role in the stability of banks. Overall, the results
show that risk and stability work in opposite directions as most factors that increase risk
reduce stability and vice versa suggesting that measures to reduce risk will have consider-
able impact in enhancing stability.
In terms of validity, our result meet the various requirements of the regression models
as shown in Table 4.4. In particular, for the GMM, the overall fitness of the result is good
as indicated by the Wald test probability, AR2 confirms the absence of serial correlation
and the result of the Hansen J statistics gives us the confidence that the instruments are
not over identified.
4.5 Summary
This chapter looked at competition and stability relationship in the SSA region’s com-
mercial banks in the light of the call to increase competition of the banking system in the
region to fight poverty through stimulating economic growth. Models that we reviewed
argue for and against competition and stability, expressing that competition may be good
and bad for the banking system. The study employed the robust orthogonalised version of
the Generalised method of Moments to analyse this relationship. The choice of methods
is to avoid the shortfalls of OLS while accounting for possible endogeneity issues between
competition and stability. We proxy competition with the Lerner index and stability with
the Zscore. Both measures have been used prominently in this kind of literature and have
continued to gain relevance. The study concludes based on the findings that competition
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is detrimental to the commercial banking sector of the SSA region. This is a departure
from the results of Moyo et al. (2014) that found otherwise in the SSA region and other
studies done elsewhere around the world. However, their studies differ from ours in size
and coverage. Based on these findings, we recommend policy makers exercise caution
in crafting policies directed towards increasing competition in the region. Meanwhile we
investigate this relationship further in Chapter 5 by factoring efficiency into competition
stability relationship in the region. The outcome will go a long way in informing further
policy recommendations. This study contributes to the literature on competition and sta-
bility in Africa. As far as we know, this study is the first empirical works focusing on the
SSA region employing such large dynamic panel dataset analysis.
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Chapter 5
Competition, Efficiency and
Stability
5.1 Introduction
This chapter takes the relationship between competition and stability considered in Chap-
ter 4 further and investigates the place of efficiency in the competition and stability re-
lationship. Specific literature relating market structure to efficiency and possible trans-
mission between competition and stability through efficiency are reviewed. Evidence from
Chapter 4 supports competition-fragility view which purports that competition brings
about instability in the SSA banking sector. For a robust conclusion for policy consider-
ation, this chapter includes empirical analysis on whether competition leads to efficiency
and the implication that has for banks stability in the region. The outcome will proffer
whether or not there is the need to invest resources in trying to stimulate competition in
the region and perhaps the role regulation could play in the later chapters.
Competition and stability in banks are important issues to bankers and regulators alike
especially in the wake of the 2007/2009 financial crisis. Bank competition has become
even more a burning issue as policy makers in the SSA region rethink strategies to break
the yoke of poverty and grow their economies. The theoretical expectation is that; a com-
petitive banking environment will promote efficiency, which in turn should increase overall
competitiveness in other sectors of an economy and thus promote economic growth (Casu
et al., 2015). However, the competition stability trade-off means that caution must be
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applied in order not to sacrifice financial system stability in the bid to engender competi-
tion to stimulate economic growth. In this study, the role of competition in the financial
stability of the SSA region is examined by evaluating a panel analysis of 37 SSA countries’
commercial banks data. Over the years, the findings of both theoretical and empirical
papers on the relationship between competition and stability have been mixed, indefinite
and inconclusive. Yet, a new look at the role of bank competition in bringing about the
dynamic efficiency of the banking system and other sectors without compromising financial
stability is now essential if the SSA region is to harness the gains of competition without
compromising financial system stability.
There is a subsisting debate on the effect of competition on stability. Two strands of
literature exist which are for and against competition stability view (Agoraki et al., 2011;
Schaeck & Ciha´k, 2014). We found evidence that is consistent with the competition-
fragility views in Chapter 4 which differs from the competition-stability conclusion of
Moyo et al. (2014) who studied 16 SSA countries banking sectors. Although our foci
differs, these inconsistencies have been found to be the case in most studies around the
world (Liu, Molyneux, & Wilson, 2013a; Marques-Ibanez et al., 2014; Schaeck & Ciha´k,
2014). Casu et al. (2012) argued that such inconsistent results of the relationship between
competition and stability make interpretation and policy measure very difficult. Hence,
there is the need for further investigation in this chapter to affirm or otherwise, these
views, including possible transmission channels of competition to stability (Leon, 2015b).
Therefore, the compelling question is, does efficiency play any significant role in the rela-
tionship between competition and stability? This question becomes germane because the
SSA region seeks a competitive banking sector in order to stimulate economic growth of
the region (Watkins, 2014).
This study aligns with a long history of literature dealing with banking competition and
specifically the concerns as to through what channel of transmission does competition im-
pact on the stability of the system. Our contributions involve the use of a unique method,
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), to exogenously model an instrumental variable for com-
petition in a regression with stability. Thus modelled how much efficiency is associated
with a competitive SSA commercial banking system, and therefore able to assess the role
of eficiency in competition and stability relationship. In addition, we extended the study
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of Moyo et al. (2014)1 to include quite a sizeable number of SSA countries for possible
generalisation. Our results indicate that the Lerner index is negatively related to stability.
However, our instrument of competition provides evidence to support the competition-
stability view as found by Moyo et al. (2014) given that the result of the SFA reveals a
marginal efficiency in competition efficiency relationship. Therefore, it reaffirms the pos-
sible transmission from competition to stability through efficiency.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the literature that
deals with competition, efficiency and stability relationship. Section 5.3 presents our
methodology, and in Section 5.4 we present the empirical results. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Literature Review
The place of competition in banking has been a subject of intense debates among prac-
titioners and the academics alike. According to Casu et al. (2015), a healthy degree of
rivalry is considered necessary for the efficiency of the banking industry and for the sta-
bility of the system as a whole. Based on theories, works that have investigated the nexus
between competition and stability have alluded to the presence of efficiency as imperative
in the study of the relationship between competition and stability (Bolt & Humphrey,
2010; Hussain & Hassan, 2012; Schaeck & Ciha´k, 2014). This section explores various the-
ories that underline this thought including the empirical literature that has been compiled
on this topic.
5.2.1 Theoretical Literature Review
As reviewed in Chapters 3 and 4, there are quite a number of underpinning theories of
banking competition as well as competition and stability relationship that is predomi-
nantly rooted in the industrial organisation theory. Their major preoccupation is whether
market power can earn monopoly rent for banks, in other words, the relationship between
the structure of a bank and its performance, in charging beyond equilibrium price in terms
of lower deposit rates and higher lending rates. Dansby and Willig (1979) believe that
the analysis of bank performance has important social and economic impacts as welfare
is optimised from an efficient and optimal allocation of resources through intermediation.
1They considered 16 SSA countries
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At the centre of this theory lies the welfare theorem associated with competition.
The market structure theory argues that firms’ conducts are influenced by the feature
of the industry in which they operate in (Nyong, 1999). Rios, McConnell, and Brue
(2013) admit that economic industries fall into four main categories; perfect competi-
tion, monopolistic competition, oligopoly and monopoly. Within these structures, firms
exhibit different traits. According to Sloman and Garratt (2010), the conduct of firms
under perfectly competitive environment differs from that of those under monopoly firms,
likewise from that of those under monopolistic competition or oligopoly. Accordingly,
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis argued that firms’ conducts affect their
performance, in terms of prices, profit, efficiency, among others (Nabieu, 2013), which in
turn affects the performance of other firms in the industry. These chain reactions triggers
collective firms’ behaviour to affect the entire industry’s performance.
In the long run, pure competition forces firms to produce at the minimum average to-
tal cost (ATC) of production and then charge the minimum price (P) that is consistent
with the cost (P = ATC). Firms’ survival is thus hinged on their ability to utilise least
cost (best available) production approaches and inputs combinations. In other words, a
particular output has to be produced from a minimum amount of resources. From the
consumers’ perspective, this is a highly favourable situation. The production methods
provide the society with the “right goods” that customers want the most. Rios et al.
(2013) referred to this as allocative efficiency (AE) in which the price charged in perfect
competitive market equals the marginal cost (MC). Hence, in the long run under perfect
competition, productive or technical efficiency (TE) and AE take place.
Since monopolist’s output is less than the output required to achieve average total cost and
its price always above marginal cost, the monopoly firm is inefficient. Hence, Harberger
(1995) argued that monopoly is allocativelly inefficient, often referred to as dead-weight
loss of non-competition. A number of explanations were offered to explain why the sponta-
neous estimation of dead-weight loss was practically not feasible in the early 1950s giving
way for the estimation of the cost of non-competitive markets. One explanation was that
monopoly waste resources or increase costs by rent seeking. A further explanation relates
to X-inefficiency where a firm’s actual costs of producing any output is greater than its
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average total cost. X-inefficiency also known as technical inefficiency is a reflection of
bad management which according to Rao (2002) is the reasons for rising firm’s costs and
thus regarded as cost inefficiency. The absence of competitive pressure on profit margin
could mean lax cost control culminating in wastages and misuse of resources. There exists
an inverse relationship between X-inefficiency and competition, explaining why it is more
observable in monopoly, followed by oligopoly, monopolistic competition and least in pure
competition. It makes average costs and marginal costs higher than expected minimum.
Leibenstein (1966) argued that with light competitive pressure, dissatisfaction of greater
efforts is traded to satisfaction of little efforts or search for the satisfaction of feeling less
pressured or of better interpersonal relations. He examined the molecular make-up of a
firm and concluded that firms’ internal agents are non-maximisers. Thus, aligned with
the Yerkes-Dodson law that individuals put less efforts to carefully calculating decisions
at low pressure levels but move towards more maximising conduct with increasing pres-
sure. Meanwhile, Stigler (1957) opined that increased output due to increased efforts, for
instance, does not amount to change in efficiency but a mere change in output.
The welfare theorem became the rational for the link between market structure and the
efficiency debate was triggered by Hicks (1935)’s quiet life hypothesis (QLH) who argued
that a monopoly market is less efficient as producer becomes passive about optimising
production since it is relieved of competitive pressure. In other words, monopoly affords
managers a quiet life devoid of competition, which permits them to either reduce their
efforts or to appropriate their share of monopoly rent through discretionary expenses. The
author hence concluded that concentration reduces efficiency thus became the first work
to link the structure of market to efficiency, a theory in 1966 identified as X-efficiency
by Leibenstein. Hence the birth of the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis (Bain,
1956) which states that collusion is anti-competition and is the cause of abnormal profit.
Bain (1956) established a direct relationship between competition and profitability and
emphasised the fact that the feature of market structure explains its conduct. Leibenstein
(1966) admits that increased competitive pressure improves efficiency as managers react
to the challenges.
The offshoot of strucuture-conduct-performance hypothesis is efficiency structure hypoth-
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esis (ESH) theory which argued that efficiency may as well be the reason for market power
(Demsetz, 1973). This assumption predicts an inverse relationship between competition
and efficiency. The argument borders on the fact that competition makes more efficient
firms operate at lower costs which directly increases their profits. Hence, the ability of
the firms to acquire larger market shares that may cause higher level of concentration, a
phenomenon referred to as relative market power (RMP) theory of the efficiency struc-
ture hypothesis. Therefore, competition and efficiency are negatively related since market
concentration implies reduced competition. This theory further argued that large banks
can exploit their market power to charge uncompetitive high prices. Shepherd (1982,
1986) and Berger (1995) further substantiated this with the arguments that superior ef-
ficiency and/or market power related factors or influences explain the differences in bank
performance. Another arm of efficiency structure hypothesis, called X-efficiency structure
hypothesis believes that technical efficiency may be realised through greater efficiency
attributable to superior management and/or production processes with direct effects of
lowering costs thus being able to earn higher profits. In the case of scale efficiency hy-
pothesis of the efficiency structure hypothesis, some firms of equally good management/
production process may acquire greater efficiency arising from economies of scale and be
able to produce at output levels closer to average total cost (Sloman & Garratt, 2010).
The three contrasting theories of efficiency structure hypothesis hence conclude a nega-
tive relationship between competition and efficiency. This is a negation of the structure
conduct performance hypothesis that argued a positive relation between the duo.
Neither technical efficiency nor allocative efficiency is feasible in monopolistic competi-
tion or oligopoly in the long run because firms here do not produce goods and services
and offer them to the market at average total cost, and price does not equate marginal
cost. The welfare theorem is undoubtedly consistent with pure competition with its pe-
culiar features; free entry and exit, perfect market information, among others. Banking
industry realities preclude pure competition, thus impede optimal utilisation of resources
in the industry, giving ways for varying levels of inefficiency to occur. Prices do not equate
marginal costs in most lines of banking, likewise, products are differentiated, with absence
of free entry and exit. In the presence of notable binding constraints of regulatory policies
and procedures, the reality of banking is either monopolistic competition or oligopoly.
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The later theory of market contestability posits that with free entry and costless exit,
market structure will not matter as potential competition guarantees efficient produc-
tion and pricing regardless of existing players in the market. This, according to Dietsch
(1993), brings the market to stability and equilibrium irrespective of the existing market
structure. Existing literature on this model in Africa tends to find consistency with it,
(Chirwa, 2003; Mugume, 2008) but suffers the setback of using concentration as a measure
of competition. Attempts to overcome the setback of the structural model gave rise to
the Lerner index and the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics, among other non-structural models
of measuring competition. In spite of their own various shortcomings, they offer better
competition measures (Liu et al., 2013b)
Recapping subsection 1.9.8, a simple measure of a firms efficiency is defined by Farrell
(1957) who argues that the technical efficiency reflects the firm’s ability to obtain max-
imal output from a given set of inputs. Farrell explains his idea by assuming that firms
use two inputs (X1 and X2) to produce one output (y), and the production is under the
assumption of constant return to scale (CRS). In other words, an increase (decrease) in
the inputs, leads to the same proportional increase (decrease) of the output. Overtime,
the parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) introduced by Farrell (1957) has been
used to empirically test this theory. It is important to note that most studies that have
considered output related technical efficiency measures have mainly used pretax income,
return on assets, and return on equity, and have concluded that a statistically significant
positive relationship exists between competition and efficiency.
5.2.2 Empirical Literature Review
Subsisting empirical models in banking literature, specifically competition-stability and
competition-fragility views, canvassed that competition could be good and bad for the
banking industry as it may result in either stability or fragility. The fragility view says
that competition is associated with moral hazards, adverse selection and agency problems
as managers strive to cope with competitive environment, resulting in instability (Ago-
raki et al., 2011; Ariss, 2010; Beck et al., 2013; Fu et al., 2014; Yeyati & Micco, 2007).
They explained that banks under high competitive pressure take more excessive risk, thus,
increasing fragility which may result in individual bank failure. This means that moral
hazards and adverse selection problems are associated with excessive competition in banks
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where the wrong client is attracted which in turn pushes up loan rate to the detriment
of low risk customers. On the other hand, The stability view believes that efficiency
comes with competition which results in systemic stability (Boyd et al., 2009; Schaeck &
Ciha´k, 2014; Uhde & Heimeshoff, 2009). Their arguments have been that competition
can have a stabilising effect on the banking system as efficiency is improved and loan
interest rates lowered, thereby reducing the likelihood of borrowers defaulting. Notably,
efficiency and stability literature suggests that efficiency enhances loan administrations
reducing the probability of loan defaults hence stability of the system (Berger & Mester,
1997; Petersen & Rajan, 1995; Williams, 2004) . It is imperative that further research is
done to revalidate this result and perhaps explore the channels through which competition
affects stability in the SSA region. These are among the foci of this study.
Earlier application of the theories linking competition and efficiency in banking contended
with the competing interpretation of concentration-profitability relationship. While Smir-
lock (1985) became the pioneer application of the efficiency theory to banking, it was
Berger (1995) who first comprehensively tested the hypothesis using specific measures of
bank efficiency. Thereafter, more extended works have empirically tested these assertions.
Casu and Girardone (2006) analysed the relationship between competition and efficiency
in the European banking market for the periods 1997-2003 and concluded in favour of
the quiet life hypothesis. They applied the fixed effects panel analysis on Panzar-Rosse
H-statistics and efficiency score generated by DEA and found that increasing competition
enhances efficiency. Their results also show that increasing efficiency does not foster com-
petition in the EU banking market as there was little evidence that more efficient banking
systems are more competitive. In a related study, Casu and Girardone (2009) revisited the
same objective in the European Union commercial banking market, this time with Lerner
index as a competition measure and efficiency scores generated by SFA and data envel-
opment analysis (DEA). The study covered a period of 2000-2005 and using generalised
method of moments (GMM) and Granger causality test, their results negate the quiet life
hypothesis as collusion does not reduce cost. They argued in favour of the efficiency struc-
ture hypothesis as their results show that efficiency precedes market power. They found
that as European banking markets become increasingly concentrated and cost efficiency
decreases, their marginal costs fall faster than their prices thus increase in market power.
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In their study of technical efficiency of large and small city banks pre– and post–WTO
in Chinese banking system, Lin, Tsao, and Yang (2009) used and unbalanced panel anal-
ysis of 63 banks for the periods 1997-2006 and with efficiency scores generated by SFA
rooted for quiet life hypothesis as they found that efficiency scores improved post-WTO
with increased competition. Bolt and Humphrey (2010) developed a new way to measure
competition using efficiency in a study of 11 European countries banking market for the
period 199-2008 and found little evidence to support relationship between competition
and efficiency. Their result shows that differences in banks competition play less role
in accounting for the differences in bank efficiencies across the countries considered. In
rather mixed results, Ariss (2010) in a Tobit model of 60 developing countries in Eastern
Europe, Central Asia, Middle East, South Asia and the Pacific for the periods 1999-2005
investigated the effects of different degrees of market power on efficiency. Using the Lerner
index as a measure of market power, they provide evidence to show that market power
increases profit efficiency but decreases cost efficiency. For Mlambo and Ncube (2011),
competition and efficiency relationship in South Africa is consistent with the Hick’s quiet
life hypothesis but with a number of efficient banks decreasing with competition. They
analysed the evolution of competition and efficiency using the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics
as a competition measure and DEA for efficiency score for the periods 1999-2008 in the
South African Banking sector.
Previous literature on the various measures of competition and stability were reviewed
by OECD (2011) in exploring the complex interrelationship between competition and sta-
bility in retail banking. They concluded that, competition helps to make the financial
sector more efficient, ensuring that rescue and stimulus packages benefit final consumers.
On the contrary, Hussain and Hassan (2012), used the fixed effects model and Granger
causality and arrived at an inverse relationship between competition and efficiency in the
US commercial banking market. Their study specifically captured pre-financial crisis era
of 2003–2007 with the use of the Lerner index and SFA for competition measure and ef-
ficiency scores respectively. Agreeing with this study, Funga´cˇova´, Pessarossi, and Weill
(2013) found competition to negatively Granger cause efficiency in the western Chinese
banking market. They used the Lerner index and cost efficiency to study the direction of
causality between competition and efficiency and with analysis done with GMM over the
periods 2002-2011 in Chinese banks. They further found that, cost efficiency improved in
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the period without increase in competition and with no significant relationship between
competition and efficiency in their banking system. Meanwhile Duygun, Sena, and Sha-
ban (2013) measured competition based on new registered product trademarks in the UK
banking sector to investigate the effects of Schumpeterian competition on efficiency of com-
mercial banks. Using maximum likelihood estimates a number of trademarks registered
and efficiency scores measured by DEA for the periods 2001–2012, they found competition
to increase both profit and cost efficiency.
In another Granger causality test, Thota (2013) investigated the relationship among com-
petition, concentration and efficiency in the Indian banking market using Panzar-Rosse
H-statistics and DEA efficiency measure. They found decline in efficiency with competition
and whether competition Granger causes efficiency depends on the competition measure
used. Schaeck and Ciha´k (2014) in a further study of competition, efficiency and stability
in the European banking markets with nearly 17000 bank year observations found evidence
to show that efficiency is the conduit through which competition contribute to stability of
the banking system, hence support the quite life hypothesis. Recent studies of C¸elik, Ka-
plan, S¸ahin, et al. (2015) and Castellanos, A´ngel, and Garza-Garc´ıa (2016) are consistent
with this study as they found that efficiency increases with increase in competition. The
former was based on the Turkish banking market for the periods 1990–2011 using PR H
statistics and DEA for efficiency, while the latter is a study of the Mexican banking sector
for the periods 2002-2012 using the Boone indicator, DEA and multivariate Tobit panel
regression.
Historically, theories and empirical literature on competition and efficiency align along
two opposing views; competition enhances efficiency (quiet life hypothesis) and efficiency
precedes market power (efficiency structure hypothesis). To the former, banking compe-
tition should result in efficiency, hence, the stability of the banking system. However,
empirical models and evidence reveal that competition results in both stability and insta-
bility. But these models and evidences fail to consider the mediating role of efficiency in
the study of the relationship between competition and stability which probably is the flash
point of the endogeneity between them. This study, therefore, fills the gap in the litera-
ture on this subject matter by applying stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to investigate
the role of efficiency in the competition-stability relationship. The study also sheds light
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on how much efficiency is orchestrated that warrants the need for competition which the
competition fragility view argues increases the risk appetite of banks. Hence, the endo-
geneity issues between competition and stability can also be addressed with the exogenous
instrument of competition which is created to be used in the regression of competition on
stability.
5.3 Methodology
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the effects of competition on stability
taking into account the role of efficiency among SSA commercial banks. In other words, we
explore a possible transmission from competition to stability via efficiency. The stochastic
frontier analysis (SFA) approach is employed to generate an instrumental variable of com-
petition to be regressed on bank stability for the period 2006 to 2015. Previous studies
on competition and stability view found competition-stability, competition-fragility and
U-shaped relationship (Fu et al., 2014; Schaeck & Ciha´k, 2014; Tabak et al., 2012). It has
also been established that efficiency is pivotal in competition and stability relationship
(Ariss, 2010; Chirwa, 2003; Mugume, 2008), However, to the best of our knowledge, no
existing studies have explicitly attempted to explore factoring in efficiency in studying
the relationship between competition and stability. How is competition related to banks
overall stability? Does competition help to improve or lower banks efficiency? Answers to
these questions will help to establish the role of competition in stability management in
banks. Extant literature, however, confronts an inherent problem in regressing competi-
tion against stability in order to measure the effects of competition on stability because of
the obvious endogeneity problem. Hence, this study follows Chiou and Porter (2015) to
develop an exogenous instrument of competition in a regression with stability using the
unique SFA.
Concerning the techniques, Debreu (1951); Farrell (1957); Koopmans (1951); William
(1970) describe and measure firm’s efficiency in terms of divergence from the frontier of its
actual performance. In the context of production function, the frontier is the maximum
feasible level of outputs given the level of inputs, in other words, it is the minimum fea-
sible level of inputs given the level of outputs. A firm’s inefficiency is therefore measured
as the divergent inputs shortfalls or divergent outputs expansion from the frontier. A
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substantial amount of works exist in literature on the measurement of efficiency of which
two methods are used, namely; the parametric like SFA (Hughes, Lang, Mester, Moon, &
Pagano, 2003; Hughes & Mester, 2013; Hughes, Mester, & Moon, 2001; Nguyen, 2010) and
non-parametric methods such as the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Bauer, Berger,
Ferrier, & Humphrey, 1998; Berger & Hannan, 1998; Kouki & Al-Nasser, 2014), among
others. SFA is an economic modelling method that was introduced by Jondrow, Lovell,
Materov, and Schmidt (1982) following the stochastic production frontier previously in-
troduced by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977); Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) and
Farrell (1957). This study adopts the SFA approach because among the modern and most
popular frontier analysis techniques, the SFA allows the construction of a unique instru-
mental variable of competition that is exogenous to banks’ stability. This helps to create
the transmission channel and as well deal with the endogeneity between competition and
stability by using SFA to estimate the inefficiency in our sample of SSA banking sectors.
Furthermore, the SFA fits best in analysing firm’s efficiency as it accounts for statistical
noise (Coelli et al., 2005; Kao & Liu, 2009). They argue that empirical efficiencies calcu-
lated from a non-parametric technique such as DEA provide low consistent estimators of
the true inefficiencies.
5.3.1 Model Specification
To construct the instrumental variable of competition, this study follows Chiou and Porter
(2015). The efficiency of the banks is measured by the distance between the frontier and
the specific bank’s profit before tax.
The production frontier model without random component can be written in the following
form:
PBTi = TEi.f(Xi : b), (5.3.1)
Where PBTi is the profit before tax of bank i,i = 1,.,N. TEi is the technical efficiency
defined as the ratio of observed output to maximum visible output, Xi is a vector of J
input used by bank i,f(Xi, b) is the frontier and b is a vector of technology parameter to
be estimated. Given that the frontier enable us to estimate the maximum visible output,
it is then possible to measure the shortfall of the observed output from the maximum
feasible output.
140
Equation (5.3.1) is deterministic, thus ignores that output can be affected by random
shocks that are not under the control of banks. Considering a stochastic component that
describes random shocks affecting the production process in this model, the stochastic
frontier becomes:
PBTi = e
vi .TEi.f(Xi : b) (5.3.2)
Where evi is the shock which is neither directly attributable to the bank nor the technology
but may emanate from random white noise in the economy; each bank faces different
shocks that are assumed to be random and are expressed by a common distribution. TEi
is further described as a stochastic variable with a specific distribution function;
TEi = e
−ui , (5.3.3)
Where ui ≥ 0, since it is required that TEi ≤ 1, hence the following equation is obtained
PBTi = e
vi−ui .f(Xi : b). (5.3.4)
From this, the frontier is expressed according to a specific production model; in this case
it is assumed that banks profitability can be specified as the Cobb Douglas production
function;
In(PBTit) = α+
H∑
h=1
bhln(Xit,h) + vit − uit (5.3.5)
Where vit is the noise component, considered as two-sided normally distributed variable
and ui is the non-negative technical inefficiency component. Because vi and ui constitute
a compound error term with a specific distribution to be determined, SFA is therefore
often referred to as composed error model.
The above stochastic frontier will therefore be used to create a unique instrumental vari-
able of bank competition to be used in the regression of competition and financial stability
in SSA region commercial banks. This is expected to answer the question of how efficient
is a bank in converting the resources with which it has to work into profit in the face
of competition. From this, we can measure the inefficiency of the banks as the distance
between the frontier and the specific bank pre-tax income.
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An unrestricted frontier model is then developed which will determine the highest possible
profitability based solely on the book value of assets employed. This is specified as;
PBTit(ABV ) = α+ b1ABVit + b2(ABVit)
2 + eit (5.3.6)
Where PBTit equals pre-tax income, ABVit is assets book value, eit =
∮
it−λit, the com-
posite error,
∮ ∼ iidN(0, δ2∮ ), is the stochastic noise which is a two-sided error term,
λ ∼ iidN(µ, δ2λ), the systematic fall (technical inefficiency) a one-sided error and λ > 0.
A quadratic equation is used to allow for a nonlinear relation between the pre-tax income
and the book value of asset. The specification is imperative to allow technical efficiency
to vary through time, and in a different manner for each bank (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2003).
The efficiency scores are estimated using frontier version 4.1 (Coelli, 1996), a computer pro-
gram based on stochastic production functions of Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995) written
to provide maximum likelihood estimates of different types of stochastic frontier produc-
tion as independently introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van Den Broeck
(1977). It accounts for truncated normal assumption including panel data with time vary-
ing efficiencies. Hence applicable to our unbalanced panel model with firm effects having
truncated normal random variables distribution assumption that are allowed to vary sys-
tematically with time (Battese & Coelli, 1992).
Hence, the parameter λ, the systematic fall, in 5.3.6, is estimated as the conditional
expectation of λit given e as follows;
E (λi|ei) =
1− Φ
[
ηitσ
∗
i − (µi∗σ∗i )
]
1− Φ(−µ∗iσ∗i )
 e[−ηitµ∗i+ 12η2itσ∗2i ] (5.3.7)
Where µ∗i =
µσ2∮−η′ieiσ2
σ2∮+η′iηiσ2 , σ
∗2
i =
σ2∮ σ2
σ2∮+η′iηiσ2 , η is an unknown scalar parameter to be esti-
mated2 and Φ(·) is the standard normal random variable of the distribution function. The
mean technical efficiency of the banks at time t is then obtained by integration with ui
density function as;
λt =
{
1− Φ [ηtσ − (µσ )]
1− Φ(−µσ )
}
e[−ηtµ+
1
2
η2t σ
2] (5.3.8)
providing the efficiency scores results in Frontier version 4.1 (Coelli, 1996) used in the
regression estimations.
2In maximum likelihood output
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Next, we develop the second frontier based on the level of banking sector competition.
The essence of the unrestricted model is to measure the unconditional inefficiencies of the
banks. Restricting the model will enable us to develop a measure of incremental efficiency
or inefficiency of the banking organisation due to the level of competition within the bank-
ing industry. It is this incremental efficiency/inefficiency due to bank level of competition
that the study proposes to use as instrument for competition in the regression of bank
stability on competition.
The restricted model again, in a quadratic form, is as follows;
PBTit(ABV,BCL) = α+ b1ABVit + b2(ABV )
2
it + b3BCLit + it (5.3.9)
Where BLC is bank level competition, estimated using the Lerner index in Chapter 3
Subsection 3.3.1, it = vit − uit is the composite error, such that, v ∼ iidN(0, δ2v), is
stochastic noise and u(> 0) ∼ iidN(µ, δ2u) is the inefficiency orchestrated by the level of
competition that the banking sector has to cope with. The estimation of u is the same
as in equation (3.7) above. Based on the two inefficiencies assessments, the profitability
due to the influence of competition can then be measured by subtracting the inefficiency
of the unrestricted model from the restricted model, thus;
ϑit = uit − λit (5.3.10)
This therefore constitutes the instrumental variable for competition.
From the foregoing, the relationship between the variable specifying banks stability and
competition is analysed by the regression equation specified as follows;
Ykit = Ckit + bkitϑkit + φkitIn(ABVkit) + ηkit (5.3.11)
Where Ykit measures the stability for bank i in country k at year t. Ckit is a constant; bkit
is the coefficient of instrumental variable of competition, ϑkit, for k’ s regression in year t;
φkit is the coefficient of the natural logarithm of bank asset book value; ηkit is the error
term. The book value of asset helps to control for the impact of size on banks risk taking
behaviour (Gatev, Schuermann, & Strahan, 2009).
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The SSA banking sector’s stability will for the purpose of this study be defined as the
Z-score3. Z-score, according to Roy (1952) is used to measure the overall stability of a
bank and has been used in bank literature, (Cihak, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Mart´ınez Per´ıa, &
Mohseni-Cheraghlou, 2012; Kouki & Al-Nasser, 2014; Laeven & Levine, 2009; Lepetit &
Strobel, 2013). A Z-score is an indicator of a bank’s probability of insolvency by combin-
ing banks’ profitability, capitalization and volatility of returns. It estimates the number
of standard deviations that a bank’s profit has to fall below its expected value before its
equity becomes negative. Higher scores correspond to a more stable bank.
We implement the regression using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regres-
sion modelled in Chapter 4. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method could not be
used because of the departure from normality of the variable ϑ due to the combined error
terms. Unlike other estimators, the GMM is robust and does not require information on
the exact distribution of the disturbances. The GMM estimator is known to be consistent,
asymptotically normal and efficient in the class of all estimators that do not use any extra
information apart from that contained in the moment conditions (Arellano & Bond, 1991;
Athanasoglou, Brissimis, & Delis, 2008; Campbell, Lo, MacKinlay, et al., 1997; Gatev et
al., 2009; Hamilton, 1994; Roodman, 2006). It is also efficient for a large number of ob-
servations over a relatively small time period. In addition, GMM deals with endogeneity
in a better way than other methods.
5.3.2 Data
We obtained our data on banks for this study from the Bankscope database by Fitch/IBCA
Bureau van Dijk on 37 SSA countries commercial banks’ financial profiles for the years
2006 to 2015. A total of 440 banks data ranging from 190 banks in 2006 to 440 banks in
2015 were sampled. The selection is based on the availability of data from the database.
SSA countries selections exclude those we considered as outliers4. Bankscope is considered
as the most comprehensive data base for banking research. Specific data collected relate
to total revenue, total assets, interest and non- interest expense, personnel expense, total
asset, and total deposits required for the estimation of bank level competition as contained
3Estimating formula stated in Chapter 4 Subsection 4.3.2
4South Africa, having highly developed and sophisticated banking system, while others like Sudan
ravaged by wars, were excluded for data availability and consistency.
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in literature (Berger et al., 2009; Kouki & Al-Nasser, 2014, among others). Data collected
for the estimation of Z-score include return on assets and equity capital ratio as part of
the annualized data obtained from Bankscope.
Other specific data collected include annual data on pre-tax income (Chiou & Porter, 2015)
and asset book value (Barro & Barro, 1990) employed for the input and output variables
for the output-oriented stochastic frontier analysis. Based on competition-stability views,
we expect a positive relationship between the instrument of competition and stability.
Our argument is that an efficiency-flexed competition should enhance the stability of the
banking system.
5.4 Empirical Results
This section presents the results of our estimations. Based on the questions we posed to
actualise the objective of this study, we test for these two hypotheses about our expectation
of the relationship among competition, efficiency and stability in SSA region. H01: There
is no significant relationship between competition and efficiency. H02: There is no link
between competition and stability that results from efficiency. Our assertions are borne
out of the level of development of the commercial banks in the SSA region.
5.4.1 Summary Statistics
The numbers of banks and statistics of the competition measure, the Lerner index, pre-
sented in Table 3.2 of Chapter 3, over the sample years are reported in Table 5.1 below.
The means of other descriptive statistics are listed: Z-score, the stability measure; ABV,
asset book value; ROA, return on asset; ROE, return on equity and PBT, profit before
tax. As explained in previous chapters, the Lerner index produced a range of competi-
tion measures with varying degrees of market power with the overall mean suggesting a
monopolistic competition market. The mean of the Z-score shows indices that are greater
than 1. The higher the Z-score, the better, as higher a Z-score depicts a stable banking
system. While the return on assets seems to be quite low in contrast to those of the
return on equity, overall, the mean values provide evidence of a banking system that is
performing over the periods under investigation which corroborates the stability reflected
by the Z-score. This sketchy behaviour shown by the summary statistics tends to point
145
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
Lerner Index
year N mean SD min max zscore abv roa roe pbt
2006 190 0.2556606 0.165618 0.0006262 0.8370308 3.54343 371504.8 0.0204855 0.1913219 10401.98
2007 215 0.2693673 0.155672 0.0128989 0.7842373 3.204579 529336 0.0181973 0.1962862 12804.17
2008 250 0.2884124 0.1773142 0.0109381 9.67E-01 3.380152 582587.9 0.0203531 0.1795552 18338.83
2009 275 0.293903 0.1883627 0.010171 9.21E-01 3.29502 691492 0.0140424 0.1480773 14048.96
2010 296 0.2959335 0.182933 0.0003647 9.79E-01 3.273991 695666.8 0.009863 0.1317374 18974.79
2011 320 0.2821636 0.1727603 0.0029686 9.77E-01 2.988873 970764 0.0116465 0.1232481 20293.32
2012 357 0.3237032 0.1944634 0.00499 9.98E-01 3.235099 1060910 0.0133897 0.1158373 26529.1
2013 392 0.3520863 0.314314 0.0000355 4.26E+00 3.403835 1153087 0.0116615 0.08695642 27427.43
2014 430 0.3318136 0.1854892 0.0003017 9.96E-01 3.624344 1159650 0.0106149 0.07606974 27434.95
2015 440 0.3243521 0.1964074 0.0005727 9.96E-01 3.484 1111977 0.0110423 0.06922351 23320.27
Source: Author’s computation, 2017, based on data collected
to the model of competition, efficiency and stability which this study hopes to reveal in
subsequent sections.
5.4.2 Instrumental Variable
The instrumental variable for competition’ descriptive statistics over the years sampled
is displayed in Table 5.2. The instrumental variable ϑit = uit − λit is a measure of
incremental bank inefficiency due to bank level competition and/or market power, where
the stochastic frontiers are PBTit = α + b1ABVit + b2(ABVit)
2 + eit, eit =
∮
it−λit, and
PBTit = α + b1ABVit + b2(ABV )
2
it + b3BCLit + it, it = vit − uit. The first frontier
measured the level of banks inefficiencies in converting their resources to output (profit).
This determines the maximum possible income achievable from a given level of asset which
is exogeneous to a specific bank because it is determined from the data of all banks in the
sample. The distance from this frontier to any specific bank’s actual income is a measure of
the bank’s inefficiency. With the second frontier, the instrument of competition is created
conditioned to bank level competition given its production capacity. The incremental
inefficiency/efficiency from the second frontier is a function of bank competition; in other
words, the difference between the second and the first frontier’s efficiency scores is used
as the instrument for competition (as in Table 5.2 for the description of our instrumental
variable). Based on pairwise correlation, the instrument is strongly negatively correlated
with Lerner index, the variable it replaces at 0.7732 with 0.0000 p-value, and uncorrelated
with the residual at -0.0000 with 1.0000 p-value, affirming that it is a good instrument. We
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Table 5.2: Instrumental Variable Distribution
year mean SD kurtosis skewness min max
2006 -4.08368E-06 7.04307E-05 66.46838888 7.558965536 -6.73E-05 0.00067622
2007 5.52651E-07 0.000163903 167.7121601 12.41309188 -0.00015733 0.00224774
2008 -1.35568E-05 4.3518E-05 31.93930828 4.276213275 -0.00011717 0.00036802
2009 -4.68567E-06 0.000117389 127.1648157 10.31878458 -0.0001322 0.00157034
2010 2.18235E-05 0.000305294 119.5363149 10.46394279 -0.00013972 0.00395189
2011 -1.00525E-06 0.000216933 272.8637947 15.94867855 -0.00015109 0.0037175
2012 2.69355E-05 0.000644388 343.9703535 18.38833656 -0.00014222 0.01205672
2013 -9.40666E-06 9.1474E-05 56.41178163 5.86973908 -0.00035134 0.0010471
2014 -3.38535E-06 0.000123564 62.19802236 7.017162991 -0.00015697 0.00133269
2015 -1.14878E-05 8.35993E-05 46.01088163 5.639606657 -0.0001813 0.0008062
Source: Author’s estimation, 2017, based on data collected.
found marginal efficiency from the results of the SFA, that is, the efficiency scores are closer
to the frontier with bank level competition as against the absence of competition. This
provides evidence to support a positive relationship between competition and efficiency,
which is consistent with literature (Castellanos et al., 2016; Casu & Girardone, 2009; C¸elik
et al., 2015, among others). On the contrary, Apriadi, Sembel, Santosa, and Firdaus (2016)
found evidence in Indonesia that competition reduces the efficiency of bank; however, our
result negates this in the case of the SSA region. For our sample, the distribution of ϑ in
the same year tends to be skewed to the right-hand side and has positive excess kurtosis.
On this note, we consider a non-parametric and use a normality-free regression model for
our analysis to avoid the possible errors of estimation.
5.4.3 GMM Results
The results of our generalised method of moments (GMM) estimations are as shown in
Models 1 - 5 in Table 5.4 below. To enhance robustness, we present both Pairwise correla-
tion coefficient between the tested variables, the instrumental variable for competition, ϑ,
and the Lerner index in Table 4.3. Table 5.5 shows the estimate of the economic impacts
of the regression coefficients of the explanatory variables on the explained variables. We
relaxed the assumption of cross-sectional dependence in our panel estimation, because as
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explianed in Chapter 4 subsection 4.3.1, the GMM model is based on iid assumption, that
is, the data is assumed to be identically and independently distributed, hence largely ac-
count for issues of cross-sectional dependence. Besides, according to Chudik and Pesaran
(2013) and Chudik, Pesaran, and Tosetti (2011), it is ideal to relax the cross-sectional
dependence assumption in large cross-sections like ours. They argue that even where it
exists, controlling for it is difficult and the result would not necessarily be biased. For effi-
cient and robust estimates, this study uses the dynamic panel data estimation technique,
and the two-step system GMM with robust and orthogonal deviation to account for the
unbalanced nature of the panel. To control for the size of the banks, the coefficient of
ϑ and those of Lerner index are generated by GMM regression with a constant and the
natural logarithm of the book value of assets. The coefficients of the control variable and
the constant term are reported in Table 5.4.
Table 5.3: Correlation Results
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
ϑ & zscore 0.1644 0.2468 -0.027 0.0341 0.2341 0.2791 0.2583 -0.0572 0.1089 0.0296
p-value 0.0234 0.0003 0.6712 0.5737 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2584 0.0239 0.5363
lerner index & zscore -0.1346 -0.2072 -0.0259 -0.0098 -0.3066 -0.3131 -0.2533 0.0038 -0.0681 -0.0174
p-value 0.064 0.0023 0.6834 0.8715 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9409 0.1586 0.7166
lerner index & pbtaratio 0.0198 0.2863 0.0183 0.2339 0.0131 -0.0737 0.1276 -0.0045 -0.0204 -0.0387
p-value 0.7859 0.0000 0.7737 0.0001 0.8225 0.1886 0.0159 0.9297 0.6735 0.4184
lerner index & roa 0.0338 0.2649 0.0771 0.3189 0.039 -0.0596 0.1213 0.0559 0.0715 0.0062
p-value 0.6433 0.0001 0.2244 0.0000 0.5041 0.288 0.0219 0.2699 0.1389 0.8966
lerner index & roe -0.0005 0.0496 0.0788 0.1581 0.0224 0.0099 0.0358 0.0302 0.0072 -0.0118
p-value 0.9943 0.4716 0.2184 0.0092 0.7027 0.8609 0.5002 0.5521 0.882 0.8057
Author’s estimation, 2017, based on data collected.
The results in Table 5.4, particularly the stability measure in the Models 1 & 2 exhibit
a statistically significant and positive relationship with their lagged values which implies
that previous financial systems stability in the banking sector largely determines the cur-
rent stability of the system as well as persistence in relationship. This relates to the
disaster myopia theory noted in Chapter 1 subsection 1.9.9 which often makes bank man-
agers complacent and most times fail to forecast future instability in the system. Our
variable of interest, ϑ, the instrument of competition is shown in Model 1. ϑ is the instru-
ment of competition5, derived from the relationship between competition and efficiency
5A proxy for competition.
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using SFA. The essence of this is firstly, to create a variable that is exogenously related
to stability in the regression of stability on competition and secondly, a variable that can
capture efficiency in competition, henece measure the transmission from competition to
stability through efficiency. This way we found a new way to capture competition and
stability relationship whose results have been inconsistent in literature largely due to the
endogeneity between the duo. We found the instrument to be statistically significant and
positively related to the Z-score, the stability measure. This implies that competition
brings about stability in the SSA region’s commercial banks. Hence, we found consistency
with Schaeck and Ciha´k (2014) of a possible transmission from competition to efficiency
and then stability in the banking system of the SSA region. The positions of Petersen
and Rajan (1995), Berger and Mester (1997) and Williams (2004) suggest that this result
may be plausible as they argued that an efficient banking system enhances the quality of
assets of banks resulting from better management and administration of loans. It logically
follows that if competition causes efficiency as in our result above, efficiency enhanced
competitive banking system should bring about stability. On the basis of this and the
economic implication of the coefficient of the instrument on stability that reveals that a
standard deviation increase in efficiency enhanced competition variable will increase sta-
bility by 2.4% (Table 5.5), we argue for competition-stability view in the SSA region. This
is against the backdrop of a weak negative economic contribution of 0.2% respectively as
shown in Tables 5.5 in this chapter and 4.5 in Chapter 4, of the original competition vari-
able, Lerner index, to stability. However, this is predicated on a healthy competition that
can engender efficiency of the system. Furthermore, the results invalidate our hypotheses
of no significant relationship between competition and stability in SSA region commercial
banks and more specifically that there is no link to efficiency. Our results predict that the
more competitive, the better the efficiency and the more stable the banking sectors will be.
For robustness, the original variable, the Lerner index, that is, the competition mea-
sure is also found to be statistically significant but negatively related to the stability
measure. It suggests an inverse relation between competition and stability without ef-
ficiency, substantiating our findings in Chapter 4. This may be the reason why models
have found competition to be fragile for banking sectors in literature in some parts of the
world, suggesting that competition, if not well-managed to bring about efficiency may the
detrimental to the system, as competition fragility views argued.
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Table 5.4: GMM Regression
Model Model Model Model Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES zscore zscore pbtaratio roa roe
L.zscore 0.785*** 0.580***
(0.0582) (0.0875)
ϑ 287.4***
(-108.5)
Lnabv 0.322* 0.195** 0.00168** -0.00316** 3.052***
(0.187) (0.0803) (0.000751) (0.00139) (0.497)
Lerner index -0.0345*** 0.000221*** -5.85e-05** 0.0806**
(0.0084) (0.0000647) (0.0000254) (0.0386)
L.pbtaratio 0.432***
(0.0337)
L.roa 0.562***
(0.132)
L.roe 0.146**
(0.0596)
Constant -3.399 -1.326 -0.00838 0.0478*** -25.98***
(2.455) (1.044) (0.01) (0.017) (6.331)
AR(2) 0.080 0.100 0.771 0.685 0.295
Hansen J Stats 0.451 0.176 0.496 0.655 0.732
Wald (Chi2) 942.24 87.72 185.35 32.36 61.06
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,725 2,696
Number of id 430 430 430 430 429
Author’s estimation, 2017, based on data collected.
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Where ϑ represents the instrument, Lerner index in the competition measure, pb-
taratio, roa and roe depict profit before tax to asset book value ratio, return on
assets and return on equity respectively surrogate efficiency measures.
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We further tested the results of the SFA by using a range of efficiency measures as con-
tained in Models 3, 4 and 5 for consistencies and comparison. Model 3 measures the
relationship between Lerner index and pretax income to assets ratio (pbtaratio). Pretax
income measures the intrinsic profitability of the sampled banks to enable for compara-
bility across borders because of differences in corporate taxes. Hence, pbtaratio is an
indicator of how profitable a bank is relative to its total assets. It gives an idea as to
how efficient management is at using its assets to generate earnings. The study found
that Lerner index is statistically significant and positively related with pbtaratio. In fact,
the economic implication shows that one standard deviation increase in competition will
cause 0.1% increase in profitability. This confirms the SFA results and existing theories
that posit a positive relationship between competition and efficiency. One would ordinarily
assume a negative relationship between competition and efficiency and/or the performance
measures owing to the level of development of the SSA region as known existing models
and results relate largely to developed countries.
The results of Lerner index and ROA however give a statistically significant but inverse
relationship. While ROA and Pbtaratio measure the same thing, we assume that the dif-
ference in the results of ROA from those of Pbtaratio, is largely due to the impact of tax
that banks face which differs across countries. The SSA region might have to consider tax
harmonisation as every sacrifice to achieve sustainable economic growth will be worth the
while. Finally, Model 5 results shows a statistically significant and positive relationship
between Lerner index and ROE. ROE measures a corporation’s profitability by revealing
how much profit a company generates with the money shareholders have invested. This is
again an affirmation of a positive relationship between competition and efficiency in the
SSA region’s commercial banks.
In general, this study found the result of Model 1 to be consistent with the competition
stability views model in literature (Schaeck & Ciha´k, 2014) which argues that competition
brings about efficiency which then leads to stability of the banking sector. This provides
evidence that despite the level of development, the behaviour of banks in the SSA region
does not differ remarkably from that of their European counterparts. Having brought in
the element of efficiency into competition and stability relationship, the result validates
the study by Moyo et al. (2014) of 16 SSA region banking sectors that supported more
stable banks in systems that are more competitive. This becomes more interesting as our
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Table 5.5: Economic Impact of Regression
variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5
ϑ 0.024427078
Lnabv 0.166976014 0.1011 0.053829119 -0.1004 10.64698336
Lerner index -0.0021 0.00081826 -0.0002 0.032491377
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017, from Table 5.4 with
Economic Impact = S.D of explanatory variable×R.C of explanatory variableS.D of dependent variable
Where S.D is standard deviation and R.C is regression coefficient.
study differs largely in scope, methods and bounds from theirs. Our result confirms this
relationship through the role of efficiency as shown from the result of SFA that reported
that efficiency is associated with competition in the SSA region. The implication will be
that provided competition could be managed to such a level that it produces efficiency, it
will continue to enhance stability. It is not surprising, however, that competition on its
own is inversely related to the stability measure which substantiates the fact that compe-
tition on its own will more likely to be inimical to the banking system unless it improves
efficiency without which it adds no value to the system, but rather causes instability. Jux-
taposing the competition-fragility result in Chapter 4 and competition-stability result in
this chapter provide a further insight to support the growing consensus of a trade-off be-
tween competition and stability in literature. This suggests that there is an optimal level
of competition that is beneficial to the banking system and policy direction to modelling
this will assist regulators to monitor and regulate competition activities, if the banking
sector is to benefit from the good while avoiding the bad side. The competition and ef-
ficiency results found in the SFA result is also confirmed in the results of Models 3 and
5 which are seen to be consistent with literature on competition and efficiency (Chirwa,
2003; Kouki & Al-Nasser, 2014; Mugume, 2008). Notwithstanding that Model 4 suggests
an inverse relationship between competition and ROA, on the average, we tend to find
evidence to support the aforementioned assertion that competition causes efficiency.
The result of these models is further supported by the tests of overall significance through
the Wald test as shown in Table 5.4. This shows that the estimated results for the five
models are statistically significant. Therefore, all the variables used as determinants are
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all desirable and would influence both stability and efficiencies of the banking sectors
significantly. This study also did not find any violation of serial correlation and over-
identification of instruments as the results of the test show the respective thresholds were
satisfied (Mileva, 2007; Roodman, 2006).
The results of the over-identification test and serial correlation tests are presented as ap-
pendages to the GMM results in Table 5.4. It has been observed that over-identification
is a common problem with dynamic panel data analysis in GMM estimates. This problem
is associated with the finite sample behaviour of the GMM estimator and there are two
major factors that affects this finite behaviour of samples. These are strength of identi-
fication and numbers of moment conditions, (Hayakawa, 2012) . The latest test for the
validity of the identification problem is the Sargan/Hassen test which is also referred to
as the J test, which in a robust estimation as ours, the Hansen J statistics is reported.
This test has been proven to be valid even when the number of instruments is large in
the cross sectional regression and under weak moments asymptotic, (Bijwaard, Ridder, &
Woutersen, 2013; Newey & Windmeijer, 2009). Furthermore, the presence of serial cor-
relation or autocorrelation in the estimates of dynamic panel data has also been pointed
out as one of the problems of dynamic panel data estimators. The implication is that it
limits the efficiency of GMM estimators (Hayakawa, 2012).
For legitimate instruments, the Hansen J null hypothesis must be accepted (Arellano
& Bond, 1991; Hausman, 1978) and the higher the p-value the better. We have no evi-
dence to doubt the validity of our instruments as the J statistics are in favour of the null
hypothesis as shown in Table 5.4. The implication is that the number of instruments used
in the GMM estimation does not have any negative effect on the estimators of the GMM.
Likewise, Table 5.4 shows the acceptance of the null hypothesis at order two which is the
system estimator step used for the GMM estimation. The implication is that, based on
the null hypothesis, no autocorrelation is accepted since the tests are computed for the
two-step system estimator with GMM. Therefore, the GMM estimates are not affected by
the problem of serial correlation hence the estimates remain consistent and efficient.
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5.5 Summary
This chapter set out to investigate the relationship between competition and stability es-
pecially as it relates to the SSA banking sector. To achieve this, we leveraged on the
relationship between competition and efficiency as contained in the literature to craft a
new way of rethinking this relationship by developing an instrument for competition using
SFA. We then used this instrument in a regression of competition against stability. We
used the Z-score to surrogate stability. Z-score measures the overall stability of the bank-
ing system. Our competition measure is the Lerner index which enables us to estimate the
market power of the 440 banks in our sample over the study period. The efficiency scores
generated from the SFA reveal in actual sense a marginal efficiency between banking sec-
tors without competition and banking sector with competition. The SFA model ensures
that technical efficiency is allowed to vary through time and in different manner for each
bank. This result is not surprising since it is consistent with literature that argues that
efficiency is inherent in competition. Furthermore, the index of competition we computed
shows a banking system with varying degrees of market power but overall having the mean
that is close to the minimum values which are close to zero which implies a monopolistic
competitive banking system over the study period. This gives us the confidence to forge
ahead with our regression.
Using GMM, we found the coefficient of our instrument to be strictly positive and sta-
tistically significant with our stability measure. This affirms a possible transmission from
competition to efficiency and then to stability. Hence, this is consistent with competition
stability view which argues that competition brings about efficiency which then causes
stability. We, therefore, conclude that competition causes stability in the SSA region’s
banking sector. However, as a rider, efforts must be made to manage competition such that
efficiency is ensured, because regressing Lerner index against stability shows a negative
and statistically significant relationship. Again, this is not surprising in that competition
fragility has already been reported in the literature, thus, the key phrase is managing
competition for efficiency.
This result presupposes that driving and maintaining a sustainable banking competition in
SSA region is most fundamental and a welcome development. The challenge, however, lies
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in optimising competition to achieve the desirable goal of ensuring the dynamic efficiency
of the banking sector that would engender stability, and consequently, economic growth.
Of utmost importance, will be the need to strengthen the various antitrust agencies and,
ensuring strict adherence to various banking regulations that address issues of competition
including monitoring and developing new ones where necessary. Efforts must also be made
to come up with complementary monetary and fiscal policies to sustain and improve on
current gains. Regulators and watchdogs must also be alive to their responsibilities.
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Chapter 6
Competition, Regulation and
Stability
6.1 Introduction
In the last two chapters of this study, we have considered the competition and stability
relationship and accounted for the role of efficiency. More importantly, we found efficiency
to be the conduit through which competition benefits the banking system in terms of sta-
bility. This chapter explores the relationship among competition, regulation and stability
issues. In particular, a short-term approach is taken to investigate the role of regulation
in ensuring an acceptable balance of competition such that stability is not compromised.
This provides a forward-looking approach to managing the relationship among these phe-
nomena.
Regulation has been long debated in the banking industry and the events leading to the
2007 - 2009 financial crises have increased attention to bank regulation across the globe
(Allen & Carletti, 2013). Amidst the reasons for regulations in banking is engendering
competition and also to foster stability of the system (Casu et al., 2015; Llewellyn, 1999).
Most regulations in banks are tied to capital requirements (Agoraki et al., 2011). The
contestable market theory posits that competition will result in stability. Meanwhile, em-
pirical work by Northcott et al. (2004) considers regulation as fundamental to the effective
working of the contestability theory. Regulation does not only stimulate competition, but
also helps in moderating the excessiveness of competitive activities as the potential insta-
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bility that could result with excessive competition often constitutes part of the agitations
for banking regulation (Agoraki et al., 2011; Angkinand, 2009; Barth, Caprio, & Levine,
2004; Carletti, 2008; Cihak et al., 2012; De Serres, Sløk, Kobayakawa, & Vartia, 2006). In
spite of the reforms implemented by SSA countries, their banking sectors are highly con-
centrated (Mlachila, Dykes, et al., 2013) and potentially unstable due to high incidences
of NPLs which are on the increase. Meanwhile in an earlier study of some banking sectors
in SSA region, Mlachila, Dykes, et al. (2013) provide evidence to show that reforms in
the SSA region have reduced the number of systemic crisis witnessed in the region from
1980 to 2010. This was substantiated by Moyo et al. (2014) who found that financial
liberalisation in the areas impacted positively on the stability of the system.
As seen in the previous chapters of this study, quite a substantial amount of work has
been done on the competition and stability relationship including the possible trade-off
between them yet the dilemma still subsist as to how to deal with this all important
aspect of the financial system. According to Vives (2016b), regulation in terms of con-
duct and structure has the capacity to alleviate the competition-stability trade-off but not
eliminate it. Matutes and Vives (2000), Vives (2014) among others, agree that capital
requirements need to be tougher with more intense competition. But how well to do this
has remained unresolved. This study therefore contributes to literature in this area by
employing P-SVAR to investigate how best to regulate the banking system in order to
strike an acceptable balance between competition and stability using data on SSA com-
mercial banks.
We found evidence to support the relationships among these three phenomena in the
commercial banks of the SSA region. Our results reveal capital regulation as most impor-
tant in dealing with issues of stability and competition in banks and stated how best to
respond to this in the next 24 quarters in the region. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first study of this nature.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The literature review; theoretical and
empirical, is presented in Section 6.2. We specifically looked at SSA commercial banks
regulatory experience in Subsection 6.2.3. Section 6.3 explains the method adopted in-
cluding data source and description of variables employed. Section 6.4 presents the results
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and the summary and conclusion are presented in Section 6.5
6.2 Literature Review
The Banking sector is highly regulated to prevent systemic instability, avoid monopoly
exploitation and to protect small retail clients (Casu et al., 2015; Llewellyn, 1999). Reg-
ulations have largely taken the form of capital base (Basel Accord)1 and have been prob-
lematic for lack of theoretical underpinning (Allen & Carletti, 2013; Bhattacharya, Boot,
& Thakor, 1998). Historically, regulation in banking has been measured in terms of the
safety and soundness of the system, capital adequacy and asset quality (known as pru-
dential regulation) as well as corporate governance (conduct of business regulation), all
of which have received even more attention in the wake of the 2007-2009 financial cri-
sis. There have been linkages in extant literature on the relationship between regulation
and competition. Delis (2012) found that reforms affect competition, with their results
supporting the fact that reforms reduce market power of banks. He however argued that
the strength of the relationship diminishes in countries with weak institutions and low
economic development. Considering the impact of bank regulation on stability, the posi-
tion of Agoraki et al. (2011) is that capital regulation may not be efficient when banks
have sufficient market power. The next section inquires further into prior theoretical and
empirical literature on what is known on competition and stability relationship and the
place of regulation.
6.2.1 Theoretical Literature Review
In a review of theoretical and empirical literature, Vives (2016b) concluded that compe-
tition is not in any way the reason for fragility in the banking system. While he admits
that the existence of heightened competitive banking environment could only aggravate
the situation, instability in banks and systemic failure in general is a subject of certain
bank fundamentals. In other words, banks may fail without necessarily being caused by
competition. Vives (2016b) posits that there are two ways competition may induce in-
stability in the banking system and cause systemic run. One way is where depositors’
coordination problem is worsened on the liability side of the bank’s statement of finan-
1Basel I and II dwell more on capital, while Basel III in addition to capital, introduces aspects of
liquidity and asset quality.
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cial position. The other way is where there is an incentive to undertake increased risky
projects on either side of the balance sheet with the attendant likelihood of failure. The
global game theory consolidates the self-fulfilling theory of crisis with fundamentals driven
views to provide insight into the competition and stability views. Based on this theory,
runs can happen independent of competition levels but rising competitive funding pressure
worsens depositors’ coordination problems by increasing the strategic complementarity of
the actions of the investors. The reason is that the increasing cost of funds constitutes the
resistant levels that most investors must overcome that makes runs takes place even with-
out sensitivity to the fundamentals. The diminished sensitivity of the resistant threshold
to fundamentals makes a depositor to react more strongly to changes in the strategies of
other investors. In the work of Vives (2014), increased strategic complementarity in the
actions of investors results in increased fragility and thus potential instability because the
impact of bad news on fundamentals and the range for which a bank is solvent but illiquid
raises the probability of a crisis.
Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) conducted a theoretical review of capital regulation, com-
petition and stability in banks to analyse capital requirements in situations where banks
compete on both the assets and liabilities sides of their balance sheets. They concluded
that the ambiguous effects of competition on bank risk taking translates to ambiguous
effects of capital requirements on financial stability as banks chose the correlation of their
loans portfolio. The authors further argued that capital can hurt stability because of its in-
fluence on competition. In other words, the stabilising effect of capital regulation tends to
obtain in those situations where the charter value effect dominates, and vice versa. Their
model suggests that capital regulation may not be suited in all circumstances to prevent
excessive risk-taking in banking. On the other hand, Daesik and Santomero (1988) in a
single-period mean-variance model of the role of capital in risk control, argue that simple
capital ratio regulation is ineffective in ameliorating banks’ likelihood of insolvency risk,
because it ignores the individual banks’ different preference structures and allows risky
banks to circumvent the restriction via financial leverage and/or business risk. Bolt and
Tieman (2004) did a theoretical dynamic modelling of demand for loan to examine the
interaction of competition, bank risk taking and regulation and came to the conclusion
that increased competition in the banking industry leads to riskier banking behaviour.
They argue that it is more beneficial for banks to hold more equity than prescribed by
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regulators, as the more intense the competition, the greater the risk taking by commer-
cial banks, the higher the failure rates hence the charter value falls. For Freixas and Ma
(2014), competition’s impact on insolvency, systemic and liquidity risk is a function of
bank’s liability structure for which risk-shifting or the charter-value may predominate.
A number of theories have associated bank run with the presence and nature of deposit in-
surance in a banking system. From their models, Allen and Gale (2004) showed that as the
number of banks grow with insured depositors, banks have the highest incentives to take
on risk on the asset side of the market. Likewise, according to Matutes and Vives (2000)
deposit insurance that is not risk dependent motivates banks’ maximal asset risk taking
with high competition in the deposit market because depositors are carefree about banks’
risk taking attitudes. This is not the case with a risk-based deposit insurance that demands
that banks are accountable, compelling them to minimise their asset risks. In an earlier
work, Matutes and Vives (1996) developed a framework that links incentive and competi-
tion theories to study rivalry among financial intermediaries in an imperfect competition
context as well as the policy implications of deposit insurance. They concluded that de-
posit insurance has the impact of improving welfare by preventing collapse, extending the
market, and minimising frictions. They however argue that deposit insurance may induce
deep competition for deposits and increase the dead-weight losses associated with failing
institutions. The welfare impact of deposit insurance depends on market structure, and
is thus ambiguous even in a world of full liability and no moral hazard in bank investments.
Furthermore, Niinima¨ki (2004) modelled the joint effects of competition and deposit insur-
ance on banks’ risk taking and concluded that the size of risk that a bank takes depends
on the structure and the side of the market competition is taking place. He argued that
with deposit insurance, competition induces fragility as banks compete for deposits in the
deposit market, deposit rates becomes excessively high forcing banks to take high risk.
He added that deposit insurance has no influence on monopoly or banks competing in
the loan market. The theories focusing on bank competition for deposit and systemic risk
argue that banks in distress have more incentives to aggressively compete for deposits
in the absence of deposit insurance because they have lower market share. However,
their distressed predicaments make them face harder times attracting deposits, hence the
aggression is short-lived. Meanwhile, deposit insurance helps to relieve this hurdle but
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increased deposit rates by distressed banks will be matched by corresponding higher rates
by safer competitors resulting in higher systemic risk.
Financial liberalisation has the positive effects of increasing depositors’ welfare but has
the potential to increase fragility. Chang and Velasco (2001) modelled liberalisation as
a departure from monopoly banking to highly competitive banks in modelling financial
crises in emerging markets. They argued that monopolies hold depositors to their reserve
by remaining insensitive to a self-sufficient system with no financial intermediation. This
is done by the monopolist bank by reducing payments to depositors and therefore its short
run liabilities. Since profits act as buffers against unexpected withdrawals, the consequence
is less likelihood of bank crisis than it would in a competitive banking environment. Hell-
mann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) concluded that if the liability side of bank balance
sheets are competitive enough, banks will invest in risky assets because, as banks com-
pete for insured deposits, they are able to invest in conservative or in volatile assets while
raising outside capital. However, banks are closed if capital becomes negative. Though
not an efficient means, as capital decreases banks’ franchise value, but they argued that
it helps to restore incentives to invest in prudent assets by imposing high capital require-
ments. According to these authors, this explains the superiority of deposit regulation in
contrast to capital regulation in excessive competition control. Modelling competition for
deposits with banks utilising internal capital, Repullo (2004) insists that deposit regulation
does not outperform capital regulation. Advocating minimum capital regulation, Allen
and Gale (2004) in a general equation model of financial intermediaries and markets with
spatial competition and Schumpeterian competition including contagion, concluded that
perceived trade-off between competition and stability arising from the allocative efficiency
that is associated with competition increased the calls for regulation to ensure the coex-
istence of competition and stability. The authors argue that the most important means
to strike the necessary balance is to impose minimum capital regulation on banks, as this
will reduce the capital available to them thus curtail their risk appetite and compete fairly.
Competition at the interbank market affects stability through its impacts on liquidity.
In most cases, distressed banks may not find support in a competitive interbank market
as single bank has no impact on the market. However, big banks may be able to offer
help to another troubled bank in an interbank market where competition is imperfect,
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even though coordination problems may arise in liquidity provision especially with a large
number of banks. Market power in interbank markets could impede liquidity provision
since banks with surplus funds could strategically under provide lending in order to induce
fire sales of the bank specific assets of the bank that is in need of liquid funds. Allen and
Gale (2004) and Carletti, Hartmann, and Spagnolo (2007), among others, posit that there
will be a high volatility of aggregate demand for liquidity in the interbank market where
imperfect competition in loan market with banks of different sizes, in a context where
banks need access to the interbank market to deal with liquidity shocks.
The theories dealing with excessive risk-taking and competition explains that the incentive
for risk-taking is driven by moral hazard and limited liability with the problem aggravated
with banks on the verge of insolvency. Limited liability banks take excessive risks on the
asset side but it is difficult for banks with observable risk position to do so. This de-
prives banks the ability to enjoy both market share and profit by taking on more risk
because investors will discount them and ask to be compensated for increased risk. Flan-
nery (1998) provides evidence to show that bank risk taking is consistent with high cost
of funding because of the demands of the holders of uninsured liabilities. Matutes and
Vives (2000) argue that flat-deposit insurance and bailout erode market discipline effects
with investors/depositors’ incentives to monitor banks’ extinction. But Kim, Kristiansen,
and Vale (2005) opine that borrower discipline effect may still subsist to avoid losses since
banks serves as their certifier.
Caminal and Matutes (2002) model whether higher probability of banking failures is nec-
essarily a result of intense competition in the banking sector and came to the conclusion
that the relationship between market power and banks’ probability of failure is ambigu-
ous. Their model show that banks have to choose between costly monitoring and capital
rationing as borrowers face the problem of moral hazard. Monopoly power provides incen-
tives for monitoring rather than capital rationing because investment declines with lending
rate and increases with monitoring efforts; the relationship between market structure and
investment is ambiguous. Notably, more market power also induces lending rate and de-
presses investment with the consequent multiplicative shocks on the overall portfolio risk
of banks. Furthermore, increased competition can increase the probability of bank failure
as intense rivalry has the effects of stifling monitoring incentives with the attendant effects
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of reducing lending rates. Depending on which is strong enough, monopoly banks may be
more exposed to aggregate uncertainty and more likely to fail, as they argue that the more
the presence of non-diversifiable risk and decreasing return to scale, the more investment
creates the danger of a higher failure rate.
Diamond and Rajan (2012) link excess risk taking arising from moral hazard to mon-
etary policy. The moral hazard problem is rooted majorly in the unobservable efforts of
banks in monitoring which may be worsened with highly liquid banks. It is the norm
that the usual banks’ optimal monetary policy is to conduct audit when there is liquidity
shock without which there is the tendency for loan officers to over extend credit. Thus the
presence of loose monetary policy often translates to bogus balance sheet with excessive
risk taking, the authors argued. Providing a theoretical foundation on the claims that lax
monetary policy conditions increase bank risk taking, Dell’Ariccia, Marquez, and Laeven
(2010) posit that the effects of monetary policy on risk taking by banks is a function of the
sensitivity of leverage to interest rate. In a model of leveraged financial intermediaries that
endogenously choose the riskiness of their portfolios, the authors argue that lax monetary
policy inevitably results in greater leverage and higher risk where a bank can adjust its
capital structure. But in a situation where a bank’s capital structure is fixed, the effects
of monetary easing depends on the degree of leverage.
A reduction in interest rates provides incentives for highly capitalised banks to increase
risk-taking attitude, but depending on the degree of competition; while banks with high
leverage decrease their risk. Boot and Ratnovski (2016) modelled the interactions of rela-
tionship banking and banks’ trading. They showed how a bank can use the franchise value
of its relationships to expand the scale of trading. They argued that the moral hazard oc-
cur when bank bets retail franchise value with scalable short-term arm’s length activities
of banks. Banks thus get exposed to trading activities as against what is optimal for their
principal due to time-inconsistency problem. They face the temptation to allocate too
much capital to trading activities at the expense of honouring their commitments to their
customers. The impact becomes even more reinforced when trading is used as a means
of shifting risk. This process heightens the banks’ risk-taking problems that may even be
severe with a more robust financial market.
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The problem of selection in the credit market has also been traced to impact on systemic
stability. Adverse selection problem could result from information asymmetry among
banks and among banks’ borrowers alike. Adverse selection refers to the unsavouring
consequences of stakeholders in the banking system having access to different and/or im-
perfect information. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) examine the interaction between
banks’ strategic behaviour in determining lending standards, lending volume, and the ag-
gregate allocation of credit and the informational structure of loan markets. They show
that banks tend to reduce their lending standards as they get to have more private in-
formation about borrowers and information asymmetries across banks decrease; causing
increase in portfolio risk, lower profits and expanded aggregate credit. The lower the
ratio of unknown borrowers, the higher the required collateral banks expect in screening
borrowers. In contrast, banks require no collateral with increase in the ratio of unknown
borrowers which indicates the presence of more new projects requiring financing in the
market. Because as the rate of new projects increases, adverse selection decreases as less
borrowers get turned down by other banks, making banks to lower collateral to attract
more customers and increase their market share. These practices, De Meza and Webb
(1987) argue, pose the danger of good borrowers drawing in bad ones. In other words, a
higher proportion of borrowers with unknown characteristics in the market results in credit
expansion as it prompt banks to loosen up credit requirements, lower screening, with zero
collateral. This increases the likelihood of systemic failure because the reduction in loan
portfolio quality reduces banks profitability. This provides a plausible explanation as to
why expansionary economic policies end up breeding crises and instability in the banking
system.
Competition produces similar scenario when there are new inflows of borrowers that cause
existing monopolistic banks to abandon screening in favour of pooling loan applicants in
order to sustain its market share and take advantage of the information at its disposal.
According to Mahoney and Weyl (2014), customers that pose more risk to the banks are
often the least likely to approach the bank for loan and only get attracted by generous
banks’ offers. Increased competition thus becomes bad to welfare where marginal increase
of borrowers worsen credit risk than average borrowers. Hence competitive market over
supply credit because lenders are unable to differentiate between good and bad credit risk
when they compete and attract both types with generous offers. The externalities associ-
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ated with this are that a lender whose good customer is attracted away by another gets
hurt. Therefore, monopoly lender provides too little credit as it has the market power
to restrict quantity and competitive market offers too much credit to the point that it
equates price to the average cost of serving the customers. This shows that there is an
intermediate degree of market power that yields the social optimum.
At the root of risk taking problems of banks is the debate of agency conflicts between
managers and owners. Often times owners attempt to resolve this with compensation
schemes that target the reduction in managers’ risk appetite and failure. Most of these
schemes however provides incentives for risk taking behaviour in banks. For instance,
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) provide evidence to show that banks with a higher level
of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) compensation linked to share price were worse hit in
the 2007-09 financial crisis. The coincidence of limited liability and high leverage that
persuades the propensity to undertake risks at the expense of stakeholders other than
shareholders differentiates corporate governance in banks from conventional industries.
Issues arise where banks have powerful diversified owners that are risk lovers who are
prepared to increase risk taking to compensate for capital requirements and activity re-
strictions. Laeven and Levine (2009) found widely owned banks less riskier than banks
with powerful diversified holders.
In the next subsection are highlights of some of the empirical evidence on the role of
regulation and how some other factors other than competition impact on the stability of
the banking system.
6.2.2 Empirical Literature Review
It is important to note from the outset that the empirical literature reviewed in Chapters
3, 4 and 5 provide an enabling background for this review as the focus in this chapter is
on evidence on how regulation and other influences have helped to shape the relationship
between competition and stability. For the purpose of hindsight, empirical studies provide
evidences to argue mixed conclusions on the competition-stability relationship. It has
been argued in theory that regulation, especially capital regulation plays a pivotal role in
determining the relationship between competition and stability. Other studies concluded
that competition is not in itself the cause of instability in the banking sector, but rather
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the peculiarity of the system itself. Though not much work has been done empirically in
this regard, nevertheless, there seems to be some consensus on the effects of regulation
but the direction thereof is far from being agreed on.
A number of empirical studies exist on the effects of regulation as well as other factors’
impact on stability with and without banking competition. Capital regulation influences
competition and stability in various ways. Stringent capital requirements can constitute
a barrier to new comers thus restrict competition and increase stability. Agoraki et al.
(2011) argued that high fixed costs of running banks are associated with high overall
banking capital requirements which will only be affordable to fewer banks. According to
Bolt and Tieman (2004), more stringent capital adequacy requirements raise the bar of
new loans acceptance criteria; this has the potential to reduce incidence of non-performing
loans hence increase bank stability. Agoraki et al. (2011) used GMM to analyse regulation,
competition and bank risk-taking in some sets of Central and Eastern European (CEE)
banking sectors for the period 1998-2005 to examine whether bank regulation affects sta-
bility directly and if not, is it transmitted via banks’ market power. They found that
capital requirements generally reduce risks in banks in the CEE countries. However, the
effect is less effective with market power and perhaps eroded at very high levels of market
power. In other words, they provide evidence in a long term analysis of the role of capital
in determining the stability of banks. In addition, they found evidence to support the role
of activity restriction and supervision as their results reveal that a combination of high
activity restriction and market power reduces credit risk and the likelihood of default with
supervisory power having direct impact on bank risk.
This substantiates the study of Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) carried out on European
banking studies that found that financial regulation is supported by capital regulation
across the entire European Union. Though they agree with the findings of Agoraki et
al. (2011) on capital having impact on competition and stability relationship, Berger et
al. (2009) differ on market power eroding and/or reversing the impact of capital. In a
GMM analysis of Zscore, NPLs, equity capital ratio and Lerner index of 8235 banks in
23 countries over seven years from 1999 to 2005, Berger et al. (2009) found that market
power increases loan portfolio risk. Their results provide evidence to show that such risk
may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratio and these findings favour increased
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equity capital ratio as a cushion to the risk that market power may pose for banks’ loan
portfolios. According to Tabak et al. (2012), bank capitalisation is an essential force in
explaining the non-linear relationship they found between competition and the risk-taking
behaviour of banks. In a GMM regression of stability on competition to investigate the
role of capital and size on risk competition relationship in 10 Latin America’s 376 banks
between 2003 and 2008, they emphasised that higher capital ratio has merits for banks
that operate in collusive markets but argue the capitalisation only enhances the stability
of larger banks under high and average competition. The recent work of Maghyereh and
Awartani (2016) affirms the importance of the role of regulation on competition stability
relationship. Applying a dynamic panel data analysis using GMM on the influence on
financial stability of 70 banks in the Gulf cooperation countries between 2001 and 2011,
they found that increased competition results in rising fragility with the influence deter-
mined by the strength of regulation across the council. They state in particular that the
impact on bank soundness will strongly depend on the size of capital, the strength of
supervisory power, the strictness of the regulations imposed on bank activities, and the
level of transparency and market discipline.
In related studies, Beck et al. (2013) who in a simple multiple regression of stability
(Zscore) on competition (Lerner index) for over 17000 banks in 79 countries from 1994
to 2009 advocated for the understanding of a banking system regulatory environment in
explaining their competition and stability relationship. The impact of increase in compe-
tition will be much felt on banks’ risk-taking behaviour in banking markets with stricter
activities restriction. They listed other factors such as the level of development of capital
market, the nature of deposit insurance held and the effectiveness of the systems of sharing
credit information as having roles to play. Ferna´ndez et al. (2013) did not agree any less as
their study of the effects of market concentration, regulation and institution in shaping the
real effects of banking crisis in 68 systemic banking crisis in 54 countries over 1980-2000
show a negative impact of lax restriction on non-traditional banking activities. With an
instrumental variable and OLS estimations of activity restriction, HHI and concentration
ratios they found evidence to show that combining traditional and non-traditional banking
activities has a negative effect on economic growth during normal periods but mitigates
the negative effects of banking crises on economic growth. This changing influence be-
tween crisis and non-crisis periods is reinforced by market concentration; explicit deposit
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insurance and better accounting standard mitigate the negative real effects of systemic
banking crises and interact positively with bank concentration to minimise the reduction
of economic growth during the periods of crisis. Investigating the impact of regulation and
supervision on banks risk taking, Bouheni (2014) also employed dynamic panel data anal-
ysis base on GMM on European banking sectors for the periods 2005-2011 and found that
stability reacts differently depending on the extent of regulation in a particular location.
Specifically, the study found evidence to show that stability improves in France, Germany
and the United Kingdom banking systems due to restrictions on banking activities during
the study period but also found that supervisor’s power and capital adequacy encouraged
risk-taking. Similarly, the study found risk incentives encouraged by more supervisors’
power only in largest banks in Italy, Greece and Spain, while regulation and supervision
strengthening weaken bank stability with risk-taking reduced by capital requirements in
these countries. Overall, the study concluded that tightening regulatory and supervisory
framework, and compliance with Basel principles enhance financial stability in Europe
explaining that the different results are a reflection of the level of monitoring of regulation
and supervision.
Furthermore, in a fixed effects regression of 1872 listed banks data for the periods 1997-
2009, Demirgc¸-Kunt et al. (2013) examined the impact of regulatory and institutional
environment on systemic risk in 63 countries. They found that frail banking systems
are associated with weak supervision, private monitoring, more government ownership
and public policies restricting competition. The authors however added that strong in-
stitutional environment that enhances efficient public and private monitoring of financial
institutions is able to mitigate the negative effects of lack of and/or weak banking su-
pervision. Beck et al. (2006) examined the impact of national bank concentration, bank
regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of a country suffering a systemic
banking crisis using logit probability model that is robust to heteroskedasticity in 69 coun-
tries for the periods 1980-1997. Their analysis provides evidence to show that stability
and/or less crisis thrive better with a concentrated banking system. However, their data
reveal that greater banking fragility is associated with regulatory policies and institutions
that distort competition. In the second part of the foregoing study, Beck (2007) repeating
the same approach probed the reasons for the conflict in theories and empirical studies
on these relationships and found that while their result on concentration and fragility
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subsist, there is no reverse causality between concentration and stability and that concen-
trated banking systems are well diversified. Nonetheless he found evidence to prove that
the presence of concentration in the banking system does not translate to the absence of
competition in the system as they found less crisis in competitive regulatory and institu-
tional environments. Also, Beck (2008) reviewed literature on the position of theories and
empirical studies on competition and stability relation, and concluded that the failures of
bank regulation and bank supervision are often times the reasons why liberalisation and
uncontrolled competition result in instability in the banking system. He recommends that
the strong advantage that competition has for efficiency and inclusive financial system
could only be harnessed if policies on regulation and supervision dwell on engendering the
right banking environment instead of dissipating efforts at fine tuning market structure
and/or the degree of competition.
Few studies have also considered these issues in Asian countries. Fu et al. (2014) employed
the instrumental variable technique with GMM estimator to investigate the influence of
bank competition, concentration, regulation and national institutions on individual bank
fragility in 14 Asian Pacific economies for the periods 2003 to 2010 and found that tougher
restriction may benefit bank stability while stronger deposit insurance schemes are asso-
ciated with greater banks instability. Jeon and Lim (2013) examined the influence of
competition and concentration on Korean financial industry stability during 1999-2011
using OLS and found that competition and stability relation depends on financial institu-
tion features while emphasising the role of corporate governance.
An individual country study of the Norwegian banks for periods between 1993 and 1998 by
Kim et al. (2005) examined banks strategies for service differentiation from those of their
rivals using two stage-least-square. They investigated if the size of bank, its ability to avoid
losses, and its capital ratio can be used as strategic variables to make banks different and
increase the interest rates it can charge its borrowers. They found no evidence to support
that the use of high capital ratio is a strategic variable that borrowers are willing to pay
for and that borrowers in the markets for credit line loans can discipline banks to avoid
failure. OECD (2011) reviewed competition in retail banking and financial stability and
concluded that the design of financial regulations is equally important as market structure
for the stability of the banking sector. Marques-Ibanez et al. (2014) in a probit regression
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of roles played by securitisation and capital in competition and risk relationship during
2007-2009 crisis found that higher level of capital did not mediate impact of competition
on realised risk; as competition increases banks resorting more heavily to securitisation
find incentives to take more risk. Exploring whether increased banking sector competition
via financial liberalisation enhances bank stability, Moyo et al. (2014) used duration bank
stress prediction model on 16 SSA countries banking sectors from 1995 to 2010. They
found evidence to submit that CAMEL-type bank specific factors are good predictors of
which banks are more likely to experience banking distress. They also found that increased
competition via liberalisation increases the lead time to distress post-reforms periods and
that banking system stability in a liberalised and competitive system is contingent on
pursuing sound macroeconomic policies and enhanced institution effectiveness. Going for-
ward, we briefly highlight regulatory experience of the SSA banking systems to gauge the
level of regulatory reforms on the banking system.
6.2.3 Regulatory Experience in SSA Banking Sectors
Modern banking began in most SSA region economies in the late 50s and early 60s. Given
the peculiarity of banks, regulation of the sector becomes part of the process and can
be said to be as old as the banking sectors themselves. However, at commencement,
banks were mere appendages/branches of the colonial masters’ banking systems. When
at independence the banking sectors became nationalised, they were indigenised making
the banking sectors of most of the region predominantly centralised and public owned.
From the 80s, African governments began to unbundle their commitments to these sectors
paving way for private participation and ownership. This development saw the wave of
reforms leading to liberalisation, restructuring, privatisation and recapitalisation of the
banking sectors across the region. The situation became even more pronounced with the
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that
were largely adopted in the region which encouraged deregulation. As shown in Chapter
1 Table 1.2, notable major reforms of the banking sectors of SSA regions banking sectors
were in Ghana in 1983 followed by liberalisation in 1988 and further restructuring in 1989
with unprecedented privatisation in 1997. Ghananian banking sectors have also recapi-
talised lately commencing from 2009 in the wake of the 2007-09 financial crises.
Nigeria has been hit with two major financial crises in its banking sector, one in the
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early 90s when banks were going under and later in the late 2000 despite the major re-
forms that have characterised the banking sector. The first major reform in the Nigerian
banking sectors was the indigenisation policy in the mid 70s that saw the influx of many
Figure 6.1: SSA Systemic Banking Crisis, 1980-2010
Source: Mlachila, Dykes, et al. (2013), Pg.19
banks in the economy as well as the SAPs of 1986 leading to liberalisation of the sectors
in 1987. Further restructuring in the 90s and specifically 1992 witnessed privatisation of
the sector. Nigerian banks have also been recapitalised twice from 2000 to date with the
major one in 2004 completed in 2006 and another post 2007-2009 financial crisis that saw
some banks nationalised, others bailed out due to what was called poor corporate gover-
nance practices within the sector that led to near failure of the banking sectors in Nigeria.
Other notable reforms in banking sectors in the region were those in Tanzania in 1985
with liberalisation and restructuring in 1991 as well as privatisation in 1994. Kenya also
witnessed reforms commencing from 1989 with privatisation in the same 1989 and further
liberalisation in 1991. In the same vein, Malawi reformed its banking system in 1987,
liberalised in 1988 and further restructured in 1990. There was also a similar development
in Uganda in 1987 when the banking sector had a major reform followed by liberalisation
in 1988. Banking sectors of Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, Gambia and Mauritius also begun major
reforms in the mid/late 80s while Botswana, Cameroon, Mauritania and Namibia started
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in the early 90s. It is noteworthy that reforms in the banking sectors are an ongoing phe-
nomenon and only a few were enlisted to highlight some of the efforts made in this regards.
The thrusts of these reforms were interest rate liberalisation, removal of credit controls,
establishment of new refinancing policies, consolidation, writing off of NPLs, deregulation
and prudential management. They are meant to reposition the banks so that they are well
capitalised with management taking off the shackles of government inefficiencies in order
to stem the tides of runs and/or failure/instabilities in the system. There is no doubt that
these developments have far-reaching effects on financial deepening in most of the sectors
overtime, not minding that their financial systems are still poorly developed relative to
their counterparts in the developed countries. Moreover, since the mid-90s, incidence of
systemic banking crises has reduced to the lowest ebb among the banking systems of the
region, as shown in Figure 6.1 above. This is a fallout of strengthened capital base, re-
duced involvement of states in banks ownership, brought about by the various reforms
that also increased the pace of commercialisation.
From the foregoing, it is clear that issues of regulation in banking have been subject of
debates both in theory and empirical works notwithstanding that the sector still remains
perhaps the most regulated industry in any economy. The strategic nature of commercial
banks, as the heart of a nation’s financial system make them a flashpoint for intense and
ongoing regulation. In spite of the fact that the major financial crisis have increased at-
tention to the regulation of banks across the globe, Allen and Carletti (2013) affirm that
banking regulation is quite problematic for lack of widely agreed underlying theoretical
framework. Regulation which has mainly been capital base and lately liquidity and the
quality of assets (Basel Accords I -III), have been set without specific theoretical basis
and with no consensus on the nature of the problem and how it is to be solved. Yet if
well-crafted, it has the potential to prevent damaging financial crises and at the same time
if otherwise managed could result in dysfunctional allocation on the part of the bank, at-
tendant slow growth and ultimately inefficiency. While it is in contention that regulation
has direct effects on competition as well as the stability of banks, Agoraki et al. (2011)
found that the stabilising effects of capital regulation on bank risk varies with bank market
power and therefore the need for the investigation of bank market structure. Given this
background, this study differs from extant literature as it applies P-SVAR that requires no
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special theories to prospectively model the short term relationship between competition,
Table 6.1: Research hypothesis for analysis
Objectives to be analysed Variables H0 Selected References
Regulation on competition capital on Lerner Index H0 = 0 Gap
Capital on interest rate spread H0 = 0 Hussain and Mustapha (2010)
Liquidity of Lerner index H0 = 0 Gap
Liquidity on interest rate spread H0 = 0 Hussain and Mustapha (2010)
Asset quality on Lerner index H0 = 0 Gap
Asset quality on interest rate spread H0 = 0 Gap
Regulation on efficiency Capital on efficiency H0 = 0 Gap
Liquidity on efficiency H0 = 0 Gap
Asset quality on efficieincy H0 = 0 Gap
Regulation on stability Capital on Zscore H0 = 0 Fu et al. (2014), Moyo et al. (2014), Agoraki et al. (2011)
Liquidty on Zscore H0 = 0 Moyo et al. (2014)
Asset quality on Zscore H0 = 0 Moyo et al. (2014)
competition on regulation Lerner index on capital H0 = 0 Gap
Interest rate spread on capital H0 = 0 Gap
Lerner index on liquidity H0 = 0 Gap
Interest rate spread on liquidity H0 = 0 Gap
Lerner index on asset quality H0 = 0 Gap
Interest rate spread on asset quality H0 = 0 Gap
Competition on efficiency Lerner index on efficiency H0 = 0 Funga´cˇova´ et al. (2013), Hussain and Hassan (2012)
interest rate spread on efficiency H0 = 0 Gap
Competition on stability Lerner index on Zscore H0 = 0 Maghyereh and Awartani (2016), Beck et al. (2013), Amidu (2013)
Interest rate spread on Zscore H0 = 0 Fu et al. (2014)
Efficiency on regulation Efficiency on capital H0 = 0 Gap
Efficiency on liquidity H0 = 0 Gap
Efficiency on asset quality H0 = 0 Berger and Mester (1997)
Efficiency on competition Effciency on Lerner index H0 = 0 Funga´cˇova´ et al. (2013)
Efficiency on interest rate spread H0 = 0 Apriadi et al. (2016)
Efficiency on stability efficiency on Zscore H0 = 0 Apriadi et al. (2016), Petersen and Rajan (1995)
Stability on regulation Zscore on capital H0 = 0 Gap
Zscore on liquidity H0 = 0 Gap
Zscore on Asset quality H0 = 0 Gap
Stability on competition Zscore on Lerner index H0 = 0 Gap
Zscore on interest rate spread H0 = 0 Apriadi et al. (2016)
Stability on efficiency Zscore of efficiency H0 = 0 Apriadi et al. (2016)
Source: Author’s Reviewa, 2017
aIdentified number of gaps is to the best of our knowledge based on reviewed literature.
regulation and stability of SSA region commercial banks. This methodology contribution
is in addition to filling the gaps in literature that are summarised in Table 6.1 above. This
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will provide insight to policy makers and practitioners in this region as to how to optimise
these phenomena to achieve the best possible outcome.
6.3 Methodology
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the relationship between competition, regulation
and stability among SSA commercial banks using a Panel Structural Vector Autoregressive
(P-SVAR) model approach. The identical yet distinctive features of the economies in the
SSA region provides an incentive for this study to pool cross-sectional data together and
deploy a panel data estimation. In particular, countries of the SSA region adopted similar
banking regulation to liberalise their various banking sectors to make them more competi-
tive. In addition, countries of this region are faced with the common enemy, poverty, that
has the degrading effect of under developing their systems and economies.
Previous studies have attributed part of the reasons for regulations in banking to com-
petition stimulation and stability. Such studies found that regulation could have some
influence on competition (Allen, Carletti, & Marquez, 2011; Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, &
Levine, 2003). However, there are conflicting views in theories and empirical evidence
among the few studies that have considered the effects of regulation on competition in
banking. Delis (2012) found that regulation enhances competition because it helps to cur-
tail market power. Based on this view, it may be justified to support SSA policy makers
calling for regulation that will ensure the right competition to unlock its potential for sav-
ings mobilisation. But the efficiency structure hypothesis theorists argue that efficiency
causes market power and discouraged checking the later through regulation. This study
thus attempts to analyse their relationships.
Although the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model, pioneered by Sims (1980) is most pop-
ular among monetary economists in studying short run impulse response functional re-
lationship among variables, (Beetsma & Giuliodori, 2011; Boubtane, Coulibaly, & Rault,
2013; Canova & Ciccarelli, 2004, 2009, 2014; Canova & Pe´rez Forero, 2015; Davoodi, Dixit,
& Pinter, 2013; Dungey & Fry, 2009; Dungey & Pagan, 2000, 2009; Rebucci, 2010, among
others), it has been criticised for not catering for the needs of researchers that are in-
terested in shocks other than monetary policy shocks (Bernanke, 1986; Elbourne, 2008).
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Hence the birth of Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model which does not only
cater for this deficiency but as well accounts for economic information that lay bare the ra-
tionale for the restrictions that help in identifying even other non-monetary policy shocks.
For instance, Omolade (2014) employed this to measure oil resources and oil price shocks
in the individual economies of five net oil producing nations in Africa. It has been applied
in banking and finance related studies, for instance, Graeve and Karas (2010) have applied
VAR to the study of bank run, and likewise Love and Zicchino (2006). However, both
VAR and SVAR handle only time series data which limit their application to one economy
and precludes the gains of panel data analysis in carrying out such investigation. Further
efforts to capture effects of transmissions and interdependences across countries and eco-
nomic units created the Panel VAR (PVAR) (Canova & Ciccarelli, 2014). However, PVAR
is faced with the problem of dimensionality. Hence the P-SVAR applied in this study was
then introduced by Kutu and Ngalawa (2016). It was built on the same principles of PVAR
but overcomes its plagues through the imposition of structural restrictions, rendering it
much more efficient and powerful to deal with finance and economic policy issues. This
study therefore benefits from the gains of SVAR, of being able to accommodate studies
that are interested in shocks outside monetary policies and still be able to pool panel data
of 37 SSA commercial banks together given the P-SVAR.
As already highlighted, previous literature has considered the relationship between com-
petition and regulation as well as the relationship between competition and stability but
has not looked at how this relationship subsists. This approach is therefore considered
for this study. Moreover, it ensures that the dynamic behaviour of the variables in the
model is captured as well as obtain more efficient estimation of the parameters which are
congruent with this study. In addition, the power of structural VARs lies in the fact that
they allow the recovery of interesting patterns in the VAR using a minimum amount of
theory which is particularly useful in fields with little or no theoretical consensus (Graeve
& Karas, 2010) as in the case of this study. Furthermore, with VAR, this study does not
lose focus of the differences in the countries under review as it affords the flexibility of
dynamic cross-section and slope heterogeneity (Canova & Ciccarelli, 2014). The P-SVAR
permits us to use past tendencies to explain the current situations and forecast what the
future holds (Canova & Ciccarelli, 2014).
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6.3.1 Model Specification
This study follows the SVAR and the PVAR models of Graeve and Karas (2010) and
Canova and Ciccarelli (2014) respectively, to analyse the relationship between competi-
tion and regulation among SSA commercial banks using a P-SVAR approach of Kutu and
Ngalawa (2016).
Assuming that the SSA commercial banking sector can be represented in the following
structural model:
QYit = βio + ω1Yit−1 + ω2Yit−2 + · · ·+ ωρYit−ρ +Kit (6.3.1)
Where Q is an invertible (kxk) explaining the simultaneous relationship among the bank
variables; Yit is a (kx1) vector of SSA region commercial banks endogenous variables such
that Yt = Y1t, Y2t · · ·Ynt; βio is a vector of constant denoting banking sector specific
intercept terms; ω1, ω2, · · ·ωρ are (kxk) matrix of lagged banks endogenous variables re-
spectively; K represents a (kxK) matrix having a zero diagonal element that allows for
direct effects of some shocks on more than one endogenous variable in the system; and it
is a vector of uncorrelated error terms (structural shocks or white noise innovation).
Since the P-SVAR equation (6.3.1) above could not be estimated directly because of the
feedback that is innate to the VAR process (Enders, 2008), the reduced form representing
Y as the lagged form of Y is estimated by multiplying through by the inverse of Q to
produce;
Yit = Q
−1βio +Q−1ω1Yit−1 +Q−1ω2Yit−2 + · · ·+Q−1ωρYit−ρ +Q−1Kit (6.3.2)
Further simplifying the forgoing equation we represent; Q−1βio = Ji, Q−1ω1 = Li for
i = 1 · · · ρ, Q−1Kit = µit. Therefore, equation (6.3.3) becomes
Yit = Ji + LiYit−1 + L2Yit−2 + · · ·+ LρYit−ρ + µit (6.3.3)
Equation (6.3.3) differs from equation (6.3.1) in that the later is a primitive system that
allows all variables to have contemporaneous impact on one another. The former is the
standard/reduced form of P–SVAR where all the right-hand side variables are predeter-
mined at time t with no variable having an immediate impact on another in the system.
Furthermore, according to (Enders, 2008), the error term (µit) is composite shocks in Yit.
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Hence, the reduced form of the P–SVAR from equation (6.3.3) above can be rewritten as
Yit = Ji + L(B)Yit + it (6.3.4)
Where Yit is (nxk) vector variable given as
Yit = (ECR,LQTY,AQLTY,LI, IRS,EFF,Zscore) (6.3.5)
Equation (6.3.5) is the vector of SSA region Commercial banks endogenous variables used
in the study. Where Zscore is stability measure, IRS, interest rate spread and LI is com-
petition index. Others are ECR, represents regulatory capital; LQTY, liquidity reserve;
AQLTY, asset quality and EFF is efficiency score estimated with SFA as efficiency mea-
sure. From equation (6.3.4), Ji is the vector of constants denoting country intercept terms,
L(B) is the matrix of polynomial in the lag operator that captures the relationship be-
tween the banks endogenous variables and their lags, µit = Q
−1Kit and/or Qit = Kit, is
a vector of random disturbance. This will be employed in order to estimate the interaction
among regulation, competition and stability of SSA region commercial banks.
To recover the information in the structural model, we impose a restriction in the ma-
trix Q and K in the system as contained in equation (6.3.6) below. The identification
scheme follows Davoodi et al. (2013), whereby structural restrictions are applied to the
contemporaneous parameter matrix.
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
ω21 1 0 ω24 0 0 0
0 ω32 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 ω52 ω53 ω54 1 ω56 0
ω61 0 0 0 0 1 0
ω71 ω72 ω73 ω74 ω75 ω76 1


ait
bit
cit
dit
eit
fit
git

=

η1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 η2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 η3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 η4 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 η5 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 η6 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 η7


µait
µbit
µcit
µdit
µeit
µfit
µgit

(6.3.6)
The notations a,b,c,d,e,f and g in the matrix above are used to represent each variable
ECR, LQTY, AQLTY, LI,IRS, EFF and Zscore respectively. Variables ordering meant
that bank features react to simultaneous innovations in regulations. The first matrix in
equation (6.3.6) is the Q matrix, relating to the non-recursive restrictions in the system.
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The diagonal matrix, also known as the K matrix describes the first matrix on the left-
hand side of the same system. ait, 
b
it, 
c
it, 
d
it, 
e
it, 
f
it and 
g
it are terms denoting the residuals
in the standard form disturbances to the variables and further explain unexpected move-
ments of each variable, based on the information in the system. While µait, µ
b
it, µ
c
it, µ
d
it,
µeit, µ
f
it, and µ
g
it are the structural shocks associated with the respective equations.
We relied on Amisiano and Giannini (1997) for the identification of the scheme, whereby
the P–SVAR requires 2n2 − n(n+ 1)/2 or 70 restrictions on the Q and K matrices com-
bined (where n is the number of variables). We imposed 48 maximum restrictions on the
diagonal matrix K so that the Q matrix absorbed the remaining 28 restrictions for the
system to be exactly identified. Given that our non-recursive P–SVAR imposes 28 zero
restrictions on Q, the system is over-identified and 21 free parameters in the Q matrix
with the 7 in the K matrix were estimated, as in equation (6.3.6).
The P–SVAR used in this study contains seven variables. ECR, LQTY and AQLTY
are regulation surrogates, LI measures competition, IRS measures banks pricing of their
core intermediation activities that are influenced by competition and regulation, while
Zscore is a stability measure. The ordering of the variables and their position in the
identification scheme is informed by the way the variables influence one another which
is largely informed by theories and empirical models. One unique strength of SVAR is
that it also provides flexibility in cases without underlying theories Davoodi et al. (2013)2.
The regulation surrogates are deemed to determine the level of competition and stabil-
ity of the banking system. We also expect some sort of transmission from competition
to stability via efficiency given the competition stability view. The non-zero coefficients
in the matrices, ωmn indicate that variable m affects variable n immediately. In other
words, row 1, for instance, measures the effects of capital regulation on the system cap-
tured by equity capital ratio. The second and third rows represent liquid assets ratio and
asset quality. Based on the Basel accords, these, besides capital regulations are the most
important targets of regulations in banking. While the main transmissions are expected
from these three variables as the main targets are competition and stability variables, ω21,
ω24 and ω32 indicates that the regulation variables respond to shocks within themselves
and the system as well. Liquidity responds instantaneously to capital and to competition
2Part of the justification for its application in this study
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measured by the Lerner index, while asset quality responds to liquid assets.
In the fourth and fifth equations are competition variable; Lerner index and IRS, we
included an efficiency measure variable, efficiency score, in equation 6 based on possible
transmission in models from competition to efficiency then to stability. ω52, ω53, ω54, ω56
and ω61 signify that IRS does respond to liquidity, asset quality, Lerner index and effi-
ciency with efficiency responding instantaneously to capital. Finally, is stability measure,
Zscore, sitting at equation 7 responding immediately to all the variables in the system,
capital, liquidity, asset quality, competition and/or market power and efficiency measure,
given ω71, ω72, ω73, ω74, ω75 and ω76 allowing simultaneous relations between stability,
competition and regulations.
6.3.2 Variables Description and Data Source
Given the nature of the study area in terms of availability of data for banking study,
our choice of bank regulatory parameter was instructed by some of the components of
CAMEL3 for which data are readily accessible. Regulatory capital (ECR), measured by
the ratio of equity capital constitutes the main capital measurement used in banking regu-
lation researches (Agoraki et al., 2011; Casu et al., 2015). The higher the capital adequacy
ratio a bank has, the more its ability to compete favourably and the more the cushion it
has for stability. As argued by Matutes and Vives (2000); Repullo (2004), capital require-
ments may prove inadequate as regulation for the banking sector, hence they advocated,
among others, for the inclusion of deposit rates control. This conforms with the industrial
organisation theory of banking that emphasised the equilibrium mechanism of the banking
sectors market structure based on the deposits rates, loan rates and the liquidity reserves
a bank is allowed to maintained. Liquidity ratio thus forms a formidable regulatory in-
struments used to curtail the activities of banks. This study uses the ratio of banks liquid
assets to depreciation and short term funds to measure liquidity reserve. This provides
an insight into the level of liquid assets a bank has at its disposal to discharge its routine
obligations including funding loan assets (Moyo et al., 2014). Interest rate spread, used
interchangeably as net interest margin is the difference between interests paid on bank
assets such as loans and those paid on its liabilities such as deposits. It is often used in
3Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management capability, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market
risk (Akins et al., 2016)
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banking literature as an indication of competitiveness of the sector as high interest rate
spread denotes a highly concentrated banking sector (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2003; Laeven
& Majnoni, 2005).
Asset quality (AQLTY), measured as loan loss reserves to net loan assets is one of the
targets of capital requirements (Moyo et al., 2014). The quality of the assets a bank pos-
sesses determines it stability as well as also impact on its competitive abilities. Bank asset
quality is also a major determinant of the performance of its loan portfolio in terms of
whether they are performing or non-performing. High incidence of non-performing loans
(NPL) in turn impacts on stability. These ratios are expected to be positively related to
the likelihood of a bank’s survival.
The main competition measure used in this study is the Lerner index. While data for
IRS were sourced directly from Bankscope, Lerner index is as estimated in Chapter 3
Subsection 3.3.1 following Kouki and Al-Nasser (2014). The Lerner index measures the
market power of banks and it is an expression of the degree to which a bank is able to
charge prices above its marginal cost. It ranges between 0 ≤ li ≤ 1 with extreme indices at
0 and 1 signifying perfect competition and monopoly respectively while indices close to 0
represents monopolistic competition and those close to 1 denote oligopolistic competitive
market. Given the indices estimated, the study expects the Lerner index to respond to
regulation variables while it is also expected to reasonably cause efficiency and stability
as well, based on empirical results of this study and theory.
Stability measure is estimated in Chapter 4 Subsection 4.3.2 based on Roy (1952)’s Zscore.
It is a measurement of banks resilience to volatility or the distance to bankruptcy of a
bank. High scores is an indication of a more stable bank with less likelihood of failure.
Based on theory, the study expects stability to react to both competition and regulation.
Specifically, a negative direct response is expected from competition while a positive re-
action is expected from the regulatory variables. Furthermore, we generated the banking
sectors efficiency scores using Stochastic frontier analysis by Coelli and Rao (1998); Coelli
et al. (2005) as contained in Chapter 5 Subsection 5.3.1. Asset quality (AQLTY) and
liquidity ratio (LQTY) were obtained from the BankScope database. Asset quality in this
case is the ratio of loan loss provision to net loan while liquidity ratio is the ratio of liquid
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assets to short term liabilities. All data were collected over the period of 2006 to 2015.
Each of the variables series is originally in ratio besides lerner index and Zscore that are
computed and thus does not require logging.
Given the short-term period coverage of the data that is available for this study and
for the purpose of the time series component of the P-SAVR analysis, we carried out fre-
quencies conversion by converting the data for each variable per country on a quarterly
basis using the quadratic moving average method tool available in Eviews and as used
in the works of (Borys, Horva´th, & Franta, 2009; Cheng, 2006; Kutu & Ngalawa, 2016;
Ngalawa & Viegi, 2011). The choices of conversion method as argued is to achieve high
frequency data while maintaining the original relational features of data.
Data Summary
We present the mean of the data for this study in Table 6.2 below for the periods under
consideration. The table shows that commercial banks in the SSA region are well capi-
talised above the 8% minimum total capital ratio required by most financial regulations
and the Basel Accord. On the average, the capital base was up to 18.10% in 2014 and a
minimum average of 13.97% in 2011. Overall, the banking system in terms of the capital
base can be adjudged to be robust. Closely tied to capital is the stability measure. We
estimated the stability of the SSA commercial banks using the Zscore. The higher the
level of score the better for a banking system in terms of stability. The average stability
measure over the period hovers around 3% which by every standard signifies stable bank-
ing systems reflecting the level of capitalisation. The banking system is also faced with a
monopolistic competitive market based on the Lerner index4. Another variable that has
been used overtime to measure concentration/market power in banking study is interest
rate spread. It is also a variable that reflects the potency to deposits and interest rate
regimes in a banking system. The mechanism is that a monopoly bank is able to charge
high lending rate while offering lower rates to their depositors. The case is different with a
competitive market where pooling effects may make a bank to offer competitive rates for
4Having maximum average index in 2013 of 0.3521 and minimum in 2006 with 0.2557. A Lerner index
is a measure of market power and the lower the index the more competitive the banking sectors will be.
The reverse is the case where the index is high denoting high market power. Within the periods covered
by this study the SSA commercial banking system can thus be concluded as competitive.
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Table 6.2: Summary Statistics
Mean
year N Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index IRS Efficiency Score Zscore
2006 190 0.1611557 0.470746 0.0139041 0.2556606 0.0701743 0.9632438 3.54343
2007 215 0.1441192 0.4439588 0.0153758 0.2693673 0.0702588 0.9611767 3.204579
2008 250 0.1568832 0.3978305 0.0160256 0.2884124 0.0752672 0.962111 3.380152
2009 275 0.150284 0.4420819 0.021476 0.293903 0.0758463 0.958097 3.29502
2010 296 0.1563837 0.4201964 0.0241048 0.2959335 0.0743105 0.9552949 3.273991
2011 320 0.139725 0.3727514 0.0221538 0.2821636 0.0725276 0.9558327 2.988873
2012 357 0.1542496 0.3743644 0.0210687 0.3237032 0.0736195 0.9566049 3.235099
2013 392 0.170136 0.4193003 0.0221185 0.3520863 0.0722735 0.9559925 3.403835
2014 430 0.1810446 0.3973395 0.0226412 0.3318136 0.0916671 0.9549598 3.624344
2015 440 0.1704147 0.3809 0.0260906 0.3243521 0.0804629 0.954971 3.484
Author’s estimation, 2017, based on data collected.
deposits and lower lending rates in order to attract customers. Apparently, the interest
rate spread as reported in the table above is relatively high overtime compared to other
regions of the world and does not reflect the competitive nature of the banking system as
reported by the Lerner index. Efficiency generated with SFA looks quite high and close
to 1 (the frontier). SFA allows the efficiency to be exogenously modelled to generate the
frontier from which efficiency of each bank in the system is compared to produce efficiency
score. The distance between the frontier and the individual bank score reflects the level of
inefficiency. Liquidity assures depositors of banks’ ability to honour their contracts. It is
often one of the elements of the assets side of bank balance sheet that can trigger runs, no
wonder it is now part of the cardinal points in pillar I of the new Basel Accord (Basel III).
Banks that are able to manage their liquid assets to strike balance between profiting and
honouring the short term obligations as they fall due are able to avoid insolvency prob-
lems. Table 6.2 shows the liquid assets of SSA commercial banks to range between 37%
in 2011 and 47% in 2006. The level of liquidity a bank must hold will generally depends
on the volume of obligation, but according to Basel III, a bank must have sufficient liquid
assets available for one-month survival in a stress scenario case. Asset quality overtime
ranges from 1.4% in 2006 to 2.6% in 2015. Banks’ asset quality ratio is at the heart of the
stability of the system since it measures the loan loss rate in the banking system. Higher
ratio of loan loss portends danger to the stability of the banks and the system as a whole.
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6.3.3 Panel Unit Root
Unit root deals with the stationarity of the data series used in the analysis, presented
in Appendix B.1. According to Dendramis, Spungin, and Tzavalis (2014), one necessary
precondition to implementing any VAR estimation is, all data series must be integrated
of the same order but not cointegrated. Hence, this study follows Vonna´k (2005), Ibrahim
and Amin (2005), Uhlig (2005), Peersman and Smets (2005), Fe`ve and Guay (2010),
Elbourne (2008), Kutu and Ngalawa (2016) among others that used levels VAR. They
argued that the estimation of VAR or SVAR when all series are at levels will prevent
efficiency loss or loss of vital information about the data sets that are usually associated
with a differenced SVARs and VARs. A further justification in Afandi (2005) who argued
that this procedure also has an advantage of producing consistent parameter estimates
irrespective of whether the time series are integrated or not, making it produce a more
robust result than a cointegrated SVAR or VAR model. Moreover, Berkelmans (2005) is
of the view that the inclusion of lagged lengths in the SVARs or VARs variables enables
the residual to be stationary even with I(1).
6.4 Empirical Results
For the purpose of hindsight, we expect a causal relationship among competition, regu-
lation and stability. Specifically, we expect an individual transmission from regulation to
competition and regulation to stability. Since models have established the relationship
between competition and stability, we assume this should result in a tripartite causal-
ity/relationship running from regulation to competition to stability. According to Casu
et al. (2015) and Llewellyn (1999) the main reason for bank regulation is to foster compe-
tition and stability of the banking system. Competition, on the one hand, is to engender
efficiency of the system which in turn also leads to stability; on the other hand, stability
is needed to sustain confidence and reduce bank runs. For this pioneering study we have
adopted a number of measures to proxy regulation, competition and stability. Further-
more, we fill the gaps identified in literature presented in Section 6.2 Table 6.1, given the
various hypothesis stated and to be analysed going forward in this study.
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6.4.1 Lag Selection
Lag selection is an important component of VAR estimation (Canova, 2007) because too
many lags increase the error in the forecasts and as well waste degrees of freedom, while too
few lags could leave out relevant information leaving the equations potentially misspecified
with the likelihood to cause autocorrelation in the residuals (Stock & Watson, 2007).
Besides experience, knowledge and theory that underscore the determination of the number
of lags required, there are information criterion procedures that help to come up with the
optimal number of lags to allow for adjustments in the model and the attainment of well-
behaved residuals. Five commonly used information criterion are: Sequential Modified LR
test, Final Prediction Error (FPE), Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), the
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), and the Hannan and Quinn Information Criterion
(HQIC). Given a transformed quarterly data series, we test for the optimal lag lengths
using these different lag selection criteria. The results as shown in Appendix B.2 show that
the standard FPE, AIC, SBIC and HQIC suggest an optimal 5-lag lengths while Sequential
Modified LR test suggest an optimal 8-lag length for the P-SVAR. Since majority of the
criteria opt for 5 maximum lag length, with the fact that all the criteria is efficient, and
out of five criteria, four suggest 5-lag length as against one that suggests 8 maximum lag
length. Therefore, we follow the majority to choose the more general model suggested by
the FPE, AIC, SBIC and HQIC. The choice of the 5 lags by this study offers accurate and
more robust dynamics without necessarily shortening the estimation sample too much,
which would compromise the degrees of confidence. This lag length also allows for no
serial correlation in the residuals (Kutu & Ngalawa, 2016).
6.4.2 Diagnostic Tests and other Econometric Issues
For robustness, we present various diagnostics test relevant for this study viz; serial correla-
tion test in Appendix B.3, normality tests in Appendix B.4 and tests of heteroskedasticity
in Appendix B.5 and B.6. As indicated in Appendix B.3, there is absence of serial cor-
relation at lag 5 (Appendix B.2). This serves to also validate the optimal lag selection
procedure carried out as a misspecified model on that basis would result in the prob-
lem of serial correlation. In addition, it is an indication of the absence of cross-sectional
dependences across time. Even though P-SVAR largly accounts for cross-sectional interde-
pendence across panels/economics units as it was built originally to recognise and account
for transmissions and effects of one unit on another as global interdependence became
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apparent with globalisation (Canova & Ciccarelli, 2014). We do not envisage any break in
the model series because although banking policies are homogeneous almost across region,
they are undertaking at different points in time. Besides, the period considered for this
study is not seriously affected, as only 2006 data came before the only known global finan-
cial crisis that could have impacted on the data. Moreover, the IPS unit root test carried
out, shown Appendix B.1, is argued to account for issues of structural breaks (Glynn,
Perera, & Verma, 2007).
6.4.3 Impulse Response Analysis
The impulse response function analysis was first introduced in VAR modelling by Sims
(1980). It helps to highlight the state of an economic system in the future if there is
a change in any of the components. Put differently, the impulse response provides an
answer to the question of how the future of a system is affected with a change in one of
its variables. It thus shows how much time to the future the variables react to each other.
Given the assumption that innovation returns to zero in subsequent periods and that all
other innovations are equal to zero, (Amisano & Giannini, 1997; Stock & Watson, 2001;
Ziegel & Enders, 1995), it permits the tracing out of the time path response of current and
future values of each variable to a one unit increase in the current value of one of the VAR
innovations. It provides a quantitative measure of the reaction of each variable to shocks
in the different equations of the system (Bernanke & Mihov, 1997). In this study, having
achieved the stability of the VAR system as shown in Appendix B.7, we therefore examined
the SSA banking system impulse response in phase based on responses to innovations in
regulations, viz; capital, liquidity and asset quality, competition; looking at lerner index
measure of competition and interest rate spread, efficiency and finally stability. The X-
axis of the impulse response graphs denotes the periods covered in the analysis which are
a quarterly basis.
6.4.4 Response to Capital Regulation Innovation
Figure 6.2 shows the impulse responses of competition, efficiency and stability to one stan-
dard deviation capital regulation innovation over the next twenty four quarters. As shown
in Figure 6.2(a), capital regulation is positive but insignificant to explain competition in
the banking sector of the SSA region. One standard deviation shock in capital causes a flat-
tened competition, as measured by the Lerner index, with competition rising slightly above
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zero in periods between period two and period four and from period twelve to the end.
This insignificant short run relationship, notwithstanding, the behaviour demonstrates the
ability of capital regulation to cumulatively increase the banking system’s competition on
a long term basis. The impact of capital regulation on competition becomes even more
glaring in Figure 6.2(b). A large interest rate spread (lending rates - minus deposit rates)
signifies the presence of market power and/or concentration, while the reverse holds for
a competitive banking system. This also gauges the efficacy of deposits and lending reg-
ulations. Capital regulation is significant and positively related to interest rate spread,
(a) Competition (Lerner Index) (b) Competition (Interest Rate Spread)
(c) Efficiency (d) Stability
Figure 6.2: Impulse Responses to Capital Regulation
Author’s Estimation, 2017
showing that interest rate spread rises with a shock in capital regulation. This is consis-
tent with the study of Hussain and Hassan (2012) who found a positive and significant
relation between capital and concentration measures. A standard deviation shock in capi-
tal regulation shows a steep rise from period three to period five and continued steady up
until period eighteen and flattened thereafter. This suggests that market power increases
in response to capital regulation. Likewise, bank efficiency response to capital shock is
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significant and positive but with a declining trend over the periods. In Figure 6.2(c), effi-
ciency increases steady from period one to period four and declines suddenly with a steep
slope up to period eight and then steady decline in the rest of the periods. The implication
of this is that the level of capital of a bank determines the relative efficiency that the bank
can attain and that bank capital have a direct and short term positive relationship with
commercial banks efficiency in the SSA region. As indicated in Figure 6.2(d), in line with
a priori, capital regulation has direct bearing on the stability of banks. Capital is positive
and strongly significant to explain its relationship with bank stability in the SSA banking
sector. This is consistent with the results of Moyo et al. (2014) and Agoraki et al. (2011).
Moyo et al. (2014) found positive and strong relationship between capital and stability pre
and post reforms in SSA countries. This result does not fully support the findings of Fu et
al. (2014) who found positive but insignificant relationship between the two phenomena.
In terms of transmission mechanism, we found a rather declining response of stability to
an innovation in capital regulation.
The capital and stability relationship confirms our expectation of an alternative hypothe-
sis that capital regulation is able to have direct impact on stability and is consistent with
literature on stability which posits that the very essence of regulation in banks is engen-
dering the stability of the sector (Llewellyn, 1999, among others). This also affirms our
result of the impact of capital on stability in Chapter 4 subsection 4.4.3 where capital is
positively significant to explain stability with economic impact of potential 40% increase in
stability with one standard deviation increase in capital. From the result in Figure 6.2(d),
stability will decline over the period with any decrease in the subsisting capital base of the
commercial banks in the SSA region. Every time capital decreases, it has consequences on
the stability of the banking system. There is a sharp decrease in stability if capital falls
from the first period to the ninth and continues to fall steadily over the periods to the next
twenty fourth period. The more reason why Bolt and Tieman (2004) may have advocated
for more stringent minimum capital requirements. This again reiterates the importance
of capital regulation in ensuring the stability of the banking sector.
6.4.5 Response to Liquidity Regulation Innovation
This section considers the responses of competition, efficiency and stability to a standard
deviation liquidity regulation shock. Figure 6.3(a) shows similar response of competition
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as measured by the Lerner index to capital regulatory shock in Figure 6.2(a), but this time
a negative relationship. Against expectation, we again found that competition does not
significantly respond to shock in bank liquidity. From the fourth quarter, competition falls
below zero and remains flattened and negative thereafter. A standard deviation shock to
(a) Competition (Lerner Index) (b) Competition (Interest Rate Spread)
(c) Efficiency (d) Stability
Figure 6.3: Impulse Responses to Liquidity Regulation
Author’s Estimation, 2017
liquidity causes a steady increase response of interest rate which was initially negative up
to period eight and become positive from then to the end of the periods, in Figure 6.3(b).
We found liquidity to be both negative and positively significant to explain competition in
the banking sector of the SSA region banking sector bringing to bear the dynamism of the
P-SVAR methodology. Hussain and Hassan (2012) had found a positive and significant
relationship between liquidity of banks and concentration measure but with an economic
impact that is not fundamentally different from zero. The implication of our result is that
competition reduces with widening interest rate spread as the ability to charge higher
lending rates and low deposit rate is synonymous with monopoly banks or banks with
high market power. They are able to place restrictions on lending irrespective of the size
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of liquidity at their disposal in order to achieve monopoly rent. Figure 6.3(c) depicts
the impulse response graph for liquidity and efficiency. Again, liquidity is positive and
significant to explain the efficiency in the banking system of SSA. A standard deviation
shock in liquidity causes a positive rise in efficiency with a steady decline between period
four and period six. From period six, efficiency rises, flattened over the periods but
declines steady towards the twenty fourth period. This negates the subsisting hypothesis
being tested as result affirms a positive effects of liquidity on bank efficiency. Although
issues of liquidity are quite tricky in the banking system, it however follows that adequate
liquid assets will both support lending and profitable investments without compromising
short term obligations, thus having far-reaching effects on profitability. In Figure 6.3(d),
we test the reaction of commercial banks’ stability to bank liquidity regulation. Liquidity
is significant and positively related to bank stability, affirming the results of Moyo et al.
(2014). Stability does rise in response to a standard deviation shock in liquidity from
the fourth quarter but flatly fluctuating over the rest of the period. This suggests that a
decrease in banks’ liquid assets may not significantly reduces bank stability for the next
twenty four quarters. This may be plausible because our review in Chapter 2 revealed
that most of the banking sectors in the SSA region are highly liquid. However, this must
be approached with a great deal of caution given the implications of illiquidity to bank
runs.
6.4.6 Response to Asset Quality Regulation Innovation
Figure 6.4 shows the response of competition, efficiency and stability to a standard de-
viation asset quality regulation shock. Specifically, Figure 6.4(a) denotes the reaction
of competition based on the Lerner index to a shock in the quality of assets of banks.
The response is insignificant with competition falling below zero from period eight and
declining further henceforth. This signifies that competition is continually shrinking with
a standard deviation asset quality shock. Unlike the response of interest rate spread to
capital regulation and liquidity shocks, Figure 6.4(b) shows interest rate spread decreasing
in response to one shock in the asset quality standard deviation. The fall in interest rate
spread fluctuates over the periods with visible steps downwards in virtually each of the
periods except within period two and period four with a longer steady decline. We further
note a positive and significant relationship between interest rate spread and asset quality
suggesting that a shock in the quality of asset of banks favours a more competitive bank-
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(a) Competition (Lerner Index) (b) Competition (Interest Rate Spread)
(c) Efficiency (d) Stability
Figure 6.4: Impulse Responses to Asset Quality Regulation
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017
ing environment. The relationship between banks asset quality and competition and/or
market power as explained by interest rate spread has received less attention in literature.
This to the best of our knowledge explains why there is little or no theoretical or empirical
literature in this area. Banks asset quality has however been included in the three cardinal
targets of the Basel Accord post 2007/09 financial crisis given the perceived role it played
in the events leading to the crisis. As for efficiency, Figure 6.4(c) shows a positive and
significant relationship between banks asset quality and efficiency. As indicated in the
graph, a standard deviation asset quality shock triggers quite an interesting pattern of
reactions over the next twenty four periods. It begins with an insignificant response until
the fourth period where it becomes significant and positive with a very sharp increase
to become flat and steady between period five and period eight. By the ninth period, it
declines steadily and rises again with twelfth and fourteenth quarters respectively only to
decline from there but shows positive responses throughout the periods. This reiterates
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the fact that efficiency in banks is also directly impacted upon by asset quality regulation
and with short term significant influence. We also found a similar response with respect
to stability where a shock in asset quality standard deviation is at first insignificant, be-
comes significant and positive at some point in period four, then flattens over three to four
quarters and with steep slop decline in the ninth period; it evens out from period sixteen
and slowly falls till the end of the period in Figure 6.4. Our result negates the positive
but insignificant relationship found by Moyo et al. (2014) between asset quality and the
stability of banks. Asset quality is directly linked to banks’ loan portfolio and this has
implications for liquidity and the profitability of the banking system and constitute one of
the biggest problematic components of banking with great implications for stability. This
further clearly shows that the stability of the banking system can directly be influenced
by the nature, extent and manner in which the regulation is made and managed.
6.4.7 Response to Competition (Lerner index) Innovation
Figures 6.5(a) - 6.5(f) presents the responses of capital, liquidity, asset quality, interest
rate spread, efficiency and stability of banks to a standard deviation competition shock.
Apparently, the results show that there appear to be no significant short term responses to
innovations in competition for most of these variables. Capital in Figure 6.5(a) indicates
that competition as measured by the Lerner index is positive but insignificant to explain
capital regulation in the banking sector of the SSA. The graph shows capital regulation’s
response to a standard deviation shock in competition, rising above zero in period nine
and gradually increasing thereon. The main emphasis in literature has been looking at
the effects of bank capital in shaping the competitiveness of the banking system and not
much if any has been said as to whether competition could impact on the level of capital.
This result points to the likelihood of a long term impact in this direction. Figure 6.5b
depicts the response of liquidity regulation to a standard deviation shock in competition.
We found the response of liquidity to competition to be almost opposite of that of capital
as it is both positive and negative but insignificant. Liquidity responds positively initially
up to the fourth period and later falls gradually and flattens around zero till the thir-
teenth quarter and thereafter becomes negative. Freixas and Ma (2014) argued an inverse
relationship between competition and liquidity. Boot and Ratnovski (2016) agreed with
this in a general literature on moral hazard in a competitive banking environment. The
authors admit that banks have incentives to divert liquidity for more profitable trading
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(a) Capital Regulation (b) Liquidity Requlation
(c) Asset Quality Regulation (d) Competition (Interest Rate Spread)
(e) Efficiency (f) Stability
Figure 6.5: Impulse Responses to Competition Measured by Lerner Index
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017
ventures at the expense of meeting their obligations to their customers suggesting that
competition should reduce liquidity. Asset quality in Figure 6.5(c) shows a positive but
insignificant relationship with competition. In other words, asset quality is insignificant
to explain competition in the short-term in the SSA banking system. The positive sign
suggests a departure from general literature that has arugued in favour of adverse selection
during competitive banking environment that would mean a negative relationship between
competition and asset quality. Asset quality’s response over most parts of the period is
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positive as it begins to rise slightly above zero from period three and remains flat at a
steady state from period five to the end of the periods. Perhaps in the long run, there may
be some significant evidence to consumate this positive relationship and that should be a
plus to the banking system (Mahoney & Weyl, 2014). Looking at the response of interest
rate spread to a standard deviation competition shock, Figure 6.5(d) shows a positive
and significant response from the first up to the tenth period. Even though the response
becomes insignificant from thereon it remains positive and with steady decline over the
period.
While the aim is not to consider intra competition measures response, interest rate spread
also in this case showcase the impact of both lending and deposit rates regulation and
thus show that competition in the short term has a considerable influence reducing the
spread. This is consistent with the welfare theorem of banking competition. Competition
in Figure 6.5(e) shows a negative but insignificant relationship with efficiency. This is
partly consistent with the study of Funga´cˇova´ et al. (2013) who found competition to neg-
atively Granger cause efficiency and Hussain and Hassan (2012) that found a significant
negative relationship between competition and efficiency. In our results, efficiency reacts
negatively in the short term against expectations to a standard deviation competition
innovation. Although the response is not significant over the study period, based on our
results in Chapter 5 we expect a positive relationship. Therefore, the need for cumulative
long term effects of theis relationship becomes desirable to ascertain this result vis-a-vis
our previous result. The reaction of stability to competition is shown in Figure 6.5(f).
Competition is posititive but insignificant to explain stability in the short term. In other
words, stability does not react significantly even though positive over the periods and at
some points not seemingly different from zero over the study period. Although our study
had in the previous two chapters argued against and for competition and stability relation-
ship as did other studies like (Amidu, 2013; Beck et al., 2013; Fu et al., 2014; Maghyereh
& Awartani, 2016, among others) , we may be able to understand why this relationship is
not significant in the short term. Given the economic impact of their long run relationship
to be within -0.02% and 2.4% as reported in the previous chapter, an immediate response
may well be insignificant. This might be a confirmation of some studies that have argued
that competition does not on its own adversely impact the stability of the banking system
(Vives, 2016a).
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6.4.8 Response to Interest Rate Spread Innovation
The response to one standard deviation interest rate spread shock by capital, liquidity,
asset quality, competition (Lerner index), efficiency and stability is presented in Figure 6.6.
Similar to the responses to shocks in competition as measured by the Lerner index above,
a cursory look at the figures shows that these variables do not largely react significantly to
(a) Capital Regulation (b) Liquidity Requlation
(c) Asset Quality Regulation (d) Competition (Lerner index)
(e) Efficiency (f) Stability
Figure 6.6: Impulse Responses to Interest Rate Spread
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017
competition as measured by interest rate spread in the short term except for asset quality
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in Figure 6.6(c). Capital responds positive from period four but with a declining trend till
the twenty second period when it becomes significantly not different from zero, as shown
in Figure 6.6(a). In Figure 6.6(b) liquidity exhibits a similar but opposite behaviour to
that of capital, falling below zero from the third period. The negative response subsists
but with a bit of fluctuations having recover from the decline in period eight and become
flat until the twenty third period where it rise and tending towards zero. Asset quality in
Figure 6.6(c) responds significantly with positive movement from seventh period to the end
of the periods. Though the earlier periods are insignificant, the response is still positive.
Implying that one standard deviation interest rate spread has a considerable impact on the
nature of assets maintained by banks even in the short term. In the case of Lerner index in
Figure 6.6(d), an innovation in interest rate spread does not elicit any significant reaction
from competition in the short term. Only between period four and period eight that its
positively rises slightly above zero otherwise it response is not fundamentally different
from zero over the periods. A similar scenario plays out for efficiency while stability in
Figure 6.6f is slightly different in that its positive but insignificant and rises above zero for
most part of the periods from the start to the eighteenth quarter. This is partly consistent
with the result of Fu et al. (2014) who found positive significance relationship between
the variables at 10%. A cumulative long run relationship may well be consistent with
concentration and/or market power and stability.
6.4.9 Response to Efficiency Innovation
Figure 6.7 shows the various responses of the variables being considered to a standard
deviation efficiency shock. Figure 6.7(a) represents the response of capital regulation to
efficiency in the banking system. Efficiency is insignificantly related to capital as capital
regulation does not significantly respond to a standard deviation shock in efficiency. Be-
tween the first and tenth periods, capital response is barely positive and above zero and
thereafter declines and tends to fall below zero. In contrast, liquidity responds (Figure
6.7(b)) significantly and positively over substantial periods of the study. This implies that
efficiency is positive and significant in explaining liquidity regulation in the banking sys-
tem. Liquidity rises and falls to zero in period five and while the response is not significant
in the fourth to the eighth periods, it reacts with a steady surge with significant positive
rise towards the end of the twenty fourth period. This indicates that changes in efficiency
have considerable short term effects on the liquidity of banks. It is logical that an efficient
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bank may be able to properly manage its liquid asset in the face of competition. In the
case of asset quality, we found in Figure 6.7(c) that efficiency is not significantly related
to the quality of assets of banks. It shows that asset quality regulation responds not sig-
nificantly different from zero to a standard deviation efficiency shock for most parts of the
periods. Notably, the response is negative up to the fifth period. This is inconsistent with
Williams (2004) and Berger and Mester (1997) that argued a better asset management
with a more efficient bank. Efficiency as shown in Figure 6.7(d) is negative but insignif-
icantly related to competition as measured by the Lerner index. We found the response
of competition to a standard deviation shock in efficiency to be initially negative up to
period five but rises above zero to be positive between period five and period eight from
where it gradually falls back to negative to the end of the period. This result aligns with
Funga´cˇova´ et al. (2013) who found evidence to show that competition does not increase
overtime with improvement in banks’ cost efficiency.
The case is however different with competition measured by interest rate spread. Fig-
ure 6.7(e) shows that efficiency is positive and strongly significant to explain interest
rate spread as a measure of competition in the banking sector. We found a downward and
gradual decline of interest rate spread in response to a standard deviation efficiency shock.
This significant and positive relation means that competition increases with efficiency since
reduction in net interest margin and/or interest rate spread denotes reduction in market
power and increase in competition. This may also speak about changes in lending and
deposit rates regulations reacting as efficiency of banks changes. The response steadily de-
clines till period four where it experiences a sudden surge that results in a steep slope that
becomes normal in period five and then the gradual decline continues. We found this re-
sult to be consistent with the recent findings of Apriadi et al. (2016) who showed evidence
that efficiency negatively Granger cause banking concentration. This indicates a positive
response of competition to an efficient banking system since reduction in concentration
is competition. Figure 6.7(f) again establishes the existence of short term relationship
between bank efficiency and bank stability. Stability responds positively and significantly
to a standard deviation efficiency innovation. This is consistent with Apriadi et al. (2016)
who found a positive relationship between efficiency and stability. The response as shown
in the graph declines steadily overtime but positive and significant over the periods. Effi-
ciency has been argued to influence the stability of banks in competition in efficiency and
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(a) Capital Regulation (b) Liquidity Requlation
(c) Asset Quality Regulation (d) Competition (Lerner index)
(e) Competition (Interest Rate Spread) (f) Stability
Figure 6.7: Impulse Responses to Efficiency
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017
stability literature (Petersen & Rajan, 1995; Williams, 2004). This therefore provides evi-
dence to underscore the importance of efficiency in banks in relation to stability especially
in the short term which will be of tremendous implication for policy development in this
area.
197
6.4.10 Response to Stability Innovation
Figure 6.8(a) - Figure 6.8(f) display the reaction of capital, liquidity, asset quality, Lerner
index, interest rate spread, and efficiency to a standard deviation stability shock. While
capital respond negatively, liquidity and asset quality are not fundamentally different from
(a) Capital Regulation (b) Liquidity Requlation
(c) Asset Quality Regulation (d) Competition (Lerner index)
(e) Competition (Interest Rate Spread) (f) Efficiency
Figure 6.8: Impulse Responses to Stability
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017
zero in their short term reaction to shock in stability over the periods. A similar scenario
plays out for Lerner index and efficiency while interest rate spread was positive initially up
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to the third period and becomes negative and significant from then until the eighth period
only to become positive again but insignificant thereafter. This behaviour implies that
while stability reacts to most other variables in the system, non of the variables signifi-
cantly react to stability in the short term. Meanwhile, Apriadi et al. (2016) found stability
to positively Granger cause both efficiency and stability. We did not find consistency with
their study.
Going forward, we analyse the decomposition of variances to gain a better insight on
which of the variables impact more on each other in the system.
6.4.11 Variance Decomposition
Variance decomposition is an indication of the extent to which the forecast error variance
of each variable can be explained by shocks that are exogenous to the remaining vari-
ables. According to Ziegel and Enders (1995), variance decomposition accounts for the
information about the proportion of the movements in a sequence that is due to the shock
in the variable itself and other shocks identified. This splits the variation in endogenous
variable into the component shocks of the VAR. Table 6.3 below presents the variance
decomposition for capital regulation as measured by equity capital ratio as an extraction
from Appendix E.1. The table shows a marginal contribution of shocks from the other
Table 6.3: Variance Decomposition of Capital Regulation
Period S.E. Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index Interest RS Efficiency Stability
4 0.041273 99.95617 0.011035 0.013340 0.003925 0.000668 0.011578 0.003279
8 0.053275 99.16903 0.430126 0.216725 0.004594 0.070758 0.032001 0.076763
12 0.060292 99.10694 0.426108 0.281371 0.014323 0.072222 0.025226 0.073811
16 0.064742 99.03454 0.424141 0.335604 0.031883 0.071085 0.021982 0.080766
20 0.067689 98.97586 0.414251 0.373998 0.063872 0.068627 0.020752 0.082637
24 0.069682 98.91596 0.404575 0.399443 0.107962 0.066131 0.020972 0.084960
Author’s Estimation, 2017, based on data collected
variables in the system to variations in bank capital. Specifically, none of the variables
confer significantly to shocks in capital as they each do not contribute up to 1% of the
variations. The contribution of bank stability to capital by the fourth period is very small
at about 0.0032% though increasing, such that by the eight period it becomes 0.077%,
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dropping in the twelfth period to 0.074%, picking up in the sixteenth period to 0.081%,
twentieth period, 0.083% and finally in the twenty fourth period, 0.085%. This situation
is not fundamentally different from efficiency contributing only about 0.012%, 0.032%,
0.025%, 0.022%, 0.021% and 0.021% at the end of the fourth, eighth, twelfth, sixteenth,
twentieth and twenty fourth periods respectively to variations in the capital of the banks.
Competition based on Lerner index shows that it does not contribute meaningfully to
variation in capital. Between the end of the fourth and the sixteenth period, competition
does not cumulatively confer up to 0.06% on the variation in capital. The contribution
however improves from the end of the twentieth and twenty fourth period to 0.064% and
0.10% but still very marginal. It is then not surprising why the contribution of interest rate
spread is not remarkably different from the aforementioned variables. It contributes near
0% at the end of the fourth period then jump to 0.071%, 0.072% and 0.071% in the eight,
twelfth and sixteenth period respectively and declines thereafter to 0.069% and 0.066 in
the twentieth and twenty fourth period. While we do not emphasise the behaviour of the
intra-regulatory variables, we noted however that most of the impacts on the variation in
capital over the periods emanate from both liquidity and asset quality especially from the
end of the eighth period. The bar chart in Figure 6.9 provides a clearer view of the results
Figure 6.9: Capital Variance Decomposition Bar Chart
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017
in Table 6.3. On the aggregate, the variation in capital in period four as seen in the figure
is based on factors peculiar to capital itself and exogenous to the activity within the sys-
tem. Again we found that this trend changes drastically by the end of period eight where
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the systems contribution increases but in bulk by factors within the regulatory variables;
liquidity and asset quality and not due to either competition or stability. This explains
why capital hardly responds significantly to any of those in the impulse response function.
In Table 6.4 below we present the various contributions of each innovations to bank liq-
uidity changes. Besides capital which is also a regulatory variable that contributes about
6.724% as at period twenty, efficiency, interest rate spread and Lerner index in that order
Table 6.4: Variance Decomposition of Liquidity Regulation
Period S.E. Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index Interest RS Efficiency Stability
4 0.220739 4.298169 95.40601 0.034615 0.177139 0.000169 0.079264 0.004635
8 0.252493 5.416644 94.06321 0.118169 0.139250 0.124635 0.076347 0.061743
12 0.269753 5.982561 93.27819 0.184600 0.122418 0.162385 0.213931 0.055914
16 0.278231 6.419105 92.58710 0.267817 0.119660 0.202303 0.345773 0.058245
20 0.282796 6.724136 92.05322 0.328430 0.122149 0.237874 0.477049 0.057138
24 0.285319 6.939906 91.64249 0.375952 0.131664 0.269872 0.583368 0.056744
Author’s Estimation, 2017, based on data collected.
contributes 0.583%, 0.270% and 0.132% to changes in the level of bank liquidity. Interest
rate spread contributes least at the end of the fourth period near 0%, followed by stability
at 0.005%, efficiency at 0.07% and then Lerner index at 0.177% apart from asset quality
Figure 6.10: Liquidity Variance Decomposition Bar Chart
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017
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that is a regulatory variable at 0.035%. There is thus an indication that capital has di-
rect effects on liquidity as well as competition, efficiency and stability without necessarily
passing through each other. It is plausible to conclude that liquidity is responsive to every
other variable in the system especially from the end of the fourth period for competition,
efficiency and stability. As has been noted, the response of liquidity to interest rate spread
meant response regulations to changes in both deposits and lending rates reflecting here
in terms of their differences. Figure 6.10 above clearly displays the impact of the shocks
that the variables in the system have on the changes in liquidity. Given liquidity as the
reference point, the figure shows quite clearly that the bulk of the impact comes from
capital changes. Beside capital, every other variables put together does not seem to make
any meaningful impact on the variation in liquidity in the quarters considered as extracted
from Appendix E.2.
Further on regulatory variables, the variations in asset quality as explained by the im-
pact of shocks in other variables in the system is represented in Table 6.5 (Appendix E.3
for the comprehensive result). As stated earlier, our focus is not particularly on the im-
Table 6.5: Variance Decomposition of Asset Quality Regulation
Period S.E. Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index Interest RS Efficiency Stability
4 0.034598 0.001160 0.092124 99.83690 0.001413 0.024046 0.036280 0.008078
8 0.036607 0.038673 0.093061 99.70494 0.015407 0.069718 0.035079 0.043121
12 0.037967 0.066535 0.116171 99.55242 0.026638 0.154244 0.038967 0.045025
16 0.038403 0.108517 0.132513 99.36311 0.043157 0.255958 0.042996 0.053751
20 0.038611 0.150214 0.147101 99.17530 0.061239 0.363616 0.045544 0.056987
24 0.038713 0.191046 0.158369 98.99229 0.080954 0.469848 0.047326 0.060162
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017, based on data collected.
pacts amidst regulatory variables, nevertheless, the previous two results have shown that
the major changes in regulatory variables are as a result of shocks within them rather than
due to those of competition, efficiency and stability. The case with asset quality is however
different as both capital and liquidity contribute quite marginally to the its variation as
does other variable in the system suggesting that factors that cause fluctuations/changes
in asset quality are exogenously determined and not due to any of those in the system.
To be specific, Table 6.5 shows the contribution of stability to variation in banks asset
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quality to be 0.008%, 0.043%, 0.045%, 0.054%, 0.057% and 0.060% at the end of periods
four, eight, twelve, sixteen, twenty and twenty four respectively. Even though the impact
increases overtime across the periods, the increase shows an insignificant influence. The
impact is even less prior to the end of twentieth period with the Lerner index having
0.001%, 0.015%, 0.027%, 0.043%, 0.061% and 0.081% for the end of period four through
to period twenty four in that order respectively. This is also the same with interest rate
spread and efficiency whose impact ranges from 0.024% to 0.047% over the periods. These
various impacts are depicted in the component bar chart in Figure 6.11 below. It is ob-
vious from this figure that none of the variables have any significant contribution to the
changes in the banks’ asset quality.
Figure 6.11: Asset Quality Variance Decomposition Bar Chart
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017
The dominance of asset quality component of the bar charts supports our conclusion that
variations in asset quality in the banks is predominantly due to exogenous factors and not
by variables in the VAR system.
Looking at the variance decomposition of Lerner index in Table 6.6 (details in Appendix
E.4 we found that the changes in bank competition as measured by Lerner index are
not significantly explained in the short term by shocks in either capital, liquidity, assets
quality, interest rate spread, efficiency or stability. Interest rate spread least impact on
changes in Lerner index with 0.000%, 0.005%, 0.004%, 0.005%, 0.005% and 0.005% at the
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Table 6.6: Variance Decomposition of Lerner Index (Competition)
Period S.E. Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index Interest RS Efficiency Stability
4 1.610183 0.002707 2.65E − 05 0.003217 99.97894 0.000116 0.014659 0.000332
8 1.899298 0.002223 0.027932 0.002666 99.90336 0.004749 0.018944 0.040122
12 2.245922 0.001708 0.024281 0.007683 99.88202 0.004216 0.049645 0.030450
16 2.501632 0.003952 0.024813 0.016500 99.84187 0.004863 0.082653 0.025348
20 2.738224 0.006630 0.024326 0.025898 99.78446 0.004915 0.131535 0.022237
24 2.945663 0.011149 0.024592 0.035679 99.72121 0.005103 0.182505 0.019759
Author’s Estimation, 2017, based on data collected.
end of the fourth to the end of the twenty fourth period. It is important to state that
both interest rate spread and Lerner index are for the purpose of this study measuring
competition, except that interest rate spread also reflects the effectiveness of deposits and
lending rates regulations. This is followed by capital with the impact of 0.003%, 0.002%,
0.002%, 0.004%, 0.007% and 0.011%; asset quality with 0.003%, 0.003%, 0.007%, 0.017%,
0.026% and 0.036%. Then next to this in impact is stability having 0.000%, 0.040%,
0.030%, 0.025%, 0.022% and 0.020%; then 0.000%, 0.028%, 0.024%, 0.025%, 0.024% and
0.025%. Efficiency seems to contribute the most among the variables’ shocks especially
from the end of period twelve with 0.015%, 0.019%, 0.050, 0.083%, 0.13% and 0.183%.
Figure 6.12: Lerner Index Variance Decomposition Bar Chart
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017
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In the component bar chart in Figure 6.12, it is apparent that these impacts are marginal
and almost non-existent till the end of the sixteenth period. Only at the end of the twen-
tieth and twenty fourth period that the impacts become visible but relatively small and
insignificant. Therefore, variations in bank competition in the short term are due to com-
petition itself and factors outside the system.
Still on variables that measure competition, the extraction of the variance decomposi-
tion of interest rate spread from Appendix E.5 is shown in Table 6.7 below. The results
show that besides stability, shocks in every other variables in the system directly impact on
variations in interest rate spread. The highest impact is contributed by efficiency having
about 12.5% at the end of the fourth period but with impact declining thereafter to 10.6%
Table 6.7: Variance Decomposition of Interest Rate Spread (Competition)
Period S.E. Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index Interest RS Efficiency Stability
4 0.019283 0.729236 1.425739 5.219649 0.310952 79.77632 12.53340 0.004705
8 0.025240 2.072900 0.896505 4.567905 0.375509 81.44026 10.59258 0.054340
12 0.029496 2.987995 0.711543 4.311312 0.366129 82.42924 9.148664 0.045114
16 0.032738 3.752955 0.715328 4.097874 0.375979 82.90277 8.113680 0.041415
20 0.035351 4.436092 0.812107 3.941449 0.380660 83.05167 7.328149 0.049869
24 0.037503 5.044259 0.940284 3.816619 0.389164 83.02032 6.729362 0.059990
Author’s Estimation, 2017, based on data collected.
at the end of period eight, 9.15% at the end of period twelve, 8.11% at the end of period
sixteen, 7.33% at the end of period twenty and 6.73% at the end of period twenty four.
Following efficiency in impact of shocks on changes in interest rate spread is asset quality.
It contributes in the region of 5.22%, 4.57%, 4.31%, 4.10%, 3.94% and 3.82% at the end of
periods four, eight, twelve, sixteen, twenty, and twenty four respectively. We found that
the nature of contribution is similar to that of efficiency as the impacts decline overtime
during the periods. Shocks in capital also contribute significantly to changes in interest
rate spread. Unlike efficiency and asset quality, the impact of capital increases overtime
with 0.729%, 2.073%, 2.988%, 3.753%, 4.436% and 5.044% by the end of the fourth, eighth,
twelfth, sixteenth, twentieth and twenty fourth periods. Liquidity contributes 1.426% in
period four, 0.897% in period eight, 0.712% in period twelve, 0.715% in period sixteen,
0.812% in period twenty and 0.940% in period twenty four. Stability contributes the least
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with 0.005%, 0.054%, 0.045%, 0.041%, 0.050% and 0.060% by the end of periods four,
eight, twelve, sixteen, twenty, and twenty four respectively.
Figure 6.13 graphically depicts this influence and unequivocally shows that efficiency has
the highest impact followed by asset quality and then capital. In essence, shocks in each
of the variables in the system apart from stability affect variations interest rate spread
directly in the short term.
Figure 6.13: Interest Rate Spread Variance Decomposition Bar Chart
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017
The extent to which shocks in capital, liquidity, asset quality, Lerner index, interest rate
spread and stability impact on changes in bank efficiency in the short term is presented
in Table 6.8 (Rest of the table in Appendix E.6). The table reveals the shocks in capital,
asset quality, Lerner index and liquidity to have the most direct impacts on the changes in
the efficiency of banks. Notably, interest rate spread and stability least affect it and with
their effect transmitted through the other variables. Innovation in capital has an average
of 6.5% impact on the changes in efficiency over the periods. Specifically 7.69%, 6.55%,
6.33%, 6.24%, 6.19% and 6.17% by the end of periods four, eight, twelve, sixteen, twenty,
and twenty four. The impact of shocks in asset quality is significant after the fourth period
when it is near zero to 2.917%, 3.048%, 3.400%, 3.566% and 3.683% thereafter to the end
of twenty fourth period. Again the impact of shocks in the Lerner index become obvious
from the twelfth period with 0.116%,
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Table 6.8: Variance Decomposition of Efficiency
Period S.E. Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index Interest RS Efficiency Stability
4 0.012370 7.685921 0.022868 0.000645 0.026200 0.002886 92.26139 9.14E − 05
8 0.014644 6.549961 0.079695 2.917262 0.036139 0.006040 90.39019 0.020715
12 0.015784 6.337248 0.196785 3.048439 0.116330 0.005291 90.27414 0.021762
16 0.016407 6.236244 0.349491 3.399150 0.232502 0.004959 89.75433 0.023326
20 0.016761 6.193195 0.488903 3.566373 0.391819 0.005096 89.33045 0.024169
24 0.016972 6.167736 0.605381 3.683419 0.583340 0.005464 88.92998 0.024684
Author’s Estimation, 2017, based on data collected.
Figure 6.14: Efficiency Variance Decomposition Bar Chart
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017
0.233%, 0.392% and 0.583% by the end of period twenty four in that order. In like man-
ner, shocks of liquidity to changes in efficiency become pronounced from the end of period
twelve at 0.197%, 0.349%, 0.489% and 0.605% by the end of the sixteenth, twentieth and
twenty fourth period respectively. The impact of interest rate spread is almost negligible
with an average of 0.005% while stability average about 0.02% beyond the end of period
four. The variations in bank efficiency are therefore explained mainly by the shocks in the
VAR system rather than variables that are exogenous to it.
Finally, Table 6.9 below shows the variance decomposition of stability as extracted from
Appendix E.7 explaining whether or not innovations in the variable in the system are the
reasons for the variations in stability. We found from the table that shocks in capital sub-
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stantially account for the variation in the stability of banks, followed by efficiency, asset
Table 6.9: Variance Decomposition of Stability
Period S.E. Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index Interest RS Efficiency Stability
4 1.046061 84.34058 0.018223 0.163104 0.002261 0.014259 11.32617 4.135404
8 1.293435 85.14309 0.303692 0.746914 0.002325 0.055910 10.89870 2.849366
12 1.437686 86.06973 0.352647 0.775919 0.002776 0.057704 10.16140 2.579824
16 1.525033 86.62596 0.401873 0.868822 0.006062 0.054816 9.696503 2.345965
20 1.581024 87.02667 0.432162 0.928954 0.010347 0.052107 9.329244 2.220520
24 1.617507 87.31053 0.451480 0.970396 0.017677 0.049881 9.066356 2.133677
Author’s Estimation, 2017, based on data collected.
quality and liquidity. It also becomes apparent that even though shocks in competition
have some influence on stability, the impact seems indirect and transmitted through other
variables such as efficiency. Capital accounts for an average of over 80% of the variation
in stability over the periods, with 84.34%, 85.14%, 86.07%, 86.63%, 87.03% and 87.31%
from the end of the fourth to the twenty fourth period in that order. Interestingly, the
influence is progressive throughout the periods. The impact of shocks in efficiency on the
changes in stability though tangible, declines across time with 11.33%, 10.90%, 10.16%,
9.70%, 9.33% and 9.07% respectively at the ends of the periods.
Figure 6.15: Stability Variance Decomposition Bar Chart
Source: Author’s Estimation
Next in influence are shocks in asset quality accounting for 0.163%, 0.750%, 0.776%,
0.869%, 0.929% and 0.970% from the end of periods four, eight, twelve, sixteen, twenty,
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and twenty four respectively. These are followed by liquidity shocks that contribute about
an average of 0.40% to changes in stability. Both competition measures contribute most
insignificantly to changes in stability with Lerner index contributing the least at 0.002%,
0.002%, 0.003%, 0.0060%, 0.010% and 0.018% at the end of the fourth period to period
twenty four; further details are contained in Appendix E.7. Figure 6.15 also provides a
clearer picture of the results, showing vividly the impact of capital graduating per period
followed by efficiency which even though declines along the progress remains a significant
force in explaining the variations in stability. We find from the figure the exact influence
of asset quality which becomes visible after the end of quarter and going forward with
liquidity while the presence of Lerner index is noticeable faintly in the twentieth period
and beyond. Hence, competition thus indirectly affects stability, the effects which may be
transmitted through other variables in the system especially through efficiency.
6.4.12 Inference and Discussion of Findings
The cardinal objective of this study is to establish the possible transmission channels
amongst competition, regulation and stability. Studies have attributed the essence of reg-
ulation in banking as primarily to stabilise the system and also to engender a competitive
banking environment. Based on our results in section 5.4 and some empirical work in this
area, we include bank efficiency as we found that competition has implications for the
efficiency that transmitted to the stability of SSA commercial banking sector. Overall,
we sought to establish the transmission channels among these variables for possible policy
implication for a region that sought a policy to stimulate competition in its banking sec-
tors. To do this, the study employed a P-SVAR model approach that is strong and best in
analysing short run relationships among variables. Our results are set out in subsections
6.4.3 and 6.4.11 above providing far-reaching revelations.
Firstly, we found evidence to support the conclusion of Vives (2016b) that competition
only provides an enabling environment to stability or otherwise in banks and is not the
major cause of instability. Our results show that capital regulation among other regu-
latory variables is the singular shock that can influence the variation in the stability of
banks. We found that over 80% of these changes are attributable to changes in capital
regulation. In other words, capital can directly influence and in the short term whether
or not the banking system will be stable. It suffices to say that capital regulation is
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the most important individual regulatory instrument for regulating the activities of the
banking system and has constituted a major flashpoint for policy makers, regulators and
practitioners alike. One reason is that a bank capital base provides the necessary cushion
against eventualities and possible runs. Accordingly, this must be safeguarded at every
point in time. The impulse response analysis results showed a declining response of stabil-
ity to capital regulation shock in the SSA region’s commercial banks over the near term.
This suggests that reduction in the capital base of the banks will negatively impact on the
stability of the banking sector of the region. This should be taken seriously by regulators
to guard against eventualities that could jeopardise the current perceived stability in the
system. The summary statistics in subsection 6.3.2 suggests the commercial banks in this
region have been well-capitalised overtime; as such, efforts must be made to maintain the
status quo.
Other regulatory variables considered that play a vital role in determining the stabil-
ity of the commercial banks in the SSA region are liquidity and asset quality. Liquid
assets determine how well banks are able to execute their day-to-day activities and also
been able to finance their commitments to the customers as they fall due, which must also
be balanced with the quest by the banks to make profit as theory suggests that banks face
the moral hazard to over allocate their liquid asset to trading at the expense of honouring
their obligation to their customers which in turn could result in instability Boot and Rat-
novski (2016). There is thus no doubt as to why stability responds significantly to shocks
in liquidity in Figure 6.3 and accounts for about an average of 1% changes in stability as
suggested by the variance decomposition in stability in Table 6.9. This empirical evidence
provides support for the impact of liquidity on the stability of banks, especially on the
short term direct influence, which constitutes one of the contributions of this study. The
positive response of stability to a standard deviation liquidity shock over the period of the
study justifies the renewed regulatory efforts at optimising the liquid in order to safeguard
the stability of the system. Although the response appeared to be flat for most of the
periods, the negative response in the immediate requires urgent policy reactions. Still on
regulatory variables, it has been noted that asset quality determines the quality of earn-
ing assets that a bank has including the collateral available against the asset side of the
bank balance sheet. This will in most cases affect stability where the quality is poor and
rightly so, we found evidence to support this. In Figure 6.4 stability responds significantly
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and positively to innovations in asset quality and this is substantiated in Table 6.9 with
asset quality accounting for an average of about 1% in changes in stability. This implies
that changes in asset quality in the next 24 quarters will have considerable impact on the
stability of commercial banks in the SSA region. Hence, policies relating to this must be
enhanced to take advantage and improve on this relationship.
Next is bank competition. Evidence from our results in 6.4.3 and 6.4.11 shows that
competition, especially as measured by the Lerner index does not have significant short
term influence on either capital, efficiency or stability. Thus, reinforced empirical findings
that competition may just be a transmission channel through which these variables im-
pact on each other. In particular, the results of the impulse response function in Figures
6.2(a), 6.3(a), 6.4(a) and 6.8(d) show that competition does not respond significantly to
capital regulation, neither does it respond to stability in the short term as well. This is
substantiated by the outcomes of the variance decomposition in Table 6.6 that shows that
none of the aforementioned variables contributes up to 1% to changes in the Lerner index
over the study period. Therefore, we conclude that there is no immediate or direct impact
on bank competition from changes in any of the regulatory variables considered as well
as stability, neither does competition contribute significantly to changes in those variables
in the immediate as revealed by Figure 6.5 and Tables 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.9. While this
does not void the impact of these variables on competition and otherwise, as found in our
study in Chapter 4 on competition and stability and in Chapter 5 on competition, effi-
ciency and stability and other previous studies, evidence suggests that competition effects
on the system are not in the immediate and may take a longer periods to manifest, hence
serving as just a conduit pipe.
Expectedly, efficiency in Figure 6.5(e) responds significantly negatively to competition
by the Lerner index sometimes in the future, as supported by Table 6.8 on variance de-
composition. This provides an affirmation of our findings in Chapter 5 as to the impact
of competition on efficiency. The result suggests declining efficiency in the future with a
standard deviation Lerner index innovation. As the Lerner index suggests, the banking
system is competitive with monopolistic competition in as shown in Table 6.2; caution
must be applied to avoid overcompetitive banking system that could erode the efficiency
currently gained as excessive competition was blamed for the recent financial crisis (Fu et
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al., 2014). The Lerner index however does not respond significantly to shocks in efficiency
as shown in Figure 6.7 ruling out the possibility of a reverse causality in the short term.
The result however differs significantly when we consider competition measured by interest
rate spread that reflects the presence of relative market power as shown in Table 6.2.
Results show that interest rate spread responds significantly positively to all the regu-
latory variables. This implies that capital, liquidity and asset quality have significant
influence over competition, measured by interest rate spread. A shock in capital increases
interest rate spread inferring less competitive banking environment. It is logical to think
that banks faced with declining capital may hold back lending at smaller margin hence
with consequent effects of larger banks dominating the assets side of the banks’ balance
sheet hence reducing competition and increasing market power in the banking markets.
Similar conclusions apply to the other regulatory variables. We found marginal evidence to
show that stability responds significantly positively at some points to interest rate spread.
This seems to suggest stability at higher interest rate which is consistent with market
power. This is consistent with literature that argued that a moderate market power is
considered necessary for the stability of the banking system (Casu et al., 2015). However,
what constitutes a moderate market has to be determined by the antitrust agencies and
monitored to avoid deliberate exploitation of the banking public.
We found consistency with the efficiency structure hypothesis in the short as results show
evidence of reverse causality between efficiency and interest rate spread. Efficiency signifi-
cantly and positively influence interest rate spread and vice versa. This hypothesis argued
that as competitive banks become more efficient, they gain market power which may
eventually result in monopoly rent, giving banks the ability to charge high uncompetitive
market prices. According to the Austrian school, the monopoly rent is only temporary
as new bank entrants that are rent seeking will erode the abnormal profit and or mar-
ket power such that the banking system becomes competitive again. The danger is that
the presence of entry and exit cost in the banking system may invalidate the Austrian
school arguments and unless policy makers and regulators alike monitor and moderate
the market process, the monopoly rents may continue unabated. The evidence of reverse
causality between efficiency and market power are affirmed by the variance decomposition
of interest rate spread which suggests that the main variations in interest rate spread is
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directly caused by efficiency, asset quality, capital and liquidity as well as variations in
stability and efficiency indirectly caused by interest rate spread. These scenarios confirm
the apparent workings of the banking system and the fact that competition does not apply
to the system as it does in other conventional industries because of certain fundamentals
like information asymmetry, moral hazard and adverse selection that meant that a cer-
tain level of market power is desirable within the banking system. The evidence therefore
should guide regulators in determining the balance between what is competitive banking
and the level of market power desired at least over the next twenty four periods in the
banking sectors of the SSA region.
Furthermore, bank efficiency seems central to the effectiveness of regulation, competi-
tion and stability in the banking system. Figure 6.7(b) reflect the influence of efficiency
for bank liquidity. Likewise, Figures 6.6(d), (e) and (f) for competition and stability re-
spectively as buttressed by their variance decompositions in Tables 6.4, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 and
6.9. Hence one can conclude that efficiency is the blood of the banking system that aids
the proper workings of every other features of the banking business. The results therefore
establish the impact of efficiency on stability and efficiency on market power; as to our
knowledge, no short run analysis has been done in this respect. We also establish the
short run influence of efficiency on competition, juxtaposing this result to existing long
run analysis in literature and in Chapter 5 of this study, we can conclude that there is
evidence to support a reverse causality between competition and efficiency of banks. This
is plausible as a bank becomes more efficient, it has better capacity to compete and on the
other hand, competitive banks increase efficiency in terms of turn around which will even-
tually accentuate to bank wellness and returns. Banking practitioners and policy makers
must therefore take this aspect of banking seriously.
Last but one in this series, we discuss the result of stability and its implications. Firstly,
the results provide evidence that stability is directly impacted by regulatory capital. In
fact, the influence is strongly positive and significant and by the variance decomposition
in Table 6.9, capital determines over 80% of changes in the stability of banks in the short
term. This suggests that stability must be borne in mind each time issues bordering on
regulation are considered. This is particularly important as the impulse response analysis
in Figure 6.2(d) suggests a decline in the stability of commercial banks in the SSA region
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over the next 24 quarters with a standard deviation capital shock. Notwithstanding that
the decline is still positive and far above zero point, it is a point for concern. Apart from
capital, both liquidity and asset quality play significant roles in determining the stability
of the banking system in the short term as shown in Figures 6.3(d) and 6.4(d). This
confirms what happens in practice where banks mostly fail for lack of liquidity and high
NPLs. Although the results suggest this relationship may be positive and good for the
banking sector over the next 24 quarters, efforts must made to tend the tides and ensure
a more stable banking system. As has been discussed above, stability is impacted on in-
directly in the short run by competition and /or market power, while directly influenced
by efficiency. The results synced with our Chapter 5 that suggest that the impact of
competition pass through efficiency to stability. Bank stability is as important to an econ-
omy as a heart to the body, as in the words of Vives (2016b), modern banking ceases to
operate with a dead bank. This underscores the importance of stability in the banking sys-
tem and the need to continually uphold the tenets of a sound banking through the policies.
Recapping our findings above, regulation, especially, capital regulation have direct ef-
fects on stability and a transmitting effect to stability via efficiency. Efficiency also has
direct effects on stability. Competition has direct effects on efficiency suggesting its in-
direct influence stability through efficiency; however, it has no direct significant influence
on stability in the short-term. Neither regulation, stability nor efficiency has short term
effects on competition. There could be competition and presence of market power at the
same time as suggested by a relatively high interest rates spread, that has reverse causality
in the short-term with efficiency reaffirming the efficiency structure hypothesis. Interest
rate spread also wields some direct influence on stability and this supports literature that
advocates for market power for a stable banking system and of course the likelihood of
trade-off between competition and stability. The implications of these; capital regulations
must continue to be jealously guided as has been the case, focus on both liquidity and
asset quality must be enhanced as results provided evidence to support their influence on
competition, efficiency and stability. The mixture of competition and moderate market
power must be ensured for an overall stability of the system. This mixture will avoid ex-
cessive competition and excessive usage of market power and so a perfect option will be to
moderate the current monopolistic competitive banking system where the market power
of each bank lies in their product differentials. In all ramification, beside the method used
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and the transmission mechanisms analysed, this study made specific significant contribu-
tions to literature by the hypotheses explored that were identified as gaps in literature as
shown in Table 6.1.
6.5 Summary and Conclusion
We investigated the short term relationship among competition, regulation and stability
of commercial banks in the SSA region using P-SVAR. The essence was to establish the
possible transmission channels and/or mechanisms among the variables. We introduced
efficiency as measured by SFA into the system to capture its role between competition
and stability, while competition is estimated based on the Lerner index with Zscore for
stability. Although theories and empirical literatures have been conflicting in conclusions
on the relationship between competition and stability, there is a growing acceptance of
the possibility of trade-off in competition stability relationship. There is also evidence
that competition does not necessarily result in fragility in the banking system as some
fundamental features of banks play an important role and competition may only aggra-
vate the process. Yet there seems to be no headway as to how the interplays of these
outcomes could be managed and/or moderated to get the best out of the relationship for
the economic growth of the host economies.
In this study, we however carried out for the first a holistic transmission analysis among
regulation, competition, efficiency and stability in the SSA commercial banking sectors.
We found direct effects of regulation, viz; capital, liquidity and asset quality of bank effi-
ciency and bank stability respectively in the short term. There is also evidence of short
run direct effects of competition and/or market power on efficiency as well as reverse
causality between market power and efficiency of banks. Our results do not suggest any
short term relationship between the competition measure and any of the regulatory mea-
sures adopted in this study and stability as well since none of these respond significantly
in the short run to shocks in their residuals. We therefore conclude that there are direct
effects of regulation on stability as well as transmission from regulation through efficiency
to stability. The results also suggest a transmission from competition through efficiency
to stability, since efficiency impacts directly on stability and competition impacts directly
on efficiency. The impulse response function and the variance decomposition results also
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provide insights into how these phenomenon could be managed over the next 24 quarters
in order to optimise the outcome of their interactions. For instance, response of stability to
capital regulation suggests that stability will decline overtime with one standard deviation
capital innovation. This must be taken seriously.
As regulation, especially capital and efficiency have become the cardinal variables for
short term moderation for bank stability in the banking system and especially in the SSA
region’s commercial banking system as revealed by this study results, practitioners and
regulators alike must ensure regulatory capital is sustained at all times. Rather than fine
tuning competition as the supposed cause of instability in the banking sectors, atten-
tion should be directed to managing other fundamentals like moral hazard, information
asymmetry and adverse selection, among others, in order to complement the impact of
regulation and competition in engendering efficiency and therefore stability.
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Chapter 7
The Interplay of Competition
Regulation and Stability
7.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have shown that competition in banking is complex. Taking into ac-
count its relationship with stability and regulation poses an even more greater challenge.
In this section, the study explores the interplay among regulation, competition and stabil-
ity in the SSA commercial banks. It is not clear in literature how competition, regulation
and stability interrelate. Agoraki et al. (2011) found that the stabilising power of capital
regulation diminishes when banks have sufficient market power to increase credit risk and
are reversed for banks that possess moderate market power. This suggests that regulation
alone may not be adequate to ensure bank stability, hence, a thorough investigation of
the market power of banks is desirable. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) provides
an avenue to model the causality that exists among these variables.
The literature for this chapter is predicated on the previous reviews in chapters 3, 4,
5 and 6 of this study. However, a recap is attempted for the purpose of emphasis. Compe-
tition and stability have been argued to be the essence of regulations in the banking sector
(Casu et al., 2015, among others). In other words, regulation causes competition and
stability individually, hence suggestive of regulation and competition as well as regulation
and stability relationship. Models on the relationship between competition and stability
are inconclusive and present conflicting views that suggest that competition could be both
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good and bad for the banking system (Vives, 2016a). Put more succinctly, competition
causes stability because of efficiency that is inherent in competition as argued by the mi-
croeconomics market structure theories (Boyd et al., 2009; Schaeck & Ciha´k, 2014, among
others). On the other hand, competition has the ability to orchestrate a volatile banking
environment that is able to trigger instability in the banking sector (Beck et al., 2013;
Fu et al., 2014, among others). While these arguments still subsist, others have argued
in favour of trade-off between competition and stability (Vives, 2016a, among others),
hence the need for a balancing act in order to benefit from the good of competition while
avoiding the down side.
More recent literature is now converging on the views that competition is rather not
the cause of fragility in the banking system but that its presence especially when in ex-
cess aggravates the risk of instability (Vives, 2016a). This line of thought put forward
the fundamentals such as moral hazard, adverse selection, information asymmetry, and
switching costs, among others, as the reasons for risks in the banking sector which at the
same time impede the workings of competition in the banking system as opposed to the
conventional industrial organisation. Empirical literature as reviewed previously has used
a number of methods to test this relationship but none have achieved a structural analysis
where competition, regulation, and stability are investigated simultaneously, by not only
answering the question why but also how the relationship exists.
Therefore, in addition to the P-SVAR transmission mechanism employed in Chapter 6
that investigated the contemporaneous relationships and/or responses of banking system
variables considered, this study further contributes to literature by investigating a path
and mediating model analysis of the structure of the banking system. Hence, the ability
to capture the variables simultaneously to analyse both the direction of causality and the
direct and the indirect relationship using SEM, thus filling the methodology gap in litera-
ture. This way the trio of competition, regulation and stability could be better managed
in the banking system for optimal performance as proposed in the model in Subsection
7.3 given the methodology that follows.
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7.2 Methodology
Following the outcome of short run estimation analysis in Chapter 6 that explains the
bidirectional relationship between the variables considered in the system, the objective
is to further investigate the relationship among competition, regulation and stability as
well as consider the mediation roles of competition and efficiency in the structure using
the SEM. SEM which dates back to the early 19th century and credited to Spearman
(1904) who developed the common factor model for correlating between tests of mental
ability. By 1930, a psychometric, Thurtson Louis, faulted the use of one common factor
for the test of intelligence score and thus came up with a multiple common factor model.
Then Jreskog (1969a, 1969b) extended the technique with the addition of confirmatory
factor analysis including its estimation using maximum likelihood estimates (MLE). This
development allows for hypothesis testing of the number of factors and their relationship
with observed variables. The concurrent development of path analysis and systems of si-
multaneous equations in econometrics saw economists (Haavelmo, 1943; Koopmans, 1945,
among others) work with the system including introducing a range of other estimation
methods. The early 70s marked the merging of the two methods with unobserved vari-
ables included in the path models (Hauser & Goldberger, 1971) and the general model for
including latent variables and for fitting systems of linear equations including fitting the
models using MLE (Werts, Joreskog, & Linn, 1973) as well as works on the frameworks
that generally combined the two methods (Keesling, 1973; Wiley, 1973). So much more
has been done thereafter to advance the frontier of the method that includes identification
evaluation and model fit test (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Marsh, Balla, & Hau, 1996, among
others).
SEM therefore consists of a vast litany of models from the linear regression model to
measurement models to simultaneous equations. It is thus a way of thinking, writing and
estimation that is not constrained by a particular kind of model; a multivariate method
that permits the system of equation estimation. In other words, it allows hypotheses test-
ing about relationships among variables. Furthermore, SEM is also referred to as analysis
of covariance structures that is able to fit models utilising the observed covariance and/or
the mean. The power also lies in the ability to measure both direct and indirect causal
effects among structure variables hence the mediation analysis. Moreover, it allows one to
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fit chains of conditional relationships via the path analysis.
Testing mediating effects according to Li (2011) has in literature been analysed using step-
wise regression or SEM. A significant attenuation of independent-dependent relationship,
following adjustment for the potential mediator, is the necessary condition for mediation.
Although stepwise regression is easier to conduct than SEM analysis, it lacks the capability
to control for measurement error and accordingly unable to take on the effects of multiple
mediators that is applicable in this study. Thus, SEM is a utility model most effective in
testing mediating effects once data requirements are met as it is able to simultaneously
test all the relationship specified in this study model.
7.2.1 Model Specification
Based on underlying theories, this study follows Chingfu, Lee, and Lee (2009) and Ralph
(1999) to fix a structural model of competition-efficiency, regulation and stability for
commercial banks in the SSA region given the general recursive path diagram for observed
variables as in Figure 7.1 below. The hypothesised a-priori expectation, as indicated in
the structure is that, 1. Regulation is expected to directly cause competition, efficiency
and stability and indirectly cause stability through competition and efficiency;
Figure 7.1: Possible Recursive Path Model For CRS
Author’s Views Based on Theories
2. We also expect competition to have direct causal effects on stability and an indirect
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effect through efficiency. For the purpose of this study, the observed regulatory variables
considered are, capital, liquidity and asset quality. Based on theories, the unidirectional
arrows in the path diagram above indicate structural influence from one variable to an-
other and the arrows pointing to the variables from outside of the structure denote the
disturbances which aggregate all unmeasured influences. Independent variables are influ-
enced exclusively by factors outside of the model and are said to be exogenous, denoted
as Xj , j = 1, · · · , NX, and variables assumed to be influenced from inside of the model
are known as endogenous, denoted as Yj , j = 1, · · · , NY . Hence, regulatory variable (ecr,
lqty & aqlty) is the exogenous variable X1 while competition (lerneri), Y1, efficiency score
(eff), Y2, and stability in index (zscore), Y3 are the endogenous variables.
Given that the path diagram represents a set of univariate regression equations, hav-
ing specified the structural model variables, the structural coefficient equals the regression
coefficient with β representing the structural effects of endogenous variables on other
endogenous variables and γ the structural effects of exogenous variables on endogenous
variables. Then the recursive model in Figure 7.1 can be expressed in the following three
structural equations.
Y1 = α1 + γ11X1 + ξ1, (7.2.1)
Y2 = α2 + β21Y1 + γ21X1 + ξ2, (7.2.2)
Y3 = α3 + β31Y1 + β32Y2 + γ31X1 + ξ3, (7.2.3)
Where αi is the intercept associated with endogenous variables Yi, βi is the structural
coefficient in the endogenous, Yi regression on other endogenous, Yi′ , variables, γij is the
structural coefficient in endogenous Yi regression on Xj exogenous variables, ξi is the error
term , and i & j are endogenous and exogenous variables subscripts respectively.
Equations 7.2.1 - 7.2.3 are represented in the matrix equation below;
Y1
Y2
Y3
 =

α1
α2
α3
+

0 0 0
β21 0 0
β31 β32 0


Y1
Y2
Y3
+

γ11
γ21
γ31
[X1]+

ξ1
ξ2
ξ3
 (7.2.4)
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This produces the reduced general form of the SEM path analytical model in equation
2.5.
Y = BY + ΓX + α+ ξ (7.2.5)
Where Y represents (NY ×1) column vector of endogenous variables, lerneri, eff & zscore,
X is a (NX × 1) column vector of exogenous variables, ecr, lqty & aqlty, B = [βij ] rep-
resenting the matrix of coefficients of endogenous predicting other endogenous variables,
Γ = [γij ] is the coefficients of exogenous matrix to endogenous variable, α = [αi] is column
vector of intercept of endogenous variables, ξ represents (NY × 1) column vector of error
terms of endogenous variables, NY is the number of endogenous variable, Y, while NX is
the number of exogenous variables.
The structure of this path analysis model is determined by the nonzero elements in the B
& Γ coefficients matrices. Furthermore, let Φ = [φij ] = V ar(X) and Ψ = [ψij ] = V ar(ξ);
all this determine the model in Figure 7.1, giving four matrices as;
B =

0 0 0
β21 0 0
β31 β32 0
 , Γ =

γ11
γ21
γ31
 , Φ = [σ2X1] , and Ψ =

σ2ξ1 0 0
0 σ2ξ2 0
0 0 σ2ξ3

Notably, one of the merits of path analysis over multiple regression analysis is the po-
tential to estimate the mediating effects among any two variables. Therefore, the direct
and indirect effects in the path diagram of competition, regulation and stability can be esti-
mated. Recall from the foregoing that the coefficient of B matrix was employed to explain
the direct effects (DE) of an endogenous on another endogenous observed variables that
are associated with the two variables. Again, Γ matrix associated with the two variables
defines the structural coefficient of DE of exogenous on endogenous observed variables.
The indirect effect (IE) between two observed variables through particular mediating vari-
ables is then the product of the structural coefficients in the B and/or Γ matrices along
the particular path from the exogenous to the endogenous variables. Therefore, the total
IE between two observed variables is the sum of all particular IE through all possible
mediating variables. The sum of the direct and total indirect effect components between
two observed variables is defined as the total effect (TE). To illustrate from Figure 7.1, let
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TE between X1 → Y3 be c1, IE from X1 → Y1 and Y1 → Y3 be a & b respectively, and
DE from X1 → Y32 be c’. then the TE is
c = c′ + ab
Hence, the DE, IE and TE components of general structural equation model for observed
variables are given as;
The direct effects are
Ed =
[
B Γ
]
, (7.2.6)
the total effects are
Et =
[
(I −B)−1 − I, (I −B)−1Γ
]
, (7.2.7)
and the indirect effects are
Ei = Et − Ed (7.2.8)
The SEM model largely uses the maximum likelihood method for its estimation and relies
on a set of assumptions for implementation. It assumed a large sample size as maximum
likelihood method depends on asymptot, that requires large sample size to obtain reliable
parameter estimates. What constitutes a large sample size has become relative based on
different suggestions by different authors but a general rule of thumb is to have a sample
size of above 200. Although often relaxed, particularly for exogenous variables, the likeli-
hood that is maximised when fitting SEM using the maximum likelihood method is based
on the assumption that the observed variables follow a multivariate normal distribution.
Moreover, a more important assumption is that the model is correctly fitted in that no
relevant variable is omitted from the model equations to stem the risk of bias outcome.
Quite a number of approaches have been put forward for assessing model goodness of fit
which adjudge overall whether the model is acceptable. Available indices are classified
as discrepancy functions - chi square test, relative chi square, and RMSEA; comparative
baseline model - such as the CFI, NFI, TFI, and IFI; information theory measure of good-
ness of fit - such as the AIC, BCC, BIC, and CAIC; and non-centrality fit measures, such
as the NCP. Marsh et al. (1996) suggest the use of a range of fit indices, while Jaccard
1Without mediating effects
2With mediating variables
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and Wan (1996) further recommend the range that is able to consider different classes
of indices especially that some indices are sensitive to sample size. However, indices like
RMSEA, PCLOSE, TFI, among others, are considered critical information indices in SEM
and are often used.
Once found to be fit and stable, the strength of SEM lies in determining the path of
causality in a structure with the ability to simultaneously deal with multiple endogenous
and exogenous variables in addition to the mediating analysis described above.
7.2.2 Data Source and Variable Description
In this study, 440 banks with 3165 observations for the periods 2006 to 2015 from 37 SSA
countries are considered. The nature of data used is consistent with that described in
the previous chapters of this thesis, from the BankScope database compiled Fitch/IBCA
Bureau Van Dijk. The main variables of interest for our proposed model, competition,
regulation and stability nexus in the SSA commercial banks include capital regulation,
liquidity regulation, asset quality regulation, bank level competition, efficiency and stabil-
ity.
Theoretically we expect a direct relationship between regulation and competition, and
competition and stability. Based on competition stability views, we expect an indirect
relationship from competition through efficiency to stability. It then suffices to say that
there is also an expectation of an indirect relationship from regulation to stability via
competition-efficiency relationship. We also hypothesised that a well regulated banking
system with relatively adequate liquid assets, capital and improved asset quality should
result in efficient banks. These underline the direction of our proposed model. The choice
of variables follows previous studies as previously described and in particular the restric-
tion of regulatory variables to capital, liquidity and asset quality is based on data coverage
in the study of SSA countries, besides they also constitute the major pillars of the Basel
Accords.
7.2.3 Summary Statistics and Data Exploratory Analysis
The summary statistics of the data employed in the model is the same as for the compe-
tition, regulation and stability relationship presented in Chapter 6 Table 6.2 providing a
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(a) ecr on lerneri (b) ecr on zscore
(c) lerneri on eff (d) lerneri on zscore
(e) lqty on eff (f) lqty on zscore
(g) aqlty on eff (h) aqlty on zscore
Figure 7.2: Data Two-way Graphs
Author’s Estimation, 2017
brief insight to the nature of the data. The main essence is for data distribution to satisfy
the thresholds for implementing the SEM model. The distribution of the individual data
is also present in the normality test in Appendix B.4 and the histograms in Appendix
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F.1. Overall, the data is normally distributed as confirmed by the Jarque-Bera statistics
in Appendix B.4 validating the use of SEM.
Exploring the theoretical relationship among data hypothesised in Subsection 7.2.2, the
reality observed in Figure 7.2 and Appendix F.2 is quite revealing. While some of the re-
lationships aligned with a-priori expectations, quite a number are in the apposition. The
graph in Figure 7.2(a) shows that the relationship between capital and competition follows
theoretical expectation with competition increasing with capital. Likewise, for capital and
stability, and competition and efficiency in Figure 7.2(b) and (c) respectively. The case
is different with competition and stability in Figure 7.2(d), while theory expects a direct
relationship the reality of data suggests a kind of trade-off relationship. This has been a
subject of debate lately among academics in this field. How this eventually plays out will
largely depend on the outcome of the statistical modelling.
7.3 Estimation Results
Once the model is found to be fit, the expectation is a structural bank model where
regulation, competition, efficiency and stability simultaneously interplay to determine the
well-being of the banking system. This suggests that none of the variables can be treated
in isolation as decision made on one will have ripple effects on all the other variables in
the system. We presented a proposed recursive CRS model in Figure 7.1 in Subsection
7.2.1 for the commercial banking system of the SSA region. The estimated version of
this model as shown in Figure 7.3 below, for the purpose of SEM contains six observed
variables consisting three observed exogenous variables, ECR, LQTY and AQLTY, as
well as three observed endogenous variables, LERNERI, EFF and ZSCORE. Observed
exogenous variables are variables with datasets that are determined outside of the model
and for the sake of the banking system, issues of regulations are largely exogenously
handled. These variables have no arrows pointing at them in the model and they are
otherwise known as independent variables. Observed endogenous variables also known
as dependent variables represent variables with datasets that are determined within the
system. The pointed arrows show the directions of causality and the estimates on the
path represent the standard coefficients estimates generated using STATA 13. While we
do not interpret the coefficient in isolation from the results in the previous chapters, as
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in the case of sign inconsistencies, the most powerful method3 prevails, SEM provides an
opportunity to model the banking system as a unit. This is the first application in a study
of this nature to the best of our knowledge and a major contribution to literature.
Table 7.1: Correlation Results
ECR LQTY AQLTY LERNERI EFF ZSCORE
ECR 1.000000 0.312420 −0.021381 −0.176526 −0.065236 0.945292
LQTY 0.312420 1.000000 0.038314 −0.045985 −0.076470 0.255193
AQLTY −0.021381 0.038314 1.000000 0.009755 −0.317865 −0.119063
LERNERI −0.176526 −0.045985 0.009755 1.000000 0.045299 −0.150826
EFF −0.065236 −0.076470 −0.317865 0.045299 1.000000 0.190637
ZSCORE 0.945292 0.255193 −0.119063 −0.150826 0.190637 1.000000
Author’s Computation, 2017, Based on Data Collected from BankScope
Table 7.1 is the correlation matrix showing the degree of association among variables. A
cursory look at the table indicates that the sign of association coefficient is consistent
with the two-way graph explained in Subsection 7.2.3 above. Only capital and stability
show a very strong positive association while others exhibit some varying degree of weak
association. The validity of the model results depend on the fitness of the model. A
Table 7.2: Data Measurement Model Fit
Model fit indicators LR Prob > chi2 RMSEA PCLOSE SRMR CFI TLI
Model measurement 0.817 0.000 1.000 0.002 1.000 1.001
Source: Author’s Estimation, 2017, Based on SEM Global Fitness Criteria
number of model goodness of fit have been proposed in literature for gauging model fitness
as mentioned in Subsection 7.2.1. However, a couple of the indicators as presented in
Table 7.2 are considered fundamental for any SEM fitness because they are adjudged to
be the most informative (Barbara, 2001; Fan, Thompson, & Wang, 1999). In terms of the
psychometric properties, all the data measurement model fit showed acceptable results for
the observed variables examined. The overall model fitness explained by LR chi2 prob
of 0.817 indicating that the model if very fit as null hypothesis requires the prob to be
> 0.05. Moreover, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) often used as
3SEM uses method of maximum likelihood for its estimation.
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a better approach for testing the fitness of large datasets SEM model is found to be 0.000
indicating exact fit or absence of misfit. The rule of thumb is for RMSEA to be < 0.05
for a model to be considered good fit (Brown & Cudeck, 1993; Marais & Andrich, 2007,
among others). PCLOSE is the p-value for testing the null hypothesis that the population
RMSEA is not > 0.05 which is expected to be > 0.50 substantiate the exact fit of our
model as it is 1.000 in our study, a further confirmation of model fitness.
Figure 7.3: CSRE Model
Source: Author’s SEM Estimation Output, 2017
The Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) provides absolute measure of
fit, it is the standardised difference between the predicted correlation and the observed
correlation. Because it is an absolute measure, a value of 0 equals perfect fit but (Hu
& Bentler, 1999) suggest a value < 0.08 as generally considered a good fit. Our results
show SRMR not to be different from 0. Other tests of fitness used are Comparative Fit
Index (CFI) and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI); they are both incremental measures of fits
that examine the discrepancy between the data and the model hypothesised. They range
from 0 to 1, and specifically values > 0.95 are considered very good fit and where greater
they are restricted to 1.
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7.3.1 Interpretation and Discussion of SEM Results
Having been satisfied with model fitness, the proposed CERS model estimates are pre-
sented in Table 7.3 below. The boxes in Figure 7.3 represent either exogenous or endoge-
nous and/or mediating variables. The arrows linking variables in the structural model
depict the direction of causality between variables in the system displaying the standard-
ised coefficients or the standardised regression weights that are also stated in Table 7.3.
The underlying goodness of fit indices confirm a good fit of the structural model to the
data employed. All the variables are observed, in other words, they are variables with
datasets. ECR, LQTY and AQLTY are exogenous regulatory variables while LERNERI
and EFF are endogenous variables that also predict other endogenous variables, ZSCORE.
All the paths allowed to be fitted by the model fit criteria are found to be statistically
significant with signs and magnitude shown in Table 7.3. Specifically, regulatory variables
are shown to have strong and direct influence on competition, efficiency and stability vari-
ables. The path of the direct influence are; ECR → LERNERI, EFF & ZSCORE;
LQTY → EFF & ZSCORE and AQLTY → EFF & ZSCORE. Likewise, both compe-
tition and efficiency variable have strong and direct influence on stability with LERNERI
directly causing ZSCORE, LERNERI → ZSCORE and EFF causing ZSCORE, EFF →
ZSCORE. Figure 7.3 contains seven mediating paths; ECR→ LERNERI → ZSCORE,
having LERNERI mediating the effects of ECR on ZSCORE; LERNERI → EFF →
ZSCORE, with EFF mediating; and ECR → LERNERI → EFF → ZSCORE, hav-
ing LERNERI and EFF mediating the effects. Others are; ECR→ LERNERI → EFF ,
with LERNERI mediating; ECR→ EFF → ZSCORE, with EFF mediating; LQTY →
EFF → ZSCORE, having EFF mediating; and AQLTY → EFF → ZSCORE, also
with the mediation of EFF. Overall, all effects (total, direct and indirect effects) on the
links among the variables in the CERS model are found to be significant. It therefore
suggests the presence of partial mediation in the structural model. In essence, competi-
tion partially mediates the influence of capital on stability, efficiency partially mediates
the effects of competition on stability with competition-efficiency partially mediating the
effects of capital on stability. This striking result of the SEM model confirms the results
of our models in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of competition-stability view hypothesis in the
commercial banks of SSA region and hence substantiating the reference to competition
and stability as the reasons for capital regulation. This study has also extended extant
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literature by establishing direct and mediating effects among other regulatory variables,
efficiency and stability supporting one of our hypotheses in Subsection 7.2.1. Statistically,
the indirect paths from regulation to stability better explains the fluctuations in the work-
ings of the banking system internal mechanisms utilising competition and efficiency as
mediating variables.
The major conclusion of this study for policy implication is that the mechanism of regula-
tion, competition and stability in the banking systems operates simultaneously substanti-
ating the short-term contemporaneous responses among the variables obtained in Chapter
6. The implication is that change in policies targeted on any of the components affects
the others either instantly or remotely. A further conclusion from the above findings is
on the role of competition-efficiency relationship in mediating the effects of regulation
and stability. As much as regulation directly impacts on stability, the influence becomes
mediated by competition and efficiency, this again point to the stance in literature that
competition may not be the major cause of instability but that its presence may aggravate
it. Moreover, the mediating role of efficiency and stability relationship found in Chapter
5 of this thesis has again been reaffirmed suggesting that competition may not on itself
cause stability unless efficiency is engendered. The policy implications are enormous for
practitioners and regulators alike with further research needed to unbundle how policies
should be crafted to address these issues.
7.4 Summary
The overall essence of this chapter and by extension the study is to propose a model that
will enable policy makers to deal with the issues of competition, regulation and stability
in the banking sector. Based on theories, models and extant empirical literature within
and without this thesis, we fitted a structural equation model to examine the interplay
among competition, efficiency, regulation and stability for the commercial banking sectors
of the SSA region. Having established fitness in the model, the results show all variables
in the structure to be statistically significant. In other words, decisions that affect the
exogenous variables (regulation, competition and efficiency) will have simultaneous corre-
sponding effects on the endogenous variables (competition, efficiency and stability) within
the banking system. Furthermore, mediating effects became apparent in the results hence
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we conclude a strong interrelationship among competition, regulation and stability in the
banking system.
Even though the degree of influence among variables differs, especially for capital reg-
ulation as alluded to in previous chapters of this thesis, we recommend policies should not
consider these issues in isolation but address them holistically, if the banking system is
to function at the optimal capacity that could engender the much anticipated growth and
development in the region. Given the enormous challenge in dealing with the balancing
act expected to optimise the working of these relationships, we recommend a further re-
search work as an offshoot of Chapter 6 to unbundle the management and implementation
process.
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Chapter 8
Summary, Conclusion and
Recommendations
8.1 Summary
This study explored the relationships among competition, regulation and stability in the
commercial banks of the SSA region. The study covered eight chapters divided into three
sections. The first section deals majorly with background to the study; namely, Chapter
1, introduction, and Chapter 2 which is a review of the banking sectors of the study ar-
eas. Next is the second part that contains the body of the thesis where the objectives of
the study were considered. This has five chapters that includes; Chapter 3 – competitive
condition, Chapter 4 – competion and stability, Chapter 5 – competition, efficiency and
stability, and Chapters 6 and 7 – competition, regulation and stability. This chapter con-
stitutes the final section where the entire study is summarised and concluded with key
findings highlighted for policy recommendations.
We motivated for this study in Chapter 1 giving the call to increase the competitive
condition of the banking sector in the region as a means to stem the tides of poverty and
underdevelopment. It became imperative to understand the context of banking competi-
tion and the implications for the stability of the sector and the role that regulation could
play to strike an acceptable balance. We also highlighted some of the contributions of
the study and the significance to academics, regulators, policy makers and practitioners
alike. Chapter 2 generally captures the macroeconomic and financial environments of the
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SSA region. The review reiterated the level of financial development vis-a-vis the major
exposures that banks are faced with in the region.
In Chapter 3 we used the Lerner index to analyse the bank level and market competi-
tive condition of the SSA commercial banks. We took account of the various criticisms
of Lerner index notably that it ignores risk which is fundamental in bank cost and price
measurement that has no single acceptable measure. We noted that even though the argu-
ments may be germane, there have been no acceptable measures to account for the risks,
besides empirical evidences has shown that studies that have adjusted for these issues have
not achieved much remarkable difference from the results of the conventional Lerner index,
thus accounting for its popular use in literature. It may be rather cumbersome attempt-
ing to control for risk in a study like ours with heterogenous panel of countries without
homogenous risk. Moreover, studies of Liu et al. (2013b) found the Lerner to be one of
the two most valid ways of measuring competition hence validating our methodology. We
also modelled the translog cost function to reflect that the core activities of commercial
banking sectors in the SSA region still remain that of intermediation. We further analysed
the drivers of competition in the region.
Chapter 4 explored the competition and stability relationship in the SSA region com-
mercial banks. We reviewed models that argue for and against competition and stability,
expressing that competition may be good and bad for the banking system. We employed
the robust orthogonalised version of the GMM to analyse this relationship. The choice of
methods was motivated by the need to avoid the shortfalls of OLS while accounting for
possible endogeneity issues between competition and stability. We proxy competition with
the Lerner index and stability with the Zscore. Both measures have been used prominently
in this kind of literature and have continued to gain relevance.
In Chapter 5 we factored in efficiency in competition and stability relationship in the
SSA banking sector in line with the arguments of the competition-stability views. This
is hoped to help in crafting a new way of rethinking this relationship by developing an
instrument for competition using SFA. We used the instrument in a regression of compe-
tition against stability. Stability was proxied by the Z-score. Z-score measures the overall
stability of the banking system. Our competition measure is the Lerner index which en-
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ables us to estimate the market power of the 440 banks in our sample over the study
period. The efficiency scores generated from the SFA reveal in actual sense an increase
efficiency in the banking sectors with competition over the periods under review. The SFA
model ensures that technical efficiency is allowed to vary through time and in a different
manner for each bank. Hence we provide evidence consistent with literature that argues
that efficiency is inherent in competition. We found that the instrument of competition
is strictly positive and strongly significant to explain stability of commercial banks in the
SSA region. Therefore we were able to find evidence of transmission from competition
through efficiency to stability.
Chapter 6 investigated the short run relationship among competition, regulation and sta-
bility of commercial banks in the SSA region using P-SVAR. The essence was to establish
the possible transmission channels/mechanism among the variables. Seven bank variables
were considered to capture competition, efficiency, regulation and stability. The same mea-
sures of competition and stability subsist as in the previous chapters. Although theories
and empirical literature have provided conflicting evidence on the relationship between
competition and stability, there is a growing acceptance of the possibility of trade-off in
competition stability relationship. There is also evidence that competition does not nec-
essarily result in fragility in the banking system as some fundamental features of banks
play an important role, and competition may only aggravate the process. Yet there seems
to be no headway as to how the interplays of these outcomes could be managed and/or
moderated to get the best out of the relationship for the economic growth of the host
economies. Our result thus provided insights on how variables interplay in the short-term
with far-reaching policy implications.
Finally, Chapter 7 wrapped up the studies with SEM that captures our core variables
in a system. The overall essence is to propose a model that will enable policy makers
to deal with the issues of competition, regulation and stability in the banking sector.
Based on theories, models and extant empirical literature within and without this the-
sis, we fitted a structural equation model to examine the interplay among competition,
efficiency, regulation and stability for the commercial banking sectors of the SSA region.
Having established fitness in the model, the results show all variables in the structure to be
statistically significant. In other words, decisions that affect the exogenous variables (reg-
235
ulation, competition and efficiency) will have simultaneous corresponding effects on the
endogenous variables (competition, efficiency and stability) within the banking system.
Furthermore, we found competition and efficiency partially mediating the relationship
between regulation and stability.
8.2 Key Findings and Conclusion
Given the above summary, a number of key findings become apparent. To begin with,
the review of the banking sectors of SSA countries’ commercial banks indicated that there
is no immediate threat to bank stability in the region. Most of the banking sectors are
well capitalised, sound, profitable and liquid. In spite of this, various exposures and on-
going vulnerabilities exist in the banking sectors of the region that if unattended to have
the capabilities to result in banking systemic failure. Notable among them is poor as-
sets portfolio arising from high incidence of NPLs. Closely linked to that is the issue of
non-diversification of loan assets with banks loans concentrated in the governments and
their agencies including large individual customers such as oil and gas firms/industry.
Most obligations are denominated in foreign currencies; this could spell disaster with any
sudden surge in exchange rates. The review also spotted poor and/or weak institutions
especially legal and judicial systems that are incapable of protecting customers’ rights
including enforcement of loan recovery. Besides, weak contracts enforcements make banks
risk averse limiting business opportunities. Prudential and ways of doing business regu-
lations unable to limit banks’ exposure to net-foreign exchange and rising NPLs. A good
credit assessments framework is also lacking which in a competitive banking environment
meant poor loan appraisal processes with attendant poor asset portfolio. These and many
more were found to remain forces to contend with in most of the various banking sectors.
Objective one tested the competitive condition of the SSA region’s commercial banking
sector and explored some of the factors influencing competition in the region. We found
monopolistic competitive condition in the banking sectors of the region. All the coun-
tries considered have the trait of this form of competition. We further found bank size,
capital and performance as constituting the major factors that are driving competition in
the banking sectors of the region. A monopolistic competitive banking market presumes
some level of welfare and/or efficiency in terms of operational costs, bank charges, lend-
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ing rates, among others. The present realities proved otherwise. Perhaps this might be
due to the nature of the banking sectors that compete for few large company’s deposits
and government funds with the bulk of the real sector lacking access to finance. This
competitive environment has to be harnessed by government and regulators alike to make
banks services better inclusive for economic growth by considering a number of policies.
Government should ensure that their central/reserve banks serve their traditional role of
being their bankers. This will compel banks to rethink their strategies and better focus
on competing for the real’s sector financial intermediation services. Such competition
will effectively drive down costs and rates as managers are forced out of their shelves to
innovate products at lesser cost to gain competitive advantage. A further policy issue
may be to provide incentives to banks, such as reduction in corporate income tax and
some related moratorium, provide financial and social infrastructure that will break the
barriers of access making banks to reach areas that may be considered originally unprof-
itable. While competition in its current state should be encouraged and improved upon,
this study highlighted some banks’ specific factors that drives competition which could be
tinkered with.
Objective two investigated the relationship between competition and stability. The study
found competition to engender stability in the banking sector of the SSA region provided
it is efficient without which fragility occurs. This established a transmission mechanism
from competition to stability via efficiency. Hence, we found that competition brings
about efficiency and thus stability of the banking system. This is after the study had
found competition-fragility view relationship between competition and stability in the
banking sector of the region, and outlined the credit and overall risks measures that ac-
count for some of the fragilities. The culmination of these results clearly reiterates the
suggested trade-off relationship between competition and stability and this is a point that
policy makers must take very seriously. In other words, while competition is desired, there
has to be a cut-off point without which the gains turn to be a curse for the sector and
systemic stability as a whole. A framework must be developed similar to the credit score
models in the banking system that is able to gauge the level of banking competition that is
considered to be healthy for the continuing efficiency of the bank and the overall system as
a whole. That way the gains of competition can be sustained without necessarily invoking
the demerits.
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Objective 3 dealt with the interplay among competition, regulation and stability in the
banking system of the SSA region with particular interest on how regulation shapes com-
petition, stability and their relationship. Hence assessed the role of regulation in ensuring
competition and stability at the same time. This was implemented using near- and long-
time analysis. For the near-term analysis, we found that regulation variables employed
(capital, liquidity and asset quality) to influence the stability of banks in the near term
with no significant impact on competition. Specifically, variation in capital regulation
is found to have the largest impact on the stability of the banking sector of the region.
Within the next twenty-four quarters, stability will continually decline with any infrac-
tion in capital of the banking sector of the region. In addition, we found these regulation
variables impacting on efficiency in the near-term as well. Modelling these relationships
in the long run, the study found regulation to have direct effects both on competition and
stability and an indirect effect between regulation and stability with competition being
the mediating variable. Again, this established a transmitting effect from regulation to
stability with competition partially mediating the relationship. This informed the study’s
proposed competition-regulation-stability (CRS) model.
The implications of the foregoing results are that regulators do not have to worry about
competition in the short-term but concentrate on maintaining stability in the system as
the impact of regulatory policies will only become much more visible in the long-term.
Notably, the impulse-response function provided insight on the management of stability
in this regard. However, much could be done to ensure ongoing sustainable regulations
in terms of capital, liquidity and asset quality in this banking sector. One major solution
to ensuring a resilient banking sector with all time adequate capital is to strengthen both
the prudential and ways of doing business guidelines. Regulators must intensify efforts at
subscribing to the Basel Accord which encapsulates strategies on how to better enhance
the three regulatory variables employed and with one of the major pillars dwelling of cap-
ital adequacy. This study noted that about 70% of the banking sectors of the region are
yet to implement Basel II let alone Basel III that have come to effects since 2010. This
way capital can be maintained and issues of stability largely solved. Liquidity and asset
quality are closely tied as poor quality of loan portfolio will reduce the liquid assets of
banks with attendant impacts on capital hence stability issues may arise. Again, the Basel
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Accord could offer most of the solutions required if the provisions are religiously imple-
mented. Concentration of assets in large individual borrowers and exposure to foreign
exchange must be addressed. Asset portfolios must be diversified and perhaps regulations
to restrict the percentage of total deposits that can be given as loan to an individual
bank customer must be enacted and where in place strengthened. This will reduce the
ongoing vulnerability faced by the system. Supervisory and corporate governance aspect
of regulation must be strengthened and/or put in place where nonexistent. A risk-based
deposit insurance that compel banks to be more proactive is encouraged as most of the
sectors also do not have deposit insurance in place.
Methodologically, we employed three unique methods, SFA, P-SVAR and SEM that are
major contributions to literature. Although, SFA may have been used in literature in
this area, we have for the first time employed it in a new way to measure the amount
of efficiency that is associated with competition. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first study that has done this. P-SVAR that accounts for the curse of dimensional-
ity in PVAR arising from the imposition of Cholseki decomposition by using structural
restriction in panel VAR in cases like ours was employed for the first time in this field.
Pooling together the strengths of both PVAR and SVAR while avoiding their shortcom-
ings, the imposed structure decomposition was strong enough to handle econometric issues
like cross-sectional dependence, etc., that may arise. Moreover, the P-SVAR which was
built on the same principles of PVAR enabled us to analyse how past banking tendencies
in the region have created what the sector now faces and how the sector should expect
the status quo to evolve in the future of banking in the region in the area of competition,
regulation and stability. This provides facts over which regulators and policy makers alike
could ruminate on to create alternative scenarios and formulate policy decisions. The
method proved valuable in measuring the contemporaneous relationship among variables
thereby recovering interesting pattern of the behaviour of the variables in the structural
model. We also employed SEM for the first time in this study area that simultaneously
captured model variables in a structure. This made it possible to measure both direct,
indirect and total effects of relationships with the direction of causality clearly indicated.
From the results of our analysis of the various objectives considered in this study we
arrive at some far-reaching conclusions. The banking market of the SSA region’s commer-
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cial banks was found to be competitive given that the index of market power indicates
a monopolistic competition. We found competition to be significantly related to stabil-
ity in the banking sector of the region. Specifically, our result is consistent with the
competition-fragility view, implying that competition breeds instability. However, consid-
ering the effects of efficiency that is associated with competition in competition-stability
relation, we found competition to positively influence efficiency in the region hence lead-
ing to the stability of the banking system, hence competition-stability view, upholding
the assertion that competition may be good or bad for the banking system. Furthermore,
we found direct effects of bank regulations (capital, liquidity and asset quality) on bank
efficiency and bank stability respectively in the short term. There is also evidence of short
run direct effects of competition and/or market power on efficiency as well as reverse
causality between market power and efficiency of banks. Our results do not suggest any
short term relationship between the competition measure and any of the regulatory mea-
sures adopted in this study and stability as well since non of these respond significantly
in the short run to shocks in their residuals. Finally, the result of the structural equation
modelling provides evidence of a simultaneous reaction of competition, regulation and sta-
bility variables in the banking system with competition and stability partially mediating
the influence of regulation on stability. Based on these findings, we found evidence to
conclude that, the commercial banking system of SSA region is competitive. However,
competition is detrimental to stability unless it is able to engender efficiency. We also
conclude that competition, regulation and stability within the banking system respond
contemporaneously in the short run to one another and simultaneously in the long run.
8.3 Recommendations
In addition to the foregoing, some other recommendations based on the findings this study
are made as follows.
This study recommends that while the antitrust agency still needs to concentrate more
efforts at devolving the market powers that reside in the individual banks, it must con-
tinuously maintain and improve on the current market competition, fiscal and monetary
policies must be harnessed to take advantage of the subsisting competitiveness of the re-
gion banking sector to cash in on the much needed economic growth.
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Based on the conclusion, we recommend caution in the way policies are directed towards
increasing competition further in the region. The preoccupation of competition policies
in the region should be to maximise competition. Competition policy and bank regula-
tion should not be crafted in isolation, since there is no perfect regulation, it must be
complemented by competition policy. Regulation must take consideration of the force
of competition and the level of market power and/or concentration to be allowed, which
should be made temporary and reviewed from time to time.
Tied to the foregoing, this study’s results presuppose that driving and maintaining a
sustainable banking competition in SSA region is most fundamental and a welcome devel-
opment. The challenge, however, lies in optimising competition to achieve the desirable
goal of ensuring the dynamic efficiency of the banking sector that would engender stability,
and consequently, economic growth. Of utmost importance, will be the need to strengthen
the various antitrust agencies and, ensuring strict adherence to various banking regulations
that address issues of competition including monitoring and developing new ones where
necessary. Efforts must also be made to come up with complementary monetary and fiscal
policies to sustain and improve on current gains. Regulators and watchdogs must also be
alive to their responsibilities.
As regulation, especially capital and efficiency have become the cardinal variables for
short term moderation for bank stability in the banking system and especially in the SSA
region’s commercial banking system as revealed by this study results, practitioners and
regulators alike must ensure regulatory capital are sustained at all time. Rather than
fine tuning competition as the supposed cause of instability in the banking sectors, atten-
tion should be directed to managing other fundamentals like moral hazards, information
asymmetry and adverse selection among others, in order to complement the impact of
regulation and competition in engendering efficiency and therefore stability. Furthermore,
regulation on the level of capital base should be tied to the intensity of competition just as
the formulation of optimal regulation must take into account the degree of competition.
Banking reviews in Chapter 2 reveal that most of the banking sectors maintain a con-
servative lending process that limits access to finance to few firms. This study therefore
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recommends a proactive approach to liberalise this process and provide a form of guaran-
tee scheme that will enable banks more ambience in granting loan without watering down
the credit process. One way will be to expedite processes to establish deposit insurance
that is absent in most of the banking sectors.
Even though the degree of influence among variables differs, especially for capital regula-
tion as alluded to in previous chapters of this thesis, we recommend that policies should
not only consider these issues in isolation but address them holistically, if the banking
system is to function at the optimal capacity that could engender the much anticipated
growth and development in the region. Given the enormous challenge in dealing with
the balancing act expected to optimise the working of these relationship we recommend
a further research work as an offshoot of Chapter 6 to unbundle the management and
implementation process.
8.4 Limitations of the Study
Every research work has its impediments and so is this study. The major constraint was
data limitation across SSA countries and particularly in their banking sectors. Other as-
pects of regulations such as conduct of business regulation, etc., which would have added
to the robustness of the study could not be considered because the data are not avail-
able. Data collected are predominantly bank profile data from the financial statement.
Financial statements no doubt are internationally acclaimed sources of research data; they
are however limited by different assumptions taking in their preparation and accordingly
across countries with their attendant impacts on some of the variables employed. Differ-
ences in national standards as well pose some limitation especially as most countries are
yet to adopt the uniform international financial reporting standards which impact on the
banks’ financial statements.
8.5 Further Research Area
Research in this area should be ongoing and our exposure from this study draws our at-
tention to other areas that need to be covered. Further studies capturing other aspects of
bank regulation such as those dealing with conduct of business are desirable for a more
holistic assessment. In addition, further analysis of the impact of fiscal and monetary
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policies on competition and stability need some investigation. It is also desirable to inves-
tigate the possibility of determining a cut-off point for banking competition in the region
without which the gains turn to be a curse for the sector and systemic stability as whole.
There have been much talk about concentration within the banking sectors of the SSA
region. Hence studies considering mergers and acquisitions (M & As) and their impact on
competition are encouraged. In addition, how the new developments in the SSA banking
sectors, especially mobile banking, affect competition and the challenges they pose for
stability and regulation are worth looking into.
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Appendix A
Country Review Summary
Table A.1: Sample Countries Macroeconomics and Financial System Summary
Regional
or Eco-
nomic
Affiliation
Countries Financial
depth
Concentration Capital profitability Liquidity NPLs Population GDP Inflation
rate
Poverty
level
Economic class Resources Vulnerability
CEMAC Cameroon, Chad,
Equitorial Guinea,
Gabon
shallow–
underdeveloped
3/70-80% 2.8–11.7% 0.8–1.2% 20–35% 9.7–20% 1.2–
24.4million
-1.1–6.9% 0.6–11.7% 33–47% low income–
upper middle
icome
oil & gas,
agric
external shocks,
terrorism, politi-
cal unrest
EAC Djibouti, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda
shallow–
developed
1-6/50-85% 18.9–
23.2%
1.7–3.7% 20–44.2% 4.8–22% 13–
103.4million
4.9–10.8% 2.5–36.4% 19.3–
67.9%
low income–
lower middle
income
mineral,
agric,
tourism
external shocks,
weak infrastruc-
ture and gover-
nance
ECOWAS Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Liberia,
Nigeria, Sierra
Leone
small–
developed
3-5/45.6–75% 16–17.5% 0.5–2.5% 10.5–
53.3%
5.2–40% 2–186million -1.7–7.5% 6.3–18% 24.2–70% low income–
lower middle
income
oil & gas,
agric,
minerals,
tourism
external shocks
political urest,
ebola, terrorsm
SADC Angola, Botswana,
Lesotho, Malawi,
Mauritius, Mozam-
bique, Namibia,
Seychelles, Swazi-
land, Zambia
small–well-
developed
3-5/56.5-90% 8–24.4% 1.1–4.6% 12.5–
28.1%
2–9.3% 0.09–
25.9million
0.5–6.5% -0.5–25.5% 28.7–
60.5%
low income–
upper middle
income
mineral,
tourism,
oil
external shocks,
HIV/AIDS,
drought
WAEMU Benin, Burkina
Faso, CAR, Coˆte
d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali,
Senegal, Togo
small–
underdeveloped
3-4/50-98% 11.3–
12.9%
0.9–1.9% 27.6–
33.6%
14.4–
17.6%
1.8–
23.7million
4-8.5% 0.3–3% 40–76% low incomea subsistent
agric,
mining,
forestry
external shocks,
political un-
rest, corruption,
ebola
Source: Author’s Review, AFDB, CIA-World Factbook, IMF and World Bank.
Review covers the period of this study.
Concentration is the proportion of banking sectors total assets held by largest banks.
Profitability by return on assets.
Financial depth is the level of development of the financial and banking systems.
aExcept Coˆte d’Ivoire that is lower-middle income.
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Appendix B
Diagnostics Test
B.1 Levels Unit Root
Table B.1: IPS, LLC and ADF Unit Root Test
IPS LLC ADF
statistics p-value statistics p-value statistics p-value
ECR -5.44164 0.0000 -33.1423 0.0000 791.553 0.0000
LQTY -9.69417 0.0000 -26.8801 0.0000 947.605 0.0000
AQLTY -9.40409 0.0000 -79.2647 0.0000 832.255 0.0000
LERNERI -8.72906 0.0000 -90.1484 0.0000 791.448 0.0000
IRS -4.35749 0.0000 -23.4108 0.0000 745.239 0.0000
EFF -3.3514 0.0004 -16.7139 0.0000 736.259 0.0000
ZSCORE -4.08961 0.0000 -17.896 0.0000 759.189 0.0000
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B.2 P-SVAR Lag length Selection
Table B.2: Lag Length Selection Criteria
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
Endogenous variables: ECR LQATDSTF AQLTY LERNERI IRS PBTARATIO ZSCORE
Exogenous variables: C
Date: 01/14/17 Time: 15:08
Sample: 2006Q1 2015Q4
Included observations: 8616
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 37007.05 NA 4.39e-13 -8.588685 -8.582948 -8.586729
1 96299.30 118474.4 4.68e-19 -22.34060 -22.29470 -22.32495
2 96386.83 174.7456 4.64e-19 -22.34954 -22.26349 -22.32020
3 96486.74 199.3086 4.58e-19 -22.36136 -22.23515 -22.31832
4 96602.49 230.7264 4.51e-19 -22.37685 -22.21048 -22.32012
5 98766.75 4310.433 2.76e-19* -22.86786* -22.66133* -22.79743*
6 98801.25 68.65684 2.77e-19 -22.86450 -22.61781 -22.78037
7 98839.49 76.03393 2.78e-19 -22.86200 -22.57515 -22.76418
8 98882.60 85.65135* 2.78e-19 -22.86063 -22.53362 -22.74912
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
FPE: Final prediction error
AIC: Akaike information criterion
SC: Schwarz information criterion
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
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B.3 Serial Correlation
Table B.3: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h
Date: 03/16/17 Time: 16:59
Sample: 2006Q1 2015Q4
Included observations: 9870
Lags LM-Stat Prob
1 45.21092 0.6275
2 30.90877 0.9797
3 29.86301 0.9859
4 2768.030 0.0000
5 59.70867 0.1405
Probs from chi-square with 49 df.
B.4 Normality Test
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B.5 Heteroskedasticity Tests
Table B.5: VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms
Joint test: Included observations: 9870
Chi-sq df Prob.
35870.81 1960 0.0000
Individual components:
Dependent R-squared F(70,9799) Prob. Chi-sq(70) Prob.
res1*res1 0.165564 27.77514 0.0000 1634.115 0.0000
res2*res2 0.073524 11.10914 0.0000 725.6845 0.0000
res3*res3 0.058240 8.657006 0.0000 574.8324 0.0000
res4*res4 0.059799 8.903354 0.0000 590.2119 0.0000
res5*res5 0.176762 30.05705 0.0000 1744.638 0.0000
res6*res6 0.066450 9.964167 0.0000 655.8613 0.0000
res7*res7 0.112892 17.81429 0.0000 1114.240 0.0000
res2*res1 0.087245 13.38036 0.0000 861.1043 0.0000
res3*res1 0.057445 8.531613 0.0000 566.9845 0.0000
res3*res2 0.118531 18.82384 0.0000 1169.900 0.0000
res4*res1 0.072119 10.88025 0.0000 711.8112 0.0000
res4*res2 0.041349 6.037927 0.0000 408.1143 0.0000
res4*res3 0.110282 17.35143 0.0000 1088.482 0.0000
res5*res1 0.107252 16.81740 0.0000 1058.574 0.0000
res5*res2 0.268333 51.33866 0.0000 2648.448 0.0000
res5*res3 0.035554 5.160472 0.0000 350.9142 0.0000
res5*res4 0.123811 19.78084 0.0000 1222.013 0.0000
res6*res1 0.054677 8.096722 0.0000 539.6632 0.0000
res6*res2 0.243638 45.09190 0.0000 2404.705 0.0000
res6*res3 0.033762 4.891387 0.0000 333.2341 0.0000
res6*res4 0.059336 8.830065 0.0000 585.6418 0.0000
res6*res5 0.118407 18.80151 0.0000 1168.676 0.0000
res7*res1 0.146840 24.09340 0.0000 1449.312 0.0000
res7*res2 0.066919 10.03952 0.0000 660.4894 0.0000
res7*res3 0.051528 7.605124 0.0000 508.5856 0.0000
res7*res4 0.060156 8.959974 0.0000 593.7395 0.0000
res7*res5 0.069157 10.40026 0.0000 682.5809 0.0000
res7*res6 0.057003 8.461896 0.0000 562.6154 0.0000
Sources: Eviews output
250
B.6 Heteroskedasticity Tests
Table B.6: VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: Includes Cross Terms
Joint test:
Chi-sq df Prob.
118843.4 10388 0.000
Individual components:
Dependent R-squared F(371,9498) Prob. Chi-sq(371) Prob.
res1*res1 0.469813 22.68577 0.0000 4637.051 0.0000
res2*res2 0.313331 11.68194 0.0000 3092.58 0.0000
res3*res3 0.301214 11.03545 0.0000 2972.985 0.0000
res4*res4 0.427995 19.15565 0.0000 4224.31 0.0000
res5*res5 0.588548 36.62027 0.0000 5808.972 0.0000
res6*res6 0.259659 8.979038 0.0000 2562.834 0.0000
res7*res7 0.359781 14.38692 0.0000 3551.038 0.0000
res2*res1 0.31379 11.70688 0.0000 3097.112 0.0000
res3*res1 0.249829 8.525926 0.0000 2465.815 0.0000
res3*res2 0.380269 15.7089 0.0000 3753.254 0.0000
res4*res1 0.229815 7.639075 0.0000 2268.271 0.0000
res4*res2 0.287539 10.33225 0.0000 2838.014 0.0000
res4*res3 0.331951 12.7211 0.0000 3276.36 0.0000
res5*res1 0.602038 38.72936 0.0000 5942.114 0.0000
res5*res2 0.638246 45.16825 0.0000 6299.489 0.0000
res5*res3 0.285434 10.22638 0.0000 2817.234 0.0000
res5*res4 0.354198 14.0412 0.0000 3495.931 0.0000
res6*res1 0.22658 7.500051 0.0000 2236.344 0.0000
res6*res2 0.585978 36.23394 0.0000 5783.599 0.0000
res6*res3 0.18968 5.992727 0.0000 1872.146 0.0000
res6*res4 0.303457 11.15343 0.0000 2995.124 0.0000
res6*res5 0.376421 15.45397 0.0000 3715.272 0.0000
res7*res1 0.411847 17.92683 0.0000 4064.928 0.0000
res7*res2 0.278499 9.882002 0.0000 2748.785 0.0000
res7*res3 0.255289 8.776124 0.0000 2519.703 0.0000
res7*res4 0.177204 5.51364 0.0000 1748.999 0.0000
res7*res5 0.48689 24.29288 0.0000 4805.606 0.0000
res7*res6 0.240393 8.101996 0.0000 2372.683 0.0000
Sources: Eviews output
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B.7 P-SVAR Stability Test
Table B.7: VAR Stability Test
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial
Endogenous variables: ECR LQA D STF AQLTY LERNERI IRS EFF SCORE ZSCORE
Exogenous variables: C; Lag specification: 1 5; Date: 02/22/17 Time: 16:38
Root Modulus
0.996483 0.996483
0.982237 0.982237
0.956690 0.956690
0.935582 0.935582
0.922969 0.922969
0.905222 0.905222
0.885821 0.885821
-0.565913 + 0.565038i 0.799703
-0.565913 - 0.565038i 0.799703
0.562555 + 0.567942i 0.799391
0.562555 - 0.567942i 0.799391
0.536567 - 0.544952i 0.764773
0.536567 + 0.544952i 0.764773
-0.544854 - 0.533533i 0.762577
-0.544854 + 0.533533i 0.762577
-0.529484 + 0.547130i 0.761383
-0.529484 - 0.547130i 0.761383
0.556670 - 0.510497i 0.755307
0.556670 + 0.510497i 0.755307
-0.489433 + 0.491865i 0.693885
-0.489433 - 0.491865i 0.693885
0.494690 - 0.482038i 0.690709
0.494690 + 0.482038i 0.690709
-0.421133 + 0.423945i 0.597564
-0.421133 - 0.423945i 0.597564
0.426110 - 0.412440i 0.593023
0.426110 + 0.412440i 0.593023
-0.357522 - 0.360735i 0.507889
-0.357522 + 0.360735i 0.507889
0.360001 - 0.348949i 0.501365
0.360001 + 0.348949i 0.501365
-0.315725 0.315725
0.003877 + 0.313552i 0.313576
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Table B.7: (continued)
Root Modulus
0.003877 - 0.313552i 0.313576
0.307014 0.307014
No root lies outside the unit circle; VAR satisfies the stability condition.
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Appendix C
P-SVAR Estimates
Table C.1: Estimation Results
Structural VAR Estimates
Model: Ae = Bu where E[uu’]=I
Restriction Type: short-run pattern matrix
A =
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
C(1) 1 0 C(9) 0 0 0
0 C(4) 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 C(5) C(7) C(10) 1 C(13) 0
C(2) 0 0 0 0 1 0
C(3) C(6) C(8) C(11) C(12) C(14) 1
B =
C(15) 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 C(16) 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 C(17) 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 C(18) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 C(19) 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 C(20) 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 C(21)
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Table C.2: Estimation Results Cont’d
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C(1) −1.162139 0.055533 −20.92694 0.0000
C(2) −0.076524 0.003022 −25.32461 0.0000
C(3) −20.95516 0.059963 −349.4681 0.0000
C(4) −0.003496 0.001589 −2.200736 0.0278
C(5) 0.012723 0.000719 17.70584 0.0000
C(6) 0.044474 0.010478 4.244662 0.0000
C(7) −0.122468 0.004543 −26.95959 0.0000
C(8) 1.551005 0.066246 23.41297 0.0000
C(9) −0.005307 0.001495 −3.550858 0.0004
C(10) −0.000791 0.000109 −7.257449 0.0000
C(11) −0.004291 0.001537 −2.791554 0.0052
C(12) −0.640858 0.141664 −4.523784 0.0000
C(13) −0.576586 0.013074 −44.10120 0.0000
C(14) −28.37173 0.206486 −137.4024 0.0000
C(15) 0.021762 0.000155 140.4991 0.0000
C(16) 0.120063 0.000855 140.4991 0.0000
C(17) 0.019378 0.000138 140.4991 0.0000
C(18) 0.808594 0.005755 140.4991 0.0000
C(19) 0.008746 6.22E − 05 140.4991 0.0000
C(20) 0.006533 4.65E − 05 140.4991 0.0000
C(21) 0.123085 0.000876 140.4991 0.0000
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Table C.3: Estimation Results Cont’d
Log likelihood 118793.4
LR test for over-identification:
Chi-square(7) 3790.699 Probability 0.0000
Estimated A matrix:
1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
−1.162139 1.000000 0.000000 −0.005307 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 −0.003496 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.012723 −0.122468 −0.000791 1.000000 −0.576586 0.000000
−0.076524 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 0.000000
−20.95516 0.044474 1.551005 −0.004291 −0.640858 −28.37173 1.000000
Estimated B matrix:
0.021762 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.120063 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000 0.019378 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.808594 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.008746 0.000000 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.006533 0.000000
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.123085
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Appendix D
Response to Structural one S.D.
Innovation ± 2 S.E.
Figure D.1: Structural Innovation
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Appendix E
P-SVAR Variance Decomposition
E.1 Variance Decomposition of Capital
Table E.1: Variance Decomposition of ECR
Period S.E. Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index Interest Rate Spread Efficiency Stability
1 0.021762 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
2 0.030227 99.99293 0.001794 0.002170 0.000566 8.77E − 05 0.001914 0.000536
3 0.036370 99.97787 0.005595 0.006764 0.001876 0.000306 0.005918 0.001668
4 0.041273 99.95617 0.011035 0.013340 0.003925 0.000668 0.011578 0.003279
5 0.045039 99.65804 0.174962 0.073565 0.005488 0.028798 0.023581 0.035569
6 0.048212 99.45050 0.286255 0.125603 0.005473 0.047561 0.029237 0.055372
7 0.050926 99.29409 0.367512 0.172803 0.004981 0.060885 0.031541 0.068185
8 0.053275 99.16903 0.430126 0.216725 0.004594 0.070758 0.032001 0.076763
9 0.055358 99.14669 0.433238 0.236731 0.006170 0.072249 0.029806 0.075114
10 0.057199 99.12980 0.432901 0.253976 0.008315 0.072799 0.027996 0.074212
11 0.058834 99.11689 0.430269 0.268771 0.011033 0.072721 0.026487 0.073828
12 0.060292 99.10694 0.426108 0.281371 0.014323 0.072222 0.025226 0.073811
13 0.061591 99.08763 0.426439 0.296018 0.017421 0.072111 0.024256 0.076125
14 0.062755 99.06944 0.426075 0.309893 0.021366 0.071857 0.023386 0.077987
15 0.063801 99.05186 0.425253 0.323068 0.026181 0.071504 0.022625 0.079507
16 0.064742 99.03454 0.424141 0.335604 0.031883 0.071085 0.021982 0.080766
17 0.065593 99.01939 0.421899 0.346734 0.038739 0.070531 0.021503 0.081206
18 0.066362 99.00463 0.419455 0.356813 0.046358 0.069923 0.021144 0.081674
19 0.067058 98.99016 0.416887 0.365886 0.054738 0.069283 0.020897 0.082154
20 0.067689 98.97586 0.414251 0.373998 0.063872 0.068627 0.020752 0.082637
21 0.068261 98.96129 0.411742 0.381320 0.073694 0.067977 0.020673 0.083306
22 0.068780 98.94650 0.409280 0.387959 0.084321 0.067341 0.020688 0.083909
23 0.069252 98.93142 0.406886 0.393981 0.095746 0.066724 0.020789 0.084458
24 0.069682 98.91596 0.404575 0.399443 0.107962 0.066131 0.020972 0.084960
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E.2 Variance Decomposition of Liquidity
Table E.2: Variance Decomposition of LQATDSTF
Period S.E. Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index Interest Rate Spread Efficiency Stability
1 0.122772 4.243349 95.63448 3.36E − 34 0.122170 4.45E − 37 4.50E − 32 2.13E − 34
2 0.167375 4.260891 95.58084 0.005487 0.139578 1.82E − 05 0.012459 0.000727
3 0.197844 4.279196 95.50363 0.017334 0.157931 7.04E − 05 0.039532 0.002309
4 0.220739 4.298169 95.40601 0.034615 0.177139 0.000169 0.079264 0.004635
5 0.231419 4.630365 95.01799 0.052354 0.161338 0.035171 0.072161 0.030626
6 0.239961 4.920460 94.67455 0.072724 0.150181 0.066654 0.069021 0.046415
7 0.246866 5.180337 94.35915 0.094901 0.142942 0.096186 0.070461 0.056022
8 0.252493 5.416644 94.06321 0.118169 0.139250 0.124635 0.076347 0.061743
9 0.257977 5.579098 93.85135 0.134520 0.133552 0.135467 0.106453 0.059559
10 0.262580 5.726213 93.65041 0.151211 0.129031 0.145235 0.139948 0.057952
11 0.266463 5.860168 93.45951 0.167975 0.125389 0.154158 0.176022 0.056772
12 0.269753 5.982561 93.27819 0.184600 0.122418 0.162385 0.213931 0.055914
13 0.272418 6.105292 93.09266 0.205967 0.120586 0.172538 0.245973 0.056980
14 0.274677 6.218526 92.91559 0.227108 0.119535 0.182575 0.279015 0.057652
15 0.276596 6.322932 92.74705 0.247787 0.119234 0.192497 0.312451 0.058046
16 0.278231 6.419105 92.58710 0.267817 0.119660 0.202303 0.345773 0.058245
17 0.279644 6.505452 92.44027 0.284664 0.119759 0.211598 0.380355 0.057899
18 0.280856 6.584738 92.30254 0.300381 0.120230 0.220615 0.413890 0.057606
19 0.281898 6.657475 92.17363 0.314965 0.121037 0.229370 0.446172 0.057356
20 0.282796 6.724136 92.05322 0.328430 0.122149 0.237874 0.477049 0.057138
21 0.283569 6.785648 91.93951 0.341674 0.123996 0.246156 0.505956 0.057056
22 0.284238 6.841864 91.83337 0.353993 0.126211 0.254249 0.533350 0.056958
23 0.284817 6.893164 91.73448 0.365408 0.128773 0.262155 0.559165 0.056852
24 0.285319 6.939906 91.64249 0.375952 0.131664 0.269872 0.583368 0.056744
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E.3 Variance Decomposition of Asset Quality
Table E.3: Variance Decomposition of AQLTY
Period S.E. Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index Interest Rate Spread Efficiency Stability
1 0.019383 0.002081 0.046905 99.95095 5.99E − 05 1.93E − 38 2.76E − 35 1.31E − 37
2 0.026360 0.001277 0.060695 99.92723 0.000309 0.003454 0.005754 0.001279
3 0.031083 0.000959 0.075847 99.88875 0.000752 0.011474 0.018172 0.004043
4 0.034598 0.001160 0.092124 99.83690 0.001413 0.024046 0.036280 0.008078
5 0.035420 0.004109 0.092397 99.80536 0.004515 0.034009 0.036623 0.022989
6 0.035981 0.010665 0.092769 99.77470 0.007877 0.045106 0.036149 0.032734
7 0.036359 0.021886 0.093016 99.74195 0.011512 0.057096 0.035457 0.039080
8 0.036607 0.038673 0.093061 99.70494 0.015407 0.069718 0.035079 0.043121
9 0.037034 0.046664 0.097212 99.67322 0.018024 0.086960 0.034969 0.042949
10 0.037394 0.054100 0.102469 99.63699 0.020765 0.106898 0.035533 0.043240
11 0.037701 0.060772 0.108795 99.59663 0.023636 0.129380 0.036844 0.043947
12 0.037967 0.066535 0.116171 99.55242 0.026638 0.154244 0.038967 0.045025
13 0.038123 0.075757 0.121025 99.50541 0.030414 0.179147 0.040360 0.047882
14 0.038243 0.085796 0.125396 99.45807 0.034440 0.204561 0.041498 0.050237
15 0.038334 0.096697 0.129233 99.41059 0.038695 0.230241 0.042374 0.052171
16 0.038403 0.108517 0.132513 99.36311 0.043157 0.255958 0.042996 0.053751
17 0.038468 0.119215 0.136255 99.31636 0.047556 0.282391 0.043644 0.054579
18 0.038523 0.129805 0.139918 99.26934 0.052042 0.309214 0.044281 0.055398
19 0.038570 0.140173 0.143526 99.22226 0.056605 0.336319 0.044912 0.056202
20 0.038611 0.150214 0.147101 99.17530 0.061239 0.363616 0.045544 0.056987
21 0.038643 0.160554 0.150267 99.12843 0.066020 0.390697 0.046102 0.057929
22 0.038670 0.170806 0.153202 99.08225 0.070906 0.417490 0.046584 0.058765
23 0.038693 0.180969 0.155903 99.03684 0.075888 0.443902 0.046991 0.059506
24 0.038713 0.191046 0.158369 98.99229 0.080954 0.469848 0.047326 0.060162
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E.4 Variance Decomposition of Lerner Index
Table E.4: Variance Decomposition of LERNERI
Period S.E. Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index Interest Rate Spread Efficiency Stability
1 0.808594 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
2 1.141820 0.000429 2.17E − 06 0.000525 99.99663 1.86E − 05 0.002347 5.18E − 05
3 1.396418 0.001355 9.91E − 06 0.001635 99.98940 5.85E − 05 0.007379 0.000165
4 1.610183 0.002707 2.65E − 05 0.003217 99.97894 0.000116 0.014659 0.000332
5 1.688829 0.002464 0.010870 0.003148 99.94398 0.001629 0.019860 0.018052
6 1.762844 0.002277 0.018527 0.002908 99.92316 0.002864 0.021011 0.029257
7 1.832838 0.002189 0.023995 0.002710 99.91081 0.003888 0.020268 0.036136
8 1.899298 0.002223 0.027932 0.002666 99.90336 0.004749 0.018944 0.040122
9 1.992410 0.002023 0.026899 0.003422 99.90221 0.004559 0.023881 0.037010
10 2.080848 0.001870 0.025942 0.004538 99.89799 0.004414 0.030807 0.034435
11 2.165195 0.001765 0.025068 0.005973 99.89113 0.004303 0.039479 0.032277
12 2.245922 0.001708 0.024281 0.007683 99.88202 0.004216 0.049645 0.030450
13 2.313435 0.002069 0.024434 0.009674 99.87364 0.004419 0.056585 0.029180
14 2.378419 0.002564 0.024564 0.011828 99.86409 0.004590 0.064494 0.027865
15 2.441090 0.003192 0.024687 0.014113 99.85347 0.004736 0.073228 0.026574
16 2.501632 0.003952 0.024813 0.016500 99.84187 0.004863 0.082653 0.025348
17 2.563468 0.004513 0.024660 0.018801 99.82864 0.004870 0.094104 0.024408
18 2.623427 0.005148 0.024527 0.021149 99.81456 0.004882 0.106150 0.023586
19 2.681640 0.005854 0.024415 0.023520 99.79978 0.004898 0.118665 0.022866
20 2.738224 0.006630 0.024326 0.025898 99.78446 0.004915 0.131535 0.022237
21 2.792153 0.007634 0.024351 0.028356 99.76900 0.004971 0.144209 0.021477
22 2.844648 0.008725 0.024404 0.030811 99.75326 0.005020 0.156963 0.020817
23 2.895793 0.009898 0.024485 0.033254 99.73731 0.005064 0.169744 0.020248
24 2.945663 0.011149 0.024592 0.035679 99.72121 0.005103 0.182505 0.019759
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E.5 Variance Decomposition of Interest Rate Spread
Table E.5: Variance Decomposition of IRS
Period S.E. Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index Interest Rate Spread Efficiency Stability
1 0.009962 0.424718 2.195366 5.674827 0.346585 77.06254 14.29596 2.87E − 31
2 0.013926 0.520141 1.897677 5.512281 0.334013 78.06907 13.66606 0.000756
3 0.016871 0.622093 1.642639 5.360766 0.322142 78.97063 13.07935 0.002373
4 0.019283 0.729236 1.425739 5.219649 0.310952 79.77632 12.53340 0.004705
5 0.021038 1.146416 1.258377 4.993837 0.330809 80.25495 11.98066 0.034947
6 0.022587 1.492974 1.113565 4.821707 0.347432 80.69755 11.47813 0.048644
7 0.023978 1.796912 0.993265 4.683300 0.362103 81.09342 11.01725 0.053751
8 0.025240 2.072900 0.896505 4.567905 0.375509 81.44026 10.59258 0.054340
9 0.026428 2.320667 0.822368 4.493330 0.373191 81.75674 10.18348 0.050224
10 0.027525 2.553930 0.769030 4.426835 0.370818 82.02273 9.809191 0.047463
11 0.028544 2.775712 0.733058 4.366578 0.368450 82.24498 9.465400 0.045822
12 0.029496 2.987995 0.711543 4.311312 0.366129 82.42924 9.148664 0.045114
13 0.030381 3.189073 0.699348 4.252761 0.368441 82.58594 8.861315 0.043119
14 0.031213 3.383146 0.697038 4.197859 0.370851 82.71514 8.594089 0.041879
15 0.031997 3.570931 0.702864 4.146313 0.373363 82.81982 8.345371 0.041334
16 0.032738 3.752955 0.715328 4.097874 0.375979 82.90277 8.113680 0.041415
17 0.033443 3.931151 0.734026 4.054683 0.377050 82.96382 7.896195 0.043080
18 0.034111 4.104266 0.756983 4.014392 0.378180 83.00750 7.693596 0.045081
19 0.034747 4.272519 0.783271 3.976726 0.379380 83.03612 7.504625 0.047361
20 0.035351 4.436092 0.812107 3.941449 0.380660 83.05167 7.328149 0.049869
21 0.035927 4.594567 0.842591 3.907555 0.382610 83.05698 7.163587 0.052108
22 0.036477 4.748664 0.874410 3.875534 0.384678 83.05269 7.009454 0.054572
23 0.037001 4.898521 0.907102 3.845261 0.386863 83.04008 6.864955 0.057213
24 0.037503 5.044259 0.940284 3.816619 0.389164 83.02032 6.729362 0.059990
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E.6 Variance Decomposition of Efficiency
Table E.6: Variance Decomposition of EFFSCORE
Period S.E. Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index Interest Rate Spread Efficiency Stability
1 0.006742 6.101375 1.14E − 33 2.24E − 32 2.02E − 34 5.06E − 34 93.89863 3.07E − 31
2 0.009256 6.624173 0.003698 7.30E − 05 0.003781 0.000409 93.36785 1.53E − 05
3 0.011015 7.153219 0.011566 0.000276 0.012531 0.001368 92.82099 4.70E − 05
4 0.012370 7.685921 0.022868 0.000645 0.026200 0.002886 92.26139 9.14E − 05
5 0.013113 7.287125 0.021966 0.881153 0.024996 0.004326 91.77128 0.009155
6 0.013721 6.987500 0.029802 1.633902 0.026349 0.005198 91.30252 0.014724
7 0.014224 6.748697 0.048887 2.304586 0.030105 0.005728 90.84369 0.018310
8 0.014644 6.549961 0.079695 2.917262 0.036139 0.006040 90.39019 0.020715
9 0.015002 6.463449 0.107832 2.982915 0.051370 0.005783 90.36786 0.020786
10 0.015305 6.403195 0.137314 3.022820 0.069758 0.005557 90.34032 0.021035
11 0.015563 6.362647 0.167222 3.043096 0.091388 0.005386 90.30888 0.021380
12 0.015784 6.337248 0.196785 3.048439 0.116330 0.005291 90.27414 0.021762
13 0.015975 6.306230 0.232884 3.136799 0.141457 0.005174 90.15511 0.022344
14 0.016140 6.279927 0.270674 3.224585 0.169290 0.005084 90.02768 0.022764
15 0.016283 6.256940 0.309680 3.311988 0.199689 0.005014 89.89361 0.023078
16 0.016407 6.236244 0.349491 3.399150 0.232502 0.004959 89.75433 0.023326
17 0.016515 6.221815 0.386550 3.452301 0.268746 0.004954 89.64210 0.023540
18 0.016608 6.210143 0.422324 3.497475 0.307435 0.004974 89.53389 0.023758
19 0.016689 6.200733 0.456517 3.535294 0.348488 0.005021 89.42998 0.023970
20 0.016761 6.193195 0.488903 3.566373 0.391819 0.005096 89.33045 0.024169
21 0.016824 6.185965 0.520381 3.599667 0.436915 0.005173 89.22757 0.024332
22 0.016879 6.179445 0.550302 3.630003 0.483952 0.005262 89.12657 0.024467
23 0.016928 6.173424 0.578636 3.657798 0.532804 0.005360 89.02740 0.024583
24 0.016972 6.167736 0.605381 3.683419 0.583340 0.005464 88.92998 0.024684
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E.7 Variance Decomposition of Stability
Table E.7: Variance Decomposition of ZSCORE
Period S.E. Capital Liquidity Asset Quality Lerner Index Interest Rate Spread Efficiency Stability
1 0.551130 83.10672 0.015842 0.268073 0.004342 0.010342 11.60696 4.987722
2 0.765669 83.55284 0.016599 0.226233 0.003462 0.011480 11.51578 4.673607
3 0.921540 83.96311 0.017394 0.191529 0.002778 0.012782 11.42189 4.390524
4 1.046061 84.34058 0.018223 0.163104 0.002261 0.014259 11.32617 4.135404
5 1.124879 84.61344 0.100682 0.321526 0.001969 0.030350 11.30256 3.629470
6 1.190574 84.82975 0.173144 0.469054 0.001800 0.041549 11.20046 3.284241
7 1.246080 85.00349 0.240065 0.610220 0.001887 0.049734 11.05902 3.035581
8 1.293435 85.14309 0.303692 0.746914 0.002325 0.055910 10.89870 2.849366
9 1.336664 85.40411 0.320543 0.758697 0.002442 0.057824 10.68164 2.774746
10 1.374589 85.64353 0.333996 0.767415 0.002554 0.058487 10.48916 2.704859
11 1.408041 85.86462 0.344563 0.773092 0.002665 0.058348 10.31681 2.639902
12 1.437686 86.06973 0.352647 0.775919 0.002776 0.057704 10.16140 2.579824
13 1.463520 86.23284 0.365960 0.798109 0.003325 0.056974 10.03544 2.507348
14 1.486449 86.37875 0.378551 0.821085 0.004046 0.056238 9.915839 2.445495
15 1.506848 86.50928 0.390500 0.844693 0.004953 0.055514 9.802842 2.392216
16 1.525033 86.62596 0.401873 0.868822 0.006062 0.054816 9.696503 2.345965
17 1.541396 86.73821 0.410954 0.886812 0.006971 0.054145 9.593136 2.309773
18 1.556055 86.84185 0.418982 0.902823 0.007986 0.053456 9.497883 2.277022
19 1.569207 86.93775 0.426028 0.916857 0.009111 0.052771 9.410110 2.247373
20 1.581024 87.02667 0.432162 0.928954 0.010347 0.052107 9.329244 2.220520
21 1.591620 87.10728 0.437825 0.940636 0.011929 0.051474 9.255715 2.195145
22 1.601159 87.18114 0.442893 0.951364 0.013675 0.050891 9.187618 2.172422
23 1.609754 87.24874 0.447426 0.961249 0.015590 0.050360 9.124610 2.152024
24 1.617507 87.31053 0.451480 0.970396 0.017677 0.049881 9.066356 2.133677
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